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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In 1978, Government of Pakistan had taken a first step towards the privatization in 
Pakistan when three nationalized industrial units were handed over to their original 
owners. In the mid-eighties, privatization began to receive some consideration.  A 
serious attempt in this regard however, was taken during early 1990s, when the 
government persuaded outright sale of public enterprises, nationalized commercial 
banks and development financial institutions. This study looks into the financial and 
economic consequences of transfer of ownership from public to private in the cement 
industry. The study utilizes the data on twenty cement firms covering 95% of the 
industry over twenty six years (1986 to 2011), comprising of both public and private 
ownership periods.   
 
The study utilizes two different techniques; 1) financial performance evaluation using 
financial ratio analysis such as profitability ratios, operating efficiency ratios, capital 
investment, output, financial insolvency, and dividend pay-out pattern; 2) economic 
performance evaluation using adjusted economic ratios such as public profit and 
profitability and total factor productivity. By using frontier production and cost 
function, firm level cost and technical efficiency and productivity is estimated to 
compare the performance over the years. Total factor productivity is further 
decomposed into technical change and scale component to find out the key sources of 
productivity change. To shed some light on the labour use efficiency, the study 
estimated labour demand function using non-linear least square method. To complete 
the story, an effort was made to estimate competitive conditions in pre- and post 
xiii 
 
deregulation and privatization period using a variety of parametric and non-parametric 
methods.     
It is found that on average, investment spending and output has increased after 
privatization. Margin on sales and other profitability measures show a jump 
immediately after privatization but had been falling recently. Overall, profitability 
levels have suffered due to bad economic and law and order conditions. Public profits 
and profitability has also improved over the years. The decomposition into cost and 
technical efficiency reveals that firm-level cost efficiency has improved in the post 
privatization period. It is also found that firms using dry production process are more 
efficient both technically and cost wise compared to firms using wet process. When 
firms are grouped according to location, the north region firms outperformed the 
south region firms in term of technical as well as cost efficiency. Further, contrary to 
expectations, labour demand function estimates show decreasing labour use 
efficiencies. 
 
For most of the years this study covers, industry was operating under increasing 
returns to scale. The estimates of total productivity reveal that the industry has 
become more productive since 1997, recording 3-4% growth per annum. This growth 
was achieved primarily, due to technical change after significant investment was 
made by the new management in technology upgrades. The contribution of scale 
component was negligible. The evaluation of competitive conditions reveals that the 
industry as a whole has started exercising some market power in the post reforms 
period. By estimating biases in input usage, the study concludes that firms are using 
more labour and capital and less of fuel and material. 
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                                                                                            Introduction 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to discuss the objectives, process and critical 
issues related to change of ownership from public to private sector (privatization). In 
doing so, this chapter will summarize the main findings of the existing literature on 
the issue of privatization and performance of firms in pre- and post privatization 
period. Critical issues not addressed in the available literature are highlighted and a 
summary is provided in term of the way this study has addressed these gaps. In 
subsequent analysis, the thesis will provide the summary of what is included in the 
various chapters to put the detailed analysis of the change in policy and subsequent 
performance of privatized firms into perspective. Last part is comprised of short 
summary of the layout of the study and the contribution of this study towards existing 
empirical literature on the issue of privatization and firms‟ performance.       
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1.1. Introduction 
 
Cement industry in Pakistan has undergone significant changes in recent years as a 
result of deregulation and privatization of state owned firms in 1991-92. The process 
of deregulation started in the early 1980‟s, when the government began encouraging 
private sector investment to supplement the development programme of the state run 
State Cement Corporation of Pakistan (SCCP). Since the mass privatization of 
manufacturing and financial firms, all the cement plants in the public sector have now 
been transferred from SCCP to the private owners. In a new institutional set-up, 
public sector has no share as against to 85% before privatization. Pakistan has become 
5
th
 largest exporter of cement in the world, provides employment to 250,000 workers 
(directly and indirectly), and the “All Pakistan Cement Manufacturers Association” 
(APCMA) estimates the contribution of the industry towards the national kitty in the 
tune of 30 billion Pakistani Rupees (Pak. Rs.). Despite these developments, there are 
some serious allegations of the association forming a cartel and in effect replacing 
state monopoly. The APCMA however, maintains that the members‟ cooperation is 
aimed at adequate and fair supply of cement across the country.  
 
This thesis compares the performance of two different ownerships regimes by using 
simple financial ratios to advanced economic assessment. Post privatization period 
performance is compared with the pre- privatization period. Privatized firms 
performance is also compared with the firms already working under private 
management structure. This provides an interesting case to see how change of 
                                                                                        Chapter 1 
                                                                                            Introduction 
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ownership has affected firms‟ behaviour in term of setting prices, production levels 
and costs.  
 
1.2. Aims and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
Following a lead from the developed countries, a significant number of developing 
countries had implemented the privatization programme since the early 1980s. As a 
result, the ownership of a significant number of industrial units, financial institutions 
and utilities companies had been transferred to private sector worldwide. Broadly 
speaking, the aim of the programme has been to let the market economy function and 
to use the subsidies allocated to loss making public enterprises for the social sector in 
general and poverty reduction particularly. Boubakri et al. (2008) in regard to the 
objectives of privatization stated “primary aim is to reduce the role of the government 
as a dominant actor (stakeholder) in the economy and to favour the emergence of an 
active private sector”.  
 
Research on the success/failure of this change of policy has generated some 
interesting debate on the role of agency problems and the remedy by the change of 
ownerships. Despite of the huge efforts in comparing the performance of firms in pre- 
and post privatization scenarios, conclusions drawn from these studies are still not 
universal. Some early studies suggested performance under private ownership 
superior and supported the positive impact of privatization (some widely cited studies 
supporting this conclusion include: Thompson, 1987, Vickers and Yarrow ,1988, 
Bishop and Kay ,1989, Boardman and Vining ,1989,  Megginson, Nash and van 
                                                                                        Chapter 1 
                                                                                            Introduction 
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Randenburgh ,1994, Galal et al. ,1994, Boycko et al. ,1995, Martin and Parker ,1995, 
Bhaskar and Khan ,1995, Barberis et al. ,1996, Bousoffiane et al. ,1997, Hart et al. 
,1997, Newbery and Pollitt ,1997, Shliefer ,1998, Boubakri and Cosset ,1998,  Scully 
,1998,  Plane ,1999, Claessens and Djankov ,1999, and D‟Souza and Megginson 
,1999). Others, including Fare et al. (1985), Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986), Kay and 
Thompson (1986), Sappington and Stiglitz (1987), Wortzel and Wortzel (1989), 
Tirole (1991), Laffont and Pint (1991), De Fraja (1993), and Willner (1996) support 
public ownership or at least do not consider public ownership as an impediment to the 
efficient operation.  
 
Since 2000, by using relatively longer sample period, some more effort has gone on to 
evaluate the performance of firms in pre- and post privatization. This includes single 
as well as multi countries case studies. Similar to initial studies, literature seems to be 
not conclusive. Authors such as Shirley and Walsh (2000), Saal  and Parker (2000), 
Megginson and Netter (2001), Rossi (2001), Chirwa (2001), Dewenter and Malatesta 
(2001), D‟Souza et al. (2002), Jones and Mygind (2002), Estache et al. (2002), 
Djankov and Murrell (2002), Wei and Varela (2003), Sun and Tong (2003), Cullinane 
and Song (2003), Li and Xu (2004), Chirwa (2004), Brown et al. (2006), Okten 
(2006), and Amess and Roberts (2007) concluded that firms under private 
management performed better. Contrary to this, some studies such as Sall and Parker 
(2001), Saygili and Taymaz (2001) and Wang (2005) concluded differently.  
 
Hence, it could be argued that although there is a vast body of literature on the public-
private efficiency comparison and privatization effect itself, but it lacks the 
conclusiveness. There could be a variety of reasons for this including very short time 
                                                                                        Chapter 1 
                                                                                            Introduction 
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span and sample used in the study, lack of comparable firms operating in a similar 
regulatory and economic environment and finally to greater extent use of 
inappropriate methodologies 
 
Nonetheless, these mixed messages of the success/failure of the privatization 
programmes are adding fuel to uncertainty. One of the consequences of all this is that, 
governments in some developing counties, despite their utmost effort, had been 
unable to sell larger public sector corporations and utility companies. An update of the 
World Bank Group‟s Privatization Database shows that in 2008 privatizations in 
developing countries fell to US$38 billion, down 70 percent from 2007. 
 
Despite Google scholar showing 379,000 documents on the keyword “privatization”, 
there are however, remarkably few studies that looked into ex-post performance of the 
privatized industrial units in Pakistan. This has probably been due to lack of research 
culture and data availability issues. Further, this is also not surprising as Boubakri et 
al. (2008) while reviewing the performance of privatized firms in developing 
countries stated “In spite of the growing importance of the privatization phenomenon 
in developing countries, it is surprising that only a few studies have examined the 
impact of privatization on firm performance in these countries”.  
 
Notable among the studies in the context of Pakistani privatization are the studies by 
Aftab and Khan (1995) and Naqvi and Kemal (1997). Aftab and Khan found that 
private ownership resulted in less labour retrenchment. Contrary to this, Naqvi and 
Kemal concluded that the effect of privatization on efficiency, output and the price 
level was uncertain. But both of these studies lack rigmy and had used mostly 
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financial ratios on selected number of firms. A primary aim of this study is to fill this 
gap and evaluate the effectiveness of change of ownership on the privatized firms‟ 
performance in term of financial performance, efficiency and productivity and test the 
level of competition. 
 
1.2.1. Objectives of the Thesis 
 
This study is the first comprehensive effort to evaluate the performance of the cement 
industry in Pakistan after privatization and broader reforms were introduced in 1990s. 
Broadly speaking, the thesis identifies two clear objectives. 
 
Firstly, the objective of the study is to find out the financial performance of the 
industry and link this with the competitive conditions. The financial health of the 
industry is extremely important to make sure that the industry survives in the long 
run, continue contributing towards economy by paying maximum taxes and is able to 
compete well with international competitors. Abnormal and persistent higher 
profitability however, could be as a result of collusion rather than management 
efficiency. Recently, the APCMA offices had been raided twice by the Federal 
Investigation Agency (FIA) to find out the documentary evidence of cartel 
arrangement without any success. The allegation of manufacturer forming cartel could 
damage the repute of the industry which could jeopardize its long-term survival. By 
estimating the competition indices and linking with the profitability indicators, the 
study objective is to provide useful information to organizations such as the 
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                                                                                            Introduction 
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“Competition Commission of Pakistan”, the “Ministry of Industry”, the “Industrial 
Development Board”, the APCMA, media and the general public.    
 
Secondly, as mentioned above, contrary to hundreds of studies on the issue of 
deregulation and its impact on performance of firms in developed world, there exists a 
serious gap in international literature on this issue for developing countries. One of 
the main objectives of this study is to fill this gap by carrying out a comprehensive 
analysis of qualitative changes, adjustments in input usage, social cost benefit 
analysis, labour use efficiency and productivity and technological developments in 
pre- and post reforms periods.   
  
1.3. Layout of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is comprised of eleven chapters in total. Next chapter („Reforms and 
Cement Industry‟) is concerned with the rationale of privatization and deregulation 
policy, progress, issues and current state of play. This is followed by the discussion on 
the Pakistani cement industry including historical development, institutional set-up, 
pricing and distribution channels, and the technology of production of the cement 
industry.  
 
Chapter 3 („Choice of Performance Indicators‟) provides discussion on the ownership 
structures and performance. The chapter describes the basic questions related to the 
privatization policy, discussion of various performance indicators, competing 
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methodologies, and their suitability for the comparison of two different ownership 
structures.  
 
In chapter 4 („Qualitative Assessment‟), the thesis provides information on the 
qualitative and quantitative adjustments made as a result of change of ownership and 
their impact on the day to day running of the privatized firms and their competitors. 
The chapter sources information by looking at annual reports of the companies, 
interactions with the industry experts, producer association and consumers.  
 
Chapter 5 („Financial Performance‟) is devoted to the analysis of performance based 
upon purely financial indicators and proxies in pre- and post-privatization periods. 
Industry and individual firms‟ performance is assessed with the use of profitability, 
solvency and efficiency ratios. Simple and widely used non-parametric techniques are 
used to see any statistical difference in the value of these ratios in pre- and post 
privatization periods.  
 
In chapter 6 (Social Cost Benefit Analysis‟), the thesis deals with social cost-benefits 
analysis of the privatization policy. The discussion moves from pure private or 
corporate profit and profitability (chapter 5) to public profit or social profit/total 
return to capital and profitability. A link is established between private and social 
profitability and an effort is made to reconcile the difference in private and social 
profitability. Use of social profitability criteria is interesting and appealing given the 
fact that public firms‟ managers were less concerned with private profit and more 
focused on the maximization of social return. Thus by converting private profit to 
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social profit, the study is able to make like for like comparison. This type of 
assessment was carried out in the initial years of post privatization (early and mid 
1990s) in the studies sponsored by the World Bank.     
 
Chapter 7 („Estimation of Efficiency and Productivity‟) is comprised of modelling of 
technology of production. This chapter starts with the discussion of efficiency and 
productivity and then moves to estimation of technical and cost efficiency and total 
factor productivity. The objective of this assessment is to detect the key sources of 
changes in the productivity and efficiency by using parametric and non-parametric 
techniques. The study supplement pure parametric method of efficiency estimation 
with non-parametric linear programming based order-m efficiency techniques. 
Qualification to and explanation for the observed results are provided in this chapter. 
 
Chapter 8 („Decomposition of Total Factor Productivity Change and Input Biases‟) is 
continuation of the previous chapter where the thesis try to find sources of change in 
total factor productivity. Total factor productivity is decomposed into technical 
change and scale component. The study then establishes the substitution of factor 
inputs as a consequence of rising prices of energy and raw material in the post 
deregulation period after withdrawal of subsidies by the government. Returns to scale 
are calculated and interpreted for the overall industry and different ownerships (i.e. 
public, private and privatized) and size classes.   
   
Chapter 9 („Labour Use Efficiency Estimation‟) deals specifically with labour use 
efficiency and wage elasticities. The study models and estimates labour demand 
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function by introducing risks in production process. Labour use efficiency score is 
calculated and interpreted in pre- and post privatization periods. Efficiency scores are 
modelled against a number of economic and company specific factors to detect the 
sources of labour efficiency. 
 
Chapter 10 („Reforms and Competition in the Cement Industry‟) is concerned with 
evaluation of competitive environment in the post reforms period. The chapter starts 
first with some simple indicators of competition such as herfindhal index and 
concentration ratios, and then, moves to more sophisticated statistical techniques. 
Different widely used and popular indices of competition such as , lerner index and 
Boone  are calculated and interpreted in this chapter. The chapter then discusses the 
implication of deviation from perfectively competitive market to monopoly or 
collusive behaviour. 
 
In chapter 11 („Summary and Conclusion‟), the study summarizes the findings, 
implications and limitations of the study with possible areas of improvements and 
extensions. 
 
1.4. Originality and Contribution to Knowledge 
 
The contribution of the thesis to the current field of knowledge can be identified in 
empirical grounds. Firstly, the studies that looked manufacturing sector performance 
and had captured long business cycles include Saygili and Taymaz (2001) [16 years], 
Chirwa (2004) [28 years], Bartel and Harrison (2005) [15 years] and Okten (2006) [17 
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years]. However, my sample period exceeds these studies with the exception of 
Chirwa (2004). Hence, this study provides perspective on the short as well as unique 
long-term effect of change of ownership on the firm behaviour and performance. 
 
Secondly, broadly speaking, studies on the impact of privatisation on the performance 
of firms have used either financial ratios or estimation of efficiency and productivity 
by production and/or cost function. Studies using the first method include: Megginson 
et al. (1994), Villalonga 2000), Harper (2001), Boubakri and Cosset (2002), Jackson 
et al. (2003), Wei et al. (2003), Boubakri et al. (2004), D‟Souzaa et al. (2005), 
Boubakri  et al. (2005), Chen et al. (2006), Mathur and Banchuenvijit (2007), Farinós 
et al. (2007), Naceur et al. (2007), Cook and Uchida (2008), Huanga and Yao (2010), 
Huang and Wang (2011), and Zhang et al. (2012) . Financial ratios methodology is 
simple, intuitive and easy to implement but is less preferable among some applied 
researchers. This is due to being extremely simple, non-parametric nature and partial 
indicator of performance evaluation. Some studies that use advance techniques and 
estimate efficiency and/or productivity and compared firms performance in pre- and 
post reform regimes include: Saal  and Parker (2000a), Rossi (2001),  Sall and Parker 
(200b, 2001), Chirwa (2001), Estache et al. (2002), Jones and Mygind (2002), 
Resende and Faceanha (2002), Cullinane and Song (2003), Li and Xu (2004), Chirwa 
(2004), Tongzon and Heng (2005), Cullinane et al. (2005), Brown et al. (2006), 
Okten (2006), Amess and Roberts (2007), Sall et al. (2007) and Asaftei et al. (2008). 
Some authors such as Galal et al. (1994) used social cost benefit analysis to evaluate 
the impact of reforms on individual firms‟ performance.  
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To my knowledge, the analysis carried out in this thesis is more comprehensive and 
provides a complete picture in term of post reforms empirical performance analysis. 
The analysis starts from simple financial ratios, moves on to social cost benefit 
analysis and then extends to very sophisticated econometric estimation of production 
and cost function, competition indices and labour demand function.  
 
Thirdly, the studies that addressed the issue of privatization/deregulation and firms 
performance since 2000 are either limited to developed countries such as UK with 
relatively stable political system, established property rights and good industrial base, 
BRICS countries (Brazil and countries related to former Russian block) or countries 
relatively at the advanced stage of their economic development (South Korea, 
Argentina, Turkey and Indonesia). Pakistan being underdeveloped, having extremely 
low per capita income, political instability (five times change of government since the 
first phase of the mass privatization programme) provides an interesting setting when 
it comes to analysis of the effect of change of ownership on firms‟ performance. This 
study could provide a nice benchmark for countries similar to Pakistan in term of 
nature of reforms, duration, types and economic development. Parts of the research 
output of this empirical investigation have been already submitted in leading 
academic journals and further submission are likely to be made soon. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Reforms and Cement Industry  
 
  
 
This chapter is concerned with rationale and politics of privatization and deregulation 
policy, progress, issues and current state of play. Subsequent analysis discusses the 
historical development, institutional set-up, market structure, pricing and distribution 
channels, technology of production, conditions of entry, demand and supply 
constraints and vertical integration of the Pakistan cement industry. Last section links 
cement industry activity with macro economy and government investment during the 
analysis period  
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2.1. Deregulation and Privatization in Pakistan 
 
Similar to lot of other countries, Pakistani government used public sector as an engine 
of growth and the provider of employment during 1960s and 1970s. It was believed that 
government should invest in those industries where returns to capital are either low or 
gestation period is long. It was understood that the private sector would hesitate to 
invest in those industries and as a result economy would suffer in the long run. 
However, since the beginning of 1980s, situation, ideology and preferences changed 
and private sector started getting seal of approval as a driver of growth and facilitator of 
employment generation in Pakistan.  
 
Privatization process in Pakistan started after the collapse of socialist system in Russia 
and its former allies as part of the larger economic reforms programme. The 
privatization programme was initiated to revive the struggling industrial sector and 
move towards market economy. The privatization and deregulation programme has 
been going through lot of ups and down ever since it was launched 40 years ago due to 
ideological differences and priorities of different governments. Table 2.1 summarizes 
the major events taking place since a serious effort was made to privatize industrial 
units, banks and utility companies. 
 
 
The programme had also been under a fair bit of criticism. This includes unfair and 
unprofessional valuation of assets, favouritism, undue advantage to local bidders, no 
post privatization follow-ups and wealth accumulation by business tycoons and 
groups. Local business groups using political connections to get more detailed 
information regarding the financial health of the enterprises and outbidding the rival 
                                                                              Chapter 2 
                                                                  Reforms & Cement Industry 
   
 
15 
 
bidders has led to further accumulation of wealth in the hands of few oligarchs.  The 
rise of a business group during the time of allegations of favouritism deserves some 
attention. Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the opposition in the parliament while 
addressing the parliament once summarised the allegation by saying "while one 
brother was selling, other was buying”  
 
Table 2.1: Chronology of the Main Developments in the Privatization Process 
 
 
Despite of these allegations, the programme continued over time and is likely to be 
revived again under the new government of Nawaz Sharif this year. 
  
Period Main Events 
Nov-90 Disinvestment and Denationalization Committee formed to identify enterprises to be 
listed for sale. This committee was also tasked to make recommendations for the mode 
of privatization. 
 
Jan-91 Establishment of Privatization Commission (PC) to initiate and administer the 
privatization process. This involves valuation of enterprises by the independent 
consultants, initiate and executes bidding process, ensure and complete transfer of 
ownership to successful private bidder. 
 
Sep-91 Sale of Allied Bank Limited  to employee group 
Oct-91 Govt reversed earlier decision of selling few selected enterprises and advertised 195 
units for sale (fire sale!) 
 
Nov-92 49 out of 195 units sold successfully to private investors and business groups. 
Remaining units were technically bankrupt and did not attracted interest 
 
1994 Partial sale of PTCL 
2002 United Bank Limited privatization to Abu Dhabi Group (UAE) and Bestway Group 
(UK) after lot of controversy over selling assets to foreigners 
 
Feb-04 Handover of Habib Bank Limited management to Aga Khan Fund for Economic 
Development 
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2.1.1. Rationale of Privatization  
 
 
Contrary to western world, privatization in Pakistan was initiated not on the basis 
solid ideological grounds but rather it was the necessity of the time. By the end of 
1980s, a significant number of firms in the public sector were making losses and as a 
result government fiscal space was getting gradually smaller due to increasing 
subsidies. This could be judged by the fact that by the end of 1987-88, the fiscal 
deficit reached to 8.5% of GDP. By getting rid of these loss making units, it was 
expected that the government would be able to use those subsidies allocated for these 
enterprises previously for the building of physical and social infrastructure
1
. As a 
result of selling public enterprises, it was believed that private owners would address 
the inefficiencies in the production and distribution process by reducing the number of 
political appointees‟ workers and sourcing the inputs from cost effective and reliable 
places
2
. It was also predicted that selling state owned firms to wider private investors 
                                                 
1
 By highlighting the trickle down effect of loss making and inefficient units on financial institutions, 
government finances, and the general public, the Privatization Commission of Pakistan added: “Many 
enterprises were kept afloat solely because of coerced lending from state-owned banks or government 
support via such means as equity injections, loans and bonds, budgetary subsidies, and explicit or 
implicit government guarantees. Such forms of government support were paid for by higher taxes on 
the people, whether they use these goods and services or not”.  
 
2
 The commission set up by the government to privatize the loss making units highlighted the role of 
agency problem by stating “As in many countries, decision makers and senior officials in SOEs often 
used the enterprises to further their vested interests. Staff and managers were often appointed with little 
regard to their appropriateness for the position. Prices for many goods and services were kept 
artificially low. Cross-subsidies and pricing inefficiencies became widespread, with many prices 
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would lead to greater level of competition and broader ownership through equity 
capital.  
    
Considering the above mentioned objectives, the government put forward the 
following rationale of privatization of public enterprises
3
: 
 
1. To reduce mismanagement and overstaffing in the state owned public 
enterprises (SOEs) 
2. To improve production and profits thought to be well below potential 
3. To encourage appropriate and cost effective investment 
 
It was believed that by privatizing of these loss making units, government not only 
would be saving money in the form of reduction in subsidies, it would also send a 
single whereby private sector role in the development of business sector is 
recognized. The desire of the government in this regard was expressed eloquently by 
the Privatization Commission: 
 
“The Government's policy of liberalisation and privatisation is aimed at promoting 
market-based, private sector-led growth. Privatisation would also send a strong signal 
to investors of the Government's faith in the private sector to generate economic 
growth and productive employment”. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
bearing little relation to cost and a few interest groups benefiting from subsidies at the expense of the 
general public”. 
3
 Source: Privatization Commission of Pakistan. 
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2.1.2. Modes of Privatisation 
 
Similar to international practices and depending upon the nature of transaction, 
complexity of operations, strategic importance of entity to be sold, production and 
cost structures and perception about interest in buying the assets, following methods 
had been used by the Privatization Commission in selling of state-owned-enterprises, 
banks and development financial institutions. 
     
1. sale of assets or business through competitive bidding (majority of the 
industrial units in early 1990s were sold by this method) 
2. sale of shares through public auction or tender (known as a strategic sale when 
management transfer is involved) 
3. public offering through a stock exchange usually a minority share (some 
public utilities share were sold by this method) 
4. management or employee buyouts (some industrial units and financial 
institutions were sold using this mode) 
5. lease, management or concession contracts  
6. any other means as may be prescribed. 
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2.1.3. Privatization Process 
 
Similar to other countries who privatized their state-owned enterprises, the 
Commission set up by the government adopted the set internationally recognized 
procedures including identification of asset (enterprise) to be privatized, hiring of 
financial advisors, doing a due diligence, valuation of assets, pre- bid qualification 
assessment, management of bidding process, transfer of ownership and post bid 
matters (see Flow chart 2.1 for detail). Depending on the nature of business and 
complexities, some variations in the procedure had been introduced by the 
Privatization Commission. 
 
 In an effort to make the process fair, the Privatization Commission in its mission 
statement stated: 
 
“The Government is firmly committed to carrying out the privatisation in a fair and 
transparent manner. This includes ensuring a level playing field for existing and 
future entrants, protecting consumer and taxpayer interests, and dealing with public 
employees in a fair manner”.  
 
To ensure that as a result of privatization, market is not to become less competitive, 
the Privatization Commission was tasked through a legal ordinance to apply 
transparency in advertisement, bidding and transfer of ownership. The Commission in 
this regard states: 
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“In addition to specifying advertising requirements to ensure the widest possible 
participation in privatisation, the Ordinance directs the Privatisation Commission to 
advise that monopolies are not created in the privatisation process, to propose or 
strengthen a regulatory framework for independent and fair regulation, and to advise 
on deregulating the economy to the maximum extent possible” 
 
Broadly speaking, following steps had been taken in the privatization process. 
 
1. Identification 
The initial task of the Privatization Commission is to identify the enterprise to be 
privatized considering the objectives and goals mentioned above. An advice is 
normally sought from the relevant ministry regarding issues and implications of 
selling the enterprise to private sector. The proposal forwarded then is to the Cabinet 
Committee on Privatization (CCOP), for a seal of approval as a potential entity for 
privatization. 
   
2. Hiring of a Financial Advisor 
This is one of the important task in getting the procedure right and to achieve best 
possible price of the public asset. The selection of financial advisor is normally 
performed by the transaction manager with the approval of the relevant board. After 
the new legislation in November 2001, the procedure has become more transparent in 
this regard. 
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3. Due Diligence 
The financial advisor carries out the financial due diligence alongside legal and 
technical assessment of the transaction. This involves evaluating the legal issues that 
could arrive during or after the sale, assessing the condition of assets and a careful 
examination of financial accounts of the entity. After completion of these necessary 
tasks, the privatization plan in term of recommendations on restructuring (if needed), 
mode of sale etc. is prepared by the advisor.   
 
4. Valuation of Property 
This step involves putting the price tag on the entity to be privatized. Financial 
advisor or external firm specializing in the valuation of entities carries out the 
valuation and sets the reserve price of the entity using standard methods such as stock 
market valuation, discounted cash flow method or asset valuation at book or market 
value. 
 
6. Pre-Bid and Bid Process 
This step involves seeking the Expressions of Interest (EoI) through advertising in the 
local or international media (both in some large transactions). According to set laws 
passed in 2000, the potential bidder/acquirer must meet some conditions. The 
Commission evaluates the financial strength, source of funds and repute etc. of the 
bidder and upon satisfaction let the successful investor to submit EoI.  Those bidders 
are also provided some important information at this stage i.e. the Request For 
Proposals (RFP) package containing the detailed pre-qualification criteria, 
instructions to bidders, draft sale agreement, and other relevant documents. 
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7. Post-Bid Matters 
 
Sealed bids are opened in the presence of bidders and highest bidder is identified. The 
Privatization Commission then makes the recommendations to the CCOP as to 
whether or not to accept the bid. Depending upon reserve price, the Commission has 
the authority to accept a bid even if it is lower compared to pre- determined price. 
Upon approving the price and the bidder, a letter of intent is issued by the 
Commission containing the terms and conditions of the sale. The Commission then 
gets approval of the transaction from the CCOP and transfer the ownership from 
public to private investor. Total duration of the closing of transaction is normally 12 
to 18 months depending on simple transaction to selling of relatively complex entities.    
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Flow chart 2.1: The Privatization Process   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Privatization Commission, Government of Pakistan 
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2.2. Politics and Privatization Progress in Pakistan 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, privatization in Pakistan in major part was 
initiated to cope with the financial and economic issues surrounding the country rather 
than an ideology. In the following discussion, I summarize the progress of privatization 
under different governments in power since the nationalization policy of 1970s. 
 
Nationalization Policy (1971-1976) 
 
After war was lost in 1971, a new government in Pakistan led by the Pakistan Peoples 
Party nationalized the all major private businesses alongside utilities in response to 
widespread allegations of accumulation of wealth by few families and business groups. 
The result of this policy proved to be a disaster as rising wages and oil price shock in 
1970s depressed the growth of the economy generally and industrial sector suffered the 
most. This led to denationalisation demands by the end of 1970s and a white paper in 
this regard was issued by the then government of army dictator General Zia-ul-Haq.  
 
The military government formed a commission under the Pakistan Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation (PICIC) to explore the areas of deregulation and privatization. 
The first clear indication of the reversal of nationalization policy came with the 
introduction of Martial Order in 1978, leading to handing over of three industrial units 
to their owners including Eittefaq Group of Industries to Mian Mohammed Sharif. 
Another Martial Order similar to the previous one was promulgated in 1979 for the 
protection against any further nationalization. In a nutshell, although further 
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nationalization was ruled out after these new laws, a token progress was made in term 
of actually implementing the policy of denationalisation/deregulations during this 
period.   
 
Pakistan Peoples Party (1988-1990) 
 
After the death of General Zia-ul-Haq in a mid-air plane accident, new government led 
by Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan Peoples Party came into power with the promise of no 
state interference in running of private businesses and pursing a programme of mass 
industrialization. The government was no longer committed to state enterprise as an 
engine of growth. Subsequent event proved though that the new Bhutto was although 
less interested in pursuing the old policy of nationalisation but reluctant to sell already 
nationalized enterprises. Contrary to government at the centre, provincial government 
led by the partner/owner of Eittefaq Group sold off nationalized industrial units being 
run by the provincial government to previous owners without proper bidding process. 
The price paid by the new owners has not been disclosed since then.   
 
Nawaz Sharif Government (1990-93) 
 
In 1990, the Muslim League government headed by Nawaz Sharif, an industrialist who 
was committed to free market economy came to power. At the time, surging budget 
deficit and pressure from donor agencies provided the background of a wide spread 
privatization of state industrial units. Raising revenues through sale of state-owned 
enterprise was the easy option available to the then government to cope with the 
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mounting budget deficit. Nawaz Sharif government sold off 66 industrial units and 
commercial banks to the private sector in 1991-92 (for detail, see Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2: First Round of Privatization Process in Pakistan 
Sector Under Nawaz Sharif  
(1991-93) 
Under Banazir Bhutto 
(1993-96) 
Total 
Privatized 
Units 
To be 
Privatized 
later 
Units 
%  of  Privatized to 
Total Units 
 Uni
ts 
Bid Value 
(Million PRs) 
Units Bid Value 
(Million PRs) 
   
Automobile 7 1111.9 - - 7 4 64% 
Cement 8 4658.2 3 2892.6 11 4 73% 
Chemical 6 1039.65 6 570.93 12 1 92% 
Fertilizer 1 435.00 - - 1 7 14% 
Engineering 6 119.75 1 28.8 7 6 54% 
Ghee 16 588.95 - - 16 10 61% 
Rice 7 204.85 1 32.5 8 0 100% 
Roti 12 78.34 - - 12 1 92% 
Misc 1 86.76 5 142.6 6 17 26% 
Total 64  16  80 49 62% 
Newspaper - - 5 92 5 7 42% 
Banks 2 1213.6  - 4 16 20% 
Power Plants - - 1 7546.00 1 10 0.9% 
Insurance - - - - 0 3 0% 
Petroleum & Gas - - - - 0 14 0% 
Mining - - - - 0 3 0% 
Communication - - - - 0 1 0% 
Transportation & 
Airlines  
- - - - 0 11 0% 
Others - - - - 0 28 0% 
Grand Total 66 9537 38 11305.43 90 141 39% 
Source: From Data Provided by Government of Pakistan, Expert Advisory Cell.  
 
 
Pakistan Peoples Party (1993-1996) 
 
Second phase of privatization started in 1993; when Benazir Bhutto from the Pakistan 
Peoples Party was sworn in second time prime minister with the top priority of sorting 
out macroeconomic imbalances. The privatization programme suffered lot of setbacks 
under Benazir government this time due to party ideological leanings towards 
socialist form of governance (government as a main provider of employment rather 
than letting the private sector to generate employment). The progress of privatization 
                                                                              Chapter 2 
                                                                  Reforms & Cement Industry 
   
 
27 
 
was limited to some %age share of the national companies with natural monopolies 
such as telecommunication, thermal power plant and oil and gas. Some attempts were 
made to sell larger financial institution such as “United Bank” but failed due to 
resistance from the media, general public and unions. Overall, by the time Benazir 
government was dismissed again on the allegations of corruption in 1996, 
privatization of 20 industrial units, one bank, one electric generation plant and 12% 
shares of Pakistan Telecommunications Ltd was completed. Credit to Benazir 
government, no widespread allegations of favouritism was reported in the national or 
international media or by the pressure groups /civil society. 
  
Nawaz Sharif Government (1997-99) 
 
Contrary to previous stints as a Chief Minister of Punjab (1988-90) or Prime Minister 
of Pakistan (1990-93), this time progress of privatization was not satisfactory under 
Nawaz government. One reason could be that selling of smaller industrial units was 
relatively easy due to loss making nature of these units and comparatively less capital 
was needed to buy these units. Local banks were able to provide significant amount of 
capital to buyer of those units without compromising on their risk profile. This time, 
however focus shifted to financial reforms and establishment of regulatory 
framework. Accounting standards were refined to make these in line with the 
international standards. State central bank role in regulating banking industry was 
strengthened. Some other important reforms include stock exchange reforms, 
setting/reinforcing competition commission authorities, strengthening the role of 
security and exchange commission etc. However, the pace of further reforms was 
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halted due to nuclear tests carried out in 1998 and toppling of government by the 
army dictator General Musharraf. 
 
Musharraf/Aziz Government (2000-2007) 
 
Effort to privatize remaining industrial units and financial institutions were 
accelerated and intensified again by the investment banker prime minister Mr Shaukat 
Aziz under the presidency of General Musharraf. The privatization programme was 
one of the initiatives among many to revive the economy after foreign investment 
dried up as results of sanctions imposed by the world community due to nuclear 
explosions by Pakistan in retaliation to India in 1998.  Alongside many other policies 
to revive the economy, Mr Shaukat Aziz promoted the idea of abolishing the culture 
of industrial patronage to promote competition and productivity. To raise tax 
collection, this regime imposed sales tax on import items and provided leadership to 
the struggling public enterprise. As a result of these for reaching reforms, economy 
witnessed impressive turnaround and the GDP growth peaked to 8% in 2004 from 
mere 3-4% recorded in the previous government. Inflation dropped to historically low 
levels, consumer purchasing power improved significantly due to availability of 
consumer credit and leasing by commercial banks as a result of deregulation policy in 
the banking sector since 1999.  
 
In term of privatization policy, the government focus shifted from straight 
privatization to first restructuring the enterprises and then selling. Privatization 
progress under this regime included 80% privatization of national commercial banks, 
sale of share of large public sector organisations such as PIA to private investors. By 
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the end of Musharraf government, roughly 85-90% industrial units earmarked for the 
sale had already been sold to private investors. The commitment of the Aziz 
government towards privatization and private sector could be judged by the following 
statement in 2006. 
 
“ Nothing is sacred... I am packaging up my companies. (....).... These state-owned 
corporations (SOEs) have been well-run for the past few years.... and now I am 
offering them to investors from all over the world....!” 
 
The privatization programme of this government however, suffered a major setback 
when superior judiciary of the country (Supreme Court of Pakistan) stopped the 
government in selling the only Steel Mills on the allegation of misuse of power and 
non transparent procedures. 
   
Pakistan Peoples Party (2008-2013) 
 
As mentioned above, ideologically, PPP government has been less impressed by the 
idea of free market and private sector as main employment provider. Considering this, 
no serious attempt was made since 2008 to privatize remaining public sector loss 
making organizations such as WAPDA, Steel Mills, PIA etc. Some initiatives were 
taken to involve private sector in the running of cargo trains without any resounding 
success. Besides ideologically, PPP was unable to forcefully implement the 
privatization programme mainly due to resistant from the employee groups and 
unions who had been traditionally the main supporter of the party.      
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2.3. Privatization of Cement Industry in Pakistan  
 
Privatization of cement industry started in1984, when the first attempt was made by 
SCCP to sell part of SCCP shares of Zeal Pak and Gharibwal Cement through the 
enterprise mutual fund of the Investment Corporation of Pakistan (ICP). Shares of 
Rs.30 millions were sold by SCCP to ICP at the market price, which sold them without 
any difficulty as part of mutual fund to the public.  In 1992, the cement companies like 
Dandot Cement, D.G.Khan Cement, Kohat Cement, Mapple Leaf Cement, Gharibwal 
Cement, White Cement and Zealpak Cement were privatized.  Out of 8 units privatized 
in 1991-92, 6 units were sold to already establish industrial groups, which have already 
experience of managing industrial units in Pakistan
4
 and remaining 2 units were sold to 
“Employees Group”. The details of privatized units are given in Table 2.3.  
  
At the time of privatization of these units, total numbers of employees working in 
different fields were 5520. Government on the eve of privatization implemented a 
golden handshake scheme for workers. The response by worker was encouraging and 
some 20-30% workers opted for the scheme. Government restricted for payment of 
40% of bid value at the time of transfer of ownership. The amount of this money 
received was 2297.19 millions at that time, and 2860 millions was to be received later. 
The privatization process for Thatta Cement and Mustehkam Cement was also 
completed at that time and only payment was delayed, and finalized later due to cases 
                                                 
4
 D.G. Khan Cement was sold to Mansha and Saigal group. Dandot Cement was initially sold to 
Employees group, but they latter sold to Chakwal Group of Industries. Mapple Leaf was sold to Saigol 
Group of Industries. Similarly Kohat Cement was also sold to Palace Enterprises, another industrial 
group. 
                                                                              Chapter 2 
                                                                  Reforms & Cement Industry 
   
 
31 
 
pending in courts. The privatization of Associated Cement Rohri and Wah and General 
Refractors were completed in 1996 and Javadan Cement in 2003. 
 
Table 2.3: Details of Privatized Cement Industrial Units 
Name of Unit Name of  Successful 
Bidder 
Date of 
Bidding 
Date of 
Transfer 
Total Bid Value  
(Rs. Million)  
Amount Received (Rs. 
Million) 
Number of Employees 
White Cement Ltd.  Jehangir Elahi & 
Associates, Lahore   
17-10-1991  08-01-1992 137.47 54.99 133 
Pak. Cement Ltd. Jehangir Elahi & 
Associates, Lahore   
17-10-1991  08-01-1992 188.95 75.58 240 
Mapple Leaf 
Cement Ltd. 
Nishat Mills LTD. & 
Associates, Lahore  
17-10-1991  08-01-1992 291.28 116.51 603 
D.G.Khan Cement 
Ltd. 
Tariq S. Saigol & 
Associate, Lahore 
17-10-1991 02-5-1992 1799.67 1109.77 503 
Dandot Cement Ltd. Employees Group 17-10-1991 28-05-1992 636.69 254.68 677 
Gharibwal Cement 
Ltd. 
Haji Saifullah & Group, 
Islamabad 
20-4-92 26-09-1992 836.33 334.53 930 
Zeal Pak. Cement 
Ltd. 
Sardar M. Ashraf D. 
Baluch, Karachi 
19-4-92 10-10-1992 239.93 95.97 1402 
Kohat Cement Ltd. Palace Enterprises 
Ltd. 
18-4-92 31-10-1992 527.9 211.16 766 
 National Cement 
Ltd. 
Employees Group 23-11-92 na 110.00 44.00 266 
Total 7 Groups 13 Months 10 Months 4768.00 2297.19 5520 
Thatta Cement Ltd. - 22-11-1992 - 537.03 - 662 
Mustahkam Cement 
Ltd. 
- 29-07-1992 - 1843.59 - 1297 
Details of Cement Industrial Units Privatized in 1996 
Name of Unit Products Produced Zone Province Annual Production 
Capacity 
Total Paid-up 
Capital 
Number of Employees 
Associated Cement, 
Wah 
Ordinary Portland 
Cement 
North Punjab 450,000.00 1357 1012 
General 
Refractories Ltd. 
Fire Bricks South Sindh 4,400.00 21.551 139 
Details of Cement Industrial Units Privatized later 
Javadan Cement 
Ltd. 
Ordinary Portland 
Cement 
South Sindh 6,000,000.00 88.12 1026 
Associated Cement 
Company, Rohri 
Ordinary Portland 
Cement 
South Sindh 270,000.00 1012 790 
Source:  Privatization Commission (PC), Government of Pakistan and Expert Advisory Cell, GOP.    
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2.4. Cement Industry of Pakistan 
 
Cement manufacturing is a well-established industry in Pakistan, accounting for about 
5.5% of total industrial production, representing 1.4% of GDP and contributing 30 
billion Rupees annually to national exchequer. The industry has witnessed a significant 
transformation since the deregulation and privatization started by the end of 1980s and 
early 1990s. The industry has become global exporter of cement and has been ranked 
5
th
 largest exporter of cement. In the following discussion, main feature alongside 
issues of the industry are discussed.  
 
2.4.1.  Historical Development   
 
Cement manufacturing began in 1921 when Pakistan‟s first plant was installed with a 
capacity of 44,500 ton per year (tpy) and the industry grew steadily until independence. 
In 1947, at the time of independence, two companies with a total of four plants (all in 
the private sector) were in operation with a total capacity of 480,000 tpy.  During the 
1950‟s and 1960‟s, 6 more plants were established, 4 in the private sector and 2 
(Zealpak and Maple Leaf) in the public sector by Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation (PIDC). The industry maintained a growth rate of 9.7% per annum in 
installed capacity.  By the end of 1971 production capacity of cement had increased to 
3.45 million tpy, with 58% in the public sector and 42% in the private sector, 
respectively.  
 
In January 1972, cement industry was nationalized and all the plants were placed under 
the Board of Industrial Management (BOIM). The nationalization was formalized in 
                                                                              Chapter 2 
                                                                  Reforms & Cement Industry 
   
 
33 
 
1973, when the State Cement Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. (SCCP) was constituted as a 
holding company under the control of the Ministry of Production (MOP). All the major 
private share holding in the cement companies were acquired by the Government of 
Pakistan (GOP). 
 
At the time of SCCP formation, the company consisted of 9 portland cement and one 
white cement plants, with an overall production capacity of 3.42 million tons per year 
(tpy). These plants had been exporting substantial amount of cement to Bangladesh, 
which ceased after mid-1971.  Other markets were found after 1973 and exports 
reached a peak of 0.496 million tons in 1974-75.  By 1975-76, substantial remittances 
of foreign exchange by Pakistani working in the Middle East resulted in an increase in 
the demand for cement.  In 1976-77, the country had become a net importer and cement 
was being sold in black markets. 
 
To partially meet the demand, the SCCP plants were run at near capacity.  The capacity 
utilization of the plants increased from 82.0% in 1972-73 to 96.4% in 1979-80. The 
total production capacity of SCCP increased to 4.125 million tons per year in 1981-82.  
However, capacity utilization decreased to 88.7% in 1981-82 as against 96.8% in 1980-
81.  In response to continuing shortages, the GOP lifted the ban on private investment 
in cement in 1978, and announced an incentive package for private investors consisting 
of a guaranteed rate of return of 15-20% and reduction in import duties for equipment 
and corporation tax exemptions depending on plant location.  Subsequently, SCCP 
increased capacity by 2.1 million tpy, through six projects comprising two expansions 
and four green-field plants, while, some two dozen private investors received 
                                                                              Chapter 2 
                                                                  Reforms & Cement Industry 
   
 
34 
 
sanctioning approval. By the beginning of 1987, four private plants, comprising about 
one quarter of sub-sector capacity, had started operation.  
 
 At the beginning of 1986-87, the Pakistan cement industry consisted of 17 operating 
plants, with a total nominal installed capacity of 7.7 millions tpy. Thirteen of the plants, 
comprising about 6.0 million tpy (78% of total capacity) belong to SCCP
5
 and 4 private 
plants
6
 with installed capacity of 1.63 million tons. At the end of 1996, total number of 
cement companies increased to 23, with 6 firms entering the market during 1988-96, all 
in private sector. Since then, some new firms entered the market and some older firm 
had been acquired by the competitor firms. Government of Pakistan has successfully 
implemented the privatization policy and by 2003, all the companies belonging to 
public sector were privatized.  
 
Besides, in order to enhance their production capacity, majority of existing units have 
expended their production capacity. After commissioning of new units, and mergers, 
number of cement manufacturing plants in the country in 2011 was 21, and the 
production capacity will increase to 45 million ton per year (tpy).  Of those new units, 
some are located in the Punjab and rest in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province. 
Two of the new units in Punjab have the production capacity of 0.990 million tons 
each, while, Pioneer Cement and Lilla Cement has the capacity to produce annually 
0.660 and 1.5 million tons respectively. The complete detail of the historical 
development of cement industry of Pakistan is shown in Table 2.4.  
                                                 
5
 Nine plants produced only ordinary port land cement (OPC), two produced both OPC and slag 
cement, one produced OPC and sulphur resistant and one produced OPC and white cement.   
6
 Private companies in operation were Pakland, Cherat, Dadabhoy, and Attock at that time. 
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                      Table 2.4: Pre Reforms Historical Development of Cement Industry of Pakistan 
Year Units Inherited Established Location Installed 
Capacity 
(000) tpy 
Additional 
Capacity 
(000) tpy 
Year of 
Expansion 
Current Capacity 
(000) tpy 
Established in 
Private/ Public 
Sector 
Current 
Position 
Private/ Public 
Sector 
Remarks Process Zone Province 
1947   Associated Cement  C) 1.Wah 450 541 1985&94 991 Private Public  Wet North Punjab 
 2.Rohri 270 - - 270 Private Public  Wet South Sindh 
    Dalmia (National) Cement 1.Karachi 160 - -  Private - Closed Dry South Sindh 
 2.Dandot, Jhelum 50 - - 50 Private Private Privatized Dry North Punjab 
1956 Zeal Pak Cement Hyderabad  120 860 1961&70 1080 Public Private Closed Wet South Sindh 
 Maple Leaf Cement Mianwali Daudkhel 100 200 1963&65 501 Public Private Privatized Wet North Punjab 
1964 Javedan Cement Karachi 300 300 1980 300 Private Public  Semi Dry South Sindh 
Gharibwal Cement Gharibwal, Jhelum 360 180 1968 540 Private Private Privatized Wet North Punjab 
1966   Mustehkam Cement Hattar 360 300 1980 630 Private Public  Semi Dry North Punjab 
1967      White Cement Industries,  Maple 
Leaf 
Iskanderabad 
Daudkhel 
15 15 1982 30 Private Private Privatized Wet North Punjab 
1983 Thatta Cement Thatta 330 - - 330 Public Public  Dry South Sindh 
Kohat Cement Kohat 330 - - 330 Public Private Privatized Dry North Punjab 
Dandot Cement Dandot, Jhelum 300 - - 330 Public Private Privatized Dry North Punjab 
1985  D.G. Khan Cement D.G. Khan 680 - -  Public Private Privatized Dry North Punjab 
Pakland Cement Deh Dhando 330 - - 390 Private Private  Dry South Sindh 
Cherat Cement Nowshera 330 300 1995 660 Private Private  Dry North KPK 
1986 Dadabhoy Cement Kola Kohar 300 150 1993 409.5 Private Private  Dry South Sindh 
Attock Cement Hub Chowki 600 - - 600 Private Private  Dry South Baluchistan 
Sarela Cement Darwaza (Quetta) 70 - -  Private Private Closed Dry South Balluchistan 
1988 Essa Cement Nooriabad 150 300 1997 450 Private Private  Dry South Sindh 
Pak Cement Iskandarabad 171 - - 171 Private Private  Dry North Punjab 
Anwarzeb Cement Bholari 50 - -  Private Private  Dry South Sindh 
Fecto Cement Sanghani 300 300 1989 600 Private Private  Dry North Punjab 
             
             
                                Source:  Compiled from: 
                    Annual Report, Expert Advisory Cell, GOP (Various issues). 
                    World Bank (1986). 
                   Business Recorder (various issues). 
                  Companies’ Annual Report (various issues).  
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2.4.2. Pricing Policy and Distribution  
 
Prior to 1985, SCCP established the price of cement for each plant, including wholesale 
and retail price.  This was done through a system of average cost pricing coupled with 
cross-subsidization schemes at the plant and regional market levels.  A "retention" price 
(SCCP wholesale price less taxes and duties) was established for SCCP cement as a 
whole, on the basis of average production costs, including an overall rate of return on 
fixed assets of approximately 15%.  At the plant level, price paid to each plant was the 
retention price plus development subsidy in the case of high-cost producers or minus in 
the case of low-cost producers.  It assured each factory a more or less 15% rate of 
return on equity.  Retail prices in each locality were arrived at by adding to the 
wholesale price an allowance for transport costs (to avoid disparities in cement prices in 
different areas). SCCP established the dealer margin for major consumption areas 
whereas elsewhere, government administrators such as District Deputy Commissioners 
(DC) set the margins.  
  
In June 1985, government of Pakistan abandoned the long-standing cement price 
controls and freight equalization.  Following price decontrol, SCCP introduced a 
number of changes in its pricing procedures. First, the freight equalization scheme was 
abolished and dealers were now responsible for making their own transport 
arrangements. There had not yet been any basic changes in the system of cross-
subsidization of production at the plant level, but SCCP plant managers were allowed 
to vary the ex-plant price.  Only two plants took advantage of the more flexible pricing 
policy, one southern plant selling below SCCP's standard ex-factory price and a 
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northern plant selling above it. Plant managers however, were expected to become 
increasingly responsive as competitive pressure from the private sector increased.   
After the privatization of public sector plants, SCCP lost its control over the cement 
sector and All Pakistan Cement Manufacturer Association (APCMA) now represents 
more than  80% of cement manufacturers and sets the agreed upon price by all its 
members.  
  
2.4.3. Market Structure and Technology  
 
The market for cement in Pakistan has been unsophisticated and narrow in the past, and 
little effort was made to promote demand for cement, other than Ordinary Portland 
Cement (OPC)
7
.  Before 1981 when the private sector was first allowed to import and 
market cement, the government through SCCP, controlled all sales and distribution of 
cement in Pakistan.  SCCP determined regional quotas, arranged for transportation of 
cement and established allocation for public sector agencies. Cement market in 
Pakistan has undergone both quantitative as well as qualitative change after 
liberalization and privatization process of 1992. The market is now, no longer a “seller 
market” and prices have responded to market forces following a series of events such as 
commissioning of several private cement plants, government decision to abandon cost-
plus pricing, decontrolling market prices with elimination of freight subsidy and the 
competitive market environment after deregulation and privatization.      
 
                                                 
7
 In 1985-86, OPC comprised approximately 95% of subsector output, with slag cement and sulpher 
resistant cement comprising about 2% each of the market and white cement the remainder. 
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The cement market in Pakistan is divided into two geographical zone i.e. north and 
south zones.  The former covers KPK, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and part of Punjab 
(North of Rahim Yar Khan district), whereas the latter covers Sindh, Balochistan and 
rest of Punjab. The north zone is now served by a total of nineteen companies, while, 
the south zone is served by a total of five companies.  At present, out of the total 
production capacity of clinker about 83% is in the north and the balance 17% in the 
south (see Table 2.5). Higher ratio of capacity located in north region is mainly due to 
ease of raw material availability and proximity to two big export markets (India and 
Afghanistan). 
 
  
                                                                                Chapter 2 
                                                                           Reforms & Cement Industry 
   
 
39 
 
Table 2.5: Installed Production Capacity (As on April 2012) 
                                                                                                    
 Sr. No.  Name Of Unit  Operational Capacity 
North Zone 
  
Clinker Cement 
1   Askari Cement Limited - Wah  1,050,000 1,102,500 
2   Askari Cement - Nizampur  1,500,000 1,575,000 
3   Bestway Cement Limited - Hattar  1,170,000 1,228,500 
4   Bestway Cement Limited - Chakwal  3,428,571 3,600,000 
5  Bestway-Mustehkum Cement Limited - Hattar  1,035,000 1,086,750 
6  Cherat Cement Company Limited-Nowshera  1,050,000 1,102,500 
7   Dandot Cement Limited - Jehlum  480,000 504,000 
8  Dewan Hattar Cement Limited - Hattar  1,080,000 1,134,000 
9  D.G.Khan Cement Limited - D.G.Khan  2,010,000 2,110,500 
10  D.G.Khan Cement Limited - Chakwal  2,010,000 2,110,500 
11   Fauji Cement Company Limited - Fateh Jang  3,270,000 3,433,500 
12   Fecto Cement Limited - Sangjani  780,000 819,000 
13   Flying Cement Limited - Lilla  1,140,000 1,197,000 
14   GharibWal Cement Limited - Jehlum  2,010,000 2,110,500 
15  Kohat Cement Company Limited - Kohat  2,550,000 2,677,500 
16  Lucky Cement Limited - Pezu   3,725,714 3,912,000 
17  Maple Leaf Cement Factory Limited - Daudkhel 3,210,000 3,370,500 
18  Lafarge Pakistan Cement Company Limited - Chakwal  1,950,000 2,047,500 
19  Pioneer Cement Limited - Khushab  1,933,571 2,030,250 
                Sub Total (North Zone)  35,382,857 37,152,000 
     
South Zone    
1  Al-Abbas Cement Limited - Nooriabad, Dadu  540,000 567,000 
2  Attock Cement Pakistan Limited - Hub Chowki, Lasbela  1,710,000 1,795,500 
3  Dewan Cement Limited - Dhabeji  750,000 787,500 
4  Lucky Cement Limited, - Indus Highway, Karachi  3,428,571 3,600,000 
5  Thatta Cement Limited - Thatta  300,000 315,000 
                Sub Total (South Zone)  6,728,571 7,065,000 
                Grand Total (North+South) 42,111,428 44,217,000 
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Technology of Production 
 
Cement manufactured in Pakistan is generally called Portland cement because of its 
gray colour like Portland stone in Britain. Another variety is Sulphate Resistant cement, 
which is helpful in controlling chemical attacks. It also gives more resistance to 
building where soil is affected by water logging and salinity. Historically, there were 
three methods being used in cement production called wet and dry and semi-dry 
process
8
. 
 
A.  Limestone crushing: The size of the quarried limestone is reduced using the 
crushers. The crushed limestone is stacked in pre-blending stockpile, laying each batch 
of crushed limestone down in layers. To achieve a considerable degree of 
homogenization, the limestone is reclaimed systematically in a vertical manner. 
 
B.  Clinkerization-Wet Process: The crushed limestone is fed into a raw mill (i.e. 
horizontal-rotating mills called ball mills). Other additives such as bauxite, manganese 
ore, iron ore and water are also fed with limestone in the right proportion. The resultant 
product is raw-meal, which will be in the form of slurry. The raw meal is then fed into a 
horizontal rotating kiln. Pulverized coal and a fraction of furnace oil, if required, are 
used as fuel to burn the slurry into clinker.  Since the water (about 350%) in the raw-
meal has to be evaporated, the wet kilns consume about 350 kg to 400 kg of coal for 
production of 1 ton of clinker. 
 
                                                 
8
 Following discussion is based on the report on cement industry by Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari & 
Company Ltd. (1995) titled “Pakistan Cement Industry”. 
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C. Clinkerization-Dry process: The crushed limestone along with appropriate 
proportion of additives, such as bauxite, manganese ore, and iron ore are fed into the 
vertical roller mill. The resultant output is dry, powdered form raw-meal. The raw-meal 
is then fed into horizontal rotary kilns. The pulverized coal and a fraction of furnace oil, 
if required, are used as fuel to burn the raw-meal into clinker. Since no water 
evaporation is required in the dry kiln, the coal consumption in this process is only 
around 200 kg for the production of 1 ton of clinker. 
 
D. Cement Grinding: The clinker produced in wet/dry kiln can be stored in the open 
yard for a maximum period of 3 months, without deterioration in the quality. The 
clinker is fed into a horizontal rotating cement mill with about 8- 10% gypsum. The 
resultant finely ground product is called Ordinary Portland Cement, (OPC).  In order to 
obtain pozzolanic materials such as fly ash and broken tiles (to the extent of 10-15%) 
are added to clinker and gypsum in the cement mill. The cement is stored in cement 
silos, and is subsequently packed and dispatched. 
 
2.4.4. Entry and Exit Conditions  
 
The condition of entry to an industry is one of the important structural parameter, which 
determines the performance of firms in that industry. It measures the magnitude of the 
barriers to entry for new entrant. In most of the industries, stability of entry conditions 
determines the absolute cost advantages enjoyed by established firms because of 
technology and resource control which including access to distribution channels. The 
conditions of entry to industry may change over the time, and in some cases, they 
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change quite remarkably within relatively short period of time because of rapid 
lowering of entry barriers. This can led to rapid changes in profitability and efficiency 
of the existing firms as well as new entrants.  
 
Historically, entry conditions in the Pakistani cement industry had been strict because 
of strategic importance. But, since the deregulation in the industry in early 1990s, entry 
conditions eased up considerably. Despite of the fact that entry conditions have eased 
up quite significantly since 1990, implicit entry restrictions are still in place due to huge 
investment and funds needed to set up the cement plant. According to APCMA 
estimates, the average cost for setting up a grass root cement plant was around Rs.1500 
per ton of clinker as of 1988 prices. On this basis, a million-ton plant required about 
Rs.1500 millions. Further, with the increase in marketing cost and distribution network 
due to competition, it became necessary for the manufacturers to extend better credit 
lines to the distributors. This has further raised capital requirements in the industry. The 
necessity for installation of captive control equipment to check dust emission and 
installation of captive power generators to overcome problem of power shortage, have 
also raised the capital requirements. Therefore, the large financial resources are 
required for installing cement manufacturing facilities, which can be considered as a 
barrier to entry. 
 
However, deregulation in the banking industry and growth in credit has eased this 
implicit entry barrier to some extent in the last few years.  This led to a series of new 
entrants including some plants being set up in the areas where cheap raw material and 
labour was available. It has provided the comparative advantage to the new entrant, 
which resulted in price war among the new entrants and the firms already in the 
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business. The ultimate effect of the easy entry and exit has been the improvement in use 
of inputs.     
 
2.4.5. Demand and Supply Constraints 
 
Demand and supply interaction determines the equilibrium price provided that the big 
monopoly houses of public ownership or cartel-led monopolistic market in private 
sector do not dominate the market structure. Any distortion, which disturbs this 
interaction could leads to changes in the profitability patterns and thus ultimately 
forcing the supplier to bring broad-based changes in the production.  If demand 
decreases continuously, it can work in two ways: first it could depress the profitability 
of the industry in general; secondly, it can force the producer to go for efficient use of 
human and financial resources.  
  
Domestic demand for cement has grown at different average growth rates during the 
last 50 years. In the 1950‟s growth rate was 8.16% per annum; during1960 it witnessed 
the highest average growth rate at 10.68% per annum
9
 ; 1970‟s was a depressed 
decade
10
  and growth rate remained 2.52% per annum; in 1980‟s growth rate was 8.5% 
per annum (see Figure 2.1). In 1990‟s growth rate was recorded at 3%, where 1993-95 
experiencing even negative growth rate. On the supply-side, since 1980, sub-sector 
capacity has increased at the rate of roughly 10% per annum during 1980-87, 7.5% 
                                                 
9
 It was the period of constructing big dam‟s extension of irrigation facilities and, road network 
development. 
10
 GOP‟s nationalization and labour policies, war with India and separation of East Pakistan, oil crises 
depressed the industrial activities, economy and demand for cement during 1970-78.   
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during 1992-96 and 6.07% during 1986
11
. These uneven demand- supply growth rates 
during 1990s have forced the producers to compete on efficiency basis or use cost 
efficient technology and get improved productivity. Secondly, in 1970s and 1980s, 
there has been a shortage of cement in the north zone due to high pace of 
industrialization. South zone with high capacity and lower demand was capable to 
export the excessive supply to north. The high transportation costs were subsidized by 
the SCCP. But after privatization, the share of northern region in total cement sales 
grew from 59.5% to 64% against a capacity of about 56.7% in 1989-90 and 58.5% in 
1995-96 due to expansion of older plants and new entrants. And this increased to 71.3% 
by 1999-2000. In this new scenario, a competition was developed between the north 
and south zone in efficient utilization of resources. 
Figure 2.1: Cement Industry Production: Average Growth Rates 
 
                                                 
11
 The production of cement increased from 7.76 million tones in 1990-91 to 8.42 million tones in 
1994-95, showing a growth of 1.6% per annum. However, after the expansion of State Cement 
Corporation of Pakistan, production capacity of existing and new plants in public and private sector is 
expected to go up to 12.7 million tones to be more than the demand of 9.7 million tones for that period. 
Pakistan will have a surplus of more than 1.6 million tones of cement in 1996-97 which will rise to a 
staggering 6.3 million tones in 1997-98. 
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2.4.6. Foreign Investment  
Cement industry was among few industries that Pakistan inherited at the time of 
independence. Since then, the industry has always been set-up and run by the local 
investors. Deregulation and privatization was initiated to change this by easing up entry 
conditions and allowing domestic banks to lend money to domestic and foreign 
investors. Reducing the role of state authorities in setting prices and margins was also 
perceived as an incentive for new firms‟ entry (local as well foreign). Portfolio invest 
by foreign investors was already in place, but direct investment was missing. Since the 
deregulations measures, two foreign companies have made significant investment in the 
sector. Interestingly, $45 million investment from one of the Saudi financier in Attock 
cement was one the largest foreign investment from Middle East in Pakistan. Another 
company receiving foreign investment is Chakwal Cement. The company has attracted 
investment from one of the largest French cement producer Lafarge. These investments 
are on top of portfolio investments by foreign investors. An examination of 
shareholding patterns of cement sector companies revealed that two firms have more 
than 30% foreign shareholding and one of the largest cement producers D.G. Khan 
Cement with 15% foreign shareholding. It is anticipated that once law and order 
situation gets better in Pakistan, more direct and indirect investment is likely to be 
made in the industry. 
 
2.4.7. Diversification and Vertical Integration  
 Cement industries across the worlds have been subject to vertical integration and 
diversification and as the competition intensified, the companies would like to integrate 
vertically by moving into the ready-mix concrete business, shipping business etc. or to 
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become part of business conglomerate. Many large global cement producers like 
Lafrage have moved to vertically integrating core activities of cement, ready-mixed 
concrete and sand and gravel. In the Pakistani cement industry, vertical integration 
activity has not been in practice except Chakwal cement which is part of Lafrage group, 
it is hoped that as the competition gets stiff, firms are likely to diversify in other 
businesses and buy or merge with other companies to reduce their advertising, 
marketing, shipping and distributions costs. Lot of Pakistani cement firms are already 
part of big diversified business groups, but in significant number of cases, the nature of 
the business is completely different (like DG Khan Cement is part of Nishat Group with 
businesses in textile, cement, financial services, insurance, power generation, paper, 
hospitality industry, agriculture, dairy industry and aviation). Pakistan cement 
producers being 5
th
 largest exporter of cement are expected to make significant progress 
particularly in the shipping industry in this regard in near future.  
             
2.4.8. Economic Growth and Investment  
  
The performance of the cement industry is highly dependent on the construction 
activities within the country. A boom in the construction industry ensures the stable 
demand, which translates into higher capacity utilization and economies of large-scale 
operation. Economic policies of high growth of investment in construction sector by 
the government could cause the sequential growth in demand for cement that would 
yield the increase in sales volumes and profitability of the industry. Figure 2.1 & 
Figure 2.2 reveals some interesting trends in GDP growth (gdpgr), construction 
growth (consgr), large scale manufacturing activity growth (lsmgr) and growth rates 
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in government construction sector (GFCF) in pre-, immediate post and matured period 
of post privatization period.  
Immediately after privatization, the economic conditions of the country were fragile, 
in term of growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as well as large-scale 
manufacturing sector (see Figure 2.2). The growth rate was 3-4% p.a. during 1990-96 
against the historical growth rate of 5-6% p.a. in the last 30 years. Large-scale 
manufacturing sector also showed a declining trend since 1993. The overall trend in 
construction sector excluding few exceptional years due to mega projects like 
motorway, reconstruction of flood-effected houses, roads, railways and commercial 
buildings was generally disappointing. Total public sector investment in term of gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF) was either curtailed in to some specific sectors or 
remained stagnant since 1993 (see Figure 2.3). All these factors sent negative signals 
for construction activities in 1990s and could have an impact on profitability and 
efficiency of the overall industry during these years.  
 
Figure 2.2: Real GDP Growth Rates, Large-Scale Manufacturing and 
Construction Sector   
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However, from 1999 onward, government investment in construction sector 
stimulated the growth of construction industry significantly. Overall, by looking at 
two graphs, some interesting observations could be made i.e. 
 
 During 1986-98, investment remained more or less same (with negative growth 
for most of the years). The construction sector growth rate during this period 
declined. 
 
 During 1990-92, construction sector remained more or less stagnant due to the 
fact that during this period, most of the funds were allocated to the maintenance 
of the flood-effected buildings and roads. 
 
 Period of 2002 onwards, however, shows the deviation from the past. During this 
period both investment and construction sector have grown albeit with some 
downward pressures.  
 
Figure 2.2: Annual Growth Rates in Government Construction Sector GFCF 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Performance Indicators and Choice of Criterion 
 
This chapter is comprised of discussion on the change/nature of ownership structures 
and performance. The chapter starts with the basic question of privatization: what 
happened? and why did it happen? This is supplemented by the comprehensive 
literature on the nature of ownership and firms‟ performance. A detailed review of the 
1980s and 1990s main studies in this area is presented. In the next section, 
conclusions from the recent literature on the ownership and performance are 
presented by distinguishing the studies according to the firms‟ nature of business. 
Subsequently, discussion moves to various performance indicators, competing 
methodologies, and their suitability for the comparison of different ownership 
structures.  
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3.1. Introduction 
 
Does privatization enhance efficiency? The importance of this question follows from 
fundamental changes in the revealed preferences of the Pakistani government in the 
1980s. Internationally, the mass transition from centrally planned economic systems 
to decentralized decision making process has not been unnoticed and indeed, there is 
a vast body of literature on the subject (privatization) itself, and the performance 
evaluation of these divested enterprises. Most of the literature, however, in the early 
stage of privatization was based on traditional and political arguments, and largely 
descriptive (Galal et al. (1994)).  
 
A fundamental question in this regard is whether deregulation and privatization 
(reform policy, henceforth) improves operating and financial performance of the 
privatized firms. For example, Galal et al. (1994) raised a basic question: Is a country 
better or worse off when its government divests its public enterprises. In other words, 
what happen as a result of divestiture, why did it happen? Who wins and who loses, 
and how much? Comprehensive answers to all these questions raise few subsidiary 
questions such as, what will happen. What is it worth? For answering all the above 
questions, one needs a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the policy and distribution of 
gains to different segments of society/economy, such as consumers, buyers, and 
employees, etc. My study, however, is confined to first two questions
12
. 
 
                                                 
12
 My initial plan was to do a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of the policy but constraints like 
nature of study; data limitations and time involved forced us to be confined to the answering of only 
these two questions. It may be extended at later stage of the study. 
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Privatization: What Happened? 
This is the problem of factual analysis. It needs comparison of ex-ante and ex-post 
privatization performance of the firms, on the basis of some well defined indicators 
either economic, financial or both.  
 
Privatization: Why did it happen? 
It needs explanation, whether divestiture is the main source of variation in the 
performance or some other exogenous changes i.e. industry or the economy are 
responsible.  One could derive insight based on comparison of three groups of firms 
including private, privatized and public. This could provide the opportunity to 
evaluate the performance of three groups of firms working in relatively similar 
market and economic conditions.        
 
3.2. Early Studies on Ownership, Deregulation and Performance 
 
Privatization wave of 1980s fuelled the ongoing debate on the matter. The early 
literature on the question of ownership and performance is full of contradictory 
results (see Table 3.1). Broadly speaking, two sets of conclusions have been emerged 
from the case studies. First finds private ownership clearly superior, while, second 
favours the public sector operation or at least does not consider public ownership as a 
hurdle to efficient operation. The most notable early studies that support these 
conclusions are summarized below:  
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According to Bennett and Johnson (1979), “Without exception, the empirical findings 
indicate that the same level of output could be produced at substantially lower costs 
if, output is produced by the private rather than the public sector”.  
 
Caves and Christenson (1980) finds “Contrary to what is predicted in the property 
rights literature, I find no evidence of inferior efficiency performance by the 
government owned railroad, public ownership is not inherently less efficient than 
private ownership….the oft-noted inefficiency of government enterprises stems from 
their isolation from effective competition rather than their public ownership per se.”  
 
Sheikh (1985) conducted the study of the consequences of public ownership on the 
operational performance of the ghee industry of Pakistan. The study utilized the data 
on eighteen firms over ten-year period. The author used the national income 
techniques for calculating public profits and profitability. He finds that the average 
level of performance after adjusting for changes in prices and capital stock is higher 
for the period under public ownership as compare to private ownership regime. He 
further found that improvement in performance was accompanied by improved 
productivity of capital.     
 
Aharoni (1986) finds “The empirical evidence …lends only limited support to the 
hypothesis that SOEs [state-owned-enterprises] are less efficient than private firms. 
The financial results of SOE‟s certainly show a dismal picture of losses. However, 
these losses may be a result of social and political demands on the enterprises. In 
terms of efficiency, these enterprises‟ performance is much less bleak. As efficient 
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users of resources, they may have done as well as private firms producing the same 
product in the same country.”  
 
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986) estimated cost efficiency for a sample of 30 public 
and 123 private fossil-fuelled electricity generating monopolists and concluded that 
public and private enterprises did not differ in costs significantly,  but both had higher 
costs.                      
 
The study by Forman-Peck and Manning (1988) compares the performance of British 
Telecom with five telecommunication companies elsewhere in Europe. The study 
summarizes that “British Telecom is apparently less efficient…than the 
telecommunication enterprises in both Norway [where the company is state-owned] 
and Denmark [where ownership is mixed] but more efficient than those in Spain and 
Italy [where ownership is also mixed].”       
 
Boardman and Vining (1989) study finds “There is robust evidence that state 
enterprises and mixed enterprises are less profitable and less efficient than private 
corporations”. Similarly, Boycko et al. (1993) finds that there is virtually universal 
consensus that privatization improves efficiency.  
 
Boardman and Vining (1989) finds “The evidence suggests an “edge” for the private 
sector, but the results vary considerably across sectors. In sectors where there is some 
evidence of superior public efficiency (electricity and water), there is limited 
competition or the private firms are highly regulated. Evidence of the greater 
efficiency of [private companies] appears to be in the delivery of services where 
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government‟s subcontracts to the private sector and their monitoring costs are 
relatively low.” 
  
Bishop and Kay (1989) evaluated the consequences of British privatization program. 
The study finds that most privatized industries are grown since privatization and 
grown more than those industries that have remained in public ownership. However, 
the study finds that the privatized firms, which are doing well and grown rapidly, 
were doing better even before privatization. Similarly, the output and profits are 
grown, margins are increased, and employment has declined. The study finds that 
privatized industries tend to grow faster and are more profitable, but it seems that the 
causality runs from growth and profitability to privatization, rather than the other way 
round.  
 
Naqvi and Kemal (1991) examined the privatization of public industrial enterprises in 
Pakistan. The study shows that, some public enterprises show losses, most of these 
units made sufficiently large profits, and that their high rates of profit cannot be 
attributed to the high rates of protection. The study finds that the average rate of 
protection for industries in the public sector is lower than that of the industries in the 
private sector. Further, the study ruled-out the possibility of public sector 
monopolistic practices, significant fiscal sports as well as greater „peoples‟ equity 
participation by privatization.  
 
Megginson et al. (1994) analyzed the pre- and post-privatization financial and 
operational performance of 61 companies, from 18 countries and 32 industries, that 
experienced full or partial divestiture through the public share offering during the 
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period 1961 to 1990 by using financial ratios. Specifically, the study used 
profitability, efficiency, leverage, employment and capital investment spending ratios. 
The study documented strong performance improvements, without lowering 
employment. After privatization, firms increased real sales and capital investment 
spending; improved their operating efficiency and expanded their work force and 
become more profitable. Further, these firms lowered their debt levels and increased 
dividend pay-outs. The study also found significant changes in the size and 
composition of corporate board of directors after privatization. 
 
A thorough empirical study is of World Bank by Galal et al. (1994). The study 
analyzed the privatization performance of the twelve companies of Britain, Chile and 
Malaysia. The study raised the question that either the transformation of private 
ownership increased efficiency?  and if yes, then, with how much costs and benefits 
allocated. The study finds welfare gains in 11 out of 12 companies; no significant 
case of workers lay-offs and in three cases, performance under private sector was 
significantly better. 
 
Bousoffiane et.al (1997) by using Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) analyzed the effects 
of privatization on nine organizations privatized in the UK in 1980s. The study 
analyzed the technical efficiency of those organizations in pre- and post-privatization 
periods. The study finds the mixed results. In some cases, there is a clear evidence of 
an improvement in technical efficiency; in others there is no discernible impact of 
ownership on performance. 
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In the context of Pakistani privatization program, Aftab and Khan (1995) compared 
the pre- and post-privatization experience of five firms in three industries, where 
employees themselves and private firms purchased the units. The study finds that 
private sector firms are more successful than employees purchased ones, and in 
general, private ownership resulted in less labour retrenchment.  
 
The study by Naqvi and Kemal (1997) analyzed the performance of privatized 
manufacturing industrial units of Pakistan in post-privatization regime and concluded:  
“[While] Pakistan has, by and large, completed the divestiture process in the 
manufacturing sector, it does not necessarily mean that this activity has been crowned 
with success judged by any known economic criteria. The effects of privatization on 
efficiency, output and the price level have so for been uncertain, and there is enough 
evidence to suggest that this policy may have lowered the economy‟s employment 
potential, worsened the conditions of workers and has led to greater concentration of 
income and wealth”.  
 
Similarly, Bengali (1998) analyzed the effects of privatization on seven privatized 
enterprises of ghee, automobile, cement and chemical industries of Pakistan. The 
author by using, simple ratio analysis concluded that firms, which were sold to 
employees, did not perform well compared to firms sold to parties with already 
industrial concerns.  
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Table 3.1: Early Stage Studies Focusing on Public-Private and Pre- and Post-Privatization Efficiency  
Authors Study Sector Methodology Results 
i. Public-Private Efficiency Comparison Studies 
Koo (1985) Commercial banks of South 
Korea 
Case study approach Unsuccessful. Government still regulates rates 
and directs credits. 
 
 
Chishty (1985) Jute textile mills Case study approach. Competition and resultant better performance 
from state-owned mills.  
 
Sheikh (1985) Ghee industry Case study approach by using public profit and profitability 
supplemented by regression analysis with rigorous institutional 
detail 
Firms under public ownership regime performed 
better than under private ownership regime.  
Marshall (1986) Banks, manufacturing and 
agricultural firms  
Case study approach. Rapid privatization made system more vulnerable 
to financial difficulty. 
 
  
Foreman-Peck and 
Manning (1988) 
British Telecom (B.T)  Comparison of B.T with that of five telecommunication 
elsewhere after privatization by using international comparison 
approach. 
They conclude that B.T is apparently less efficient 
than telecommunication companies in both 
Norway and Denmark and more efficient than 
Spain and Italy. 
Kapstein (1988) Formerly private firms taken 
over by government when 
bankrupt  
Case study approach. Nova America-a successful, but little movement 
in traditionally state-owned sector.  
 
 
ii. Studies Focussing on Public-Private Efficiency Comparison in Pre- and Post-Privatization Regimes 
Boardman and Vining 
(1989) 
 
 
500 Non-US mining and 
manufacturing companies 
Ratio analysis by using sales per employee and per assets after 
controlling for regulatory and competitive environment. 
Private corporations are more profitable and more 
efficient.  
Bishop and Kay (1989) Shipping, airlines, gas, 
telecommunication, oil and 
automobile industries 
Comparison of the privatized industries (given in column 2) with 
undivested enterprises in coal, rail steel and postal services in UK 
over the same period by comparing the employment, profit 
margin, revenues and TFP. 
Most of the privatized industries have grown 
since privatization and grown more than those 
industries that have remained in public sector. 
While output and profit have grown, margins 
have increased, employment has declined. 
 
     
Adam and Mistry (1992) Industrial enterprises of eight 
developing countries 
Case study approach by using quantitative and process analysis. 
The authors analyzed the pre and post- privatization performance 
of the same firms of eight developing countries. 
Privatization improved profitability and 
efficiency. 
 
 
 
(Continued)  
                                                                           Chapter 3 
                                                              Performance and Choice of Criterion 
 
 58 
Authors Study Sector Methodology Results 
Megginson et al. (1994) Panel of forty-one 
enterprises from fifteen 
countries   
Comparison of pre and post performance of divested firms in 
term of profitability, human resource utilization, enterprise 
growth and employment. 
Strong performance improvements without 
lowering employment. Firms increased real sales, 
become more profitable, increased capital 
investment spending and improved their 
operating efficiency. 
Galal et al. (1994) 12 companies from different 
sectors predominantly public 
utilities 
A comprehensive case study approach. The authors used Cost-
Benefit approach to analyzed the pre and post- privatization 
performance by taking into account the detailed institutional 
background of the particular firms, industry and overall country 
from which these enterprises belongs. 
The study documents welfare gains in case of 11 
out of 12 companies analyzed. They find no 
workers layoff, but in three cases significantly 
better off. 
 
 
 
Aftab and Khan (1995) Automobile and ghee industries Simple ratio analysis of the divested firms in pre and post 
privatization periods.  
The study compares private firms with employee 
owned firms after privatization. The conclusion 
is that private firms are more profitable than 
employee buyouts firms. 
 
  
Bengali (1998) Industrial enterprises from 
cement, automobile and 
chemical sectors   
Simple ratio analysis with brief institutional characteristics of the 
enterprises particularly focussing on the labour issues after 
privatization. 
Profitability and efficiency decreased for five out 
of seven companies, while solvency ratios 
showed a significant increase for three out of 
seven companies. 
 
 
Mehdi (1998) Industrial enterprises from 
automobile, ghee, cement, 
chemical and ceramics 
sectors  
Simple ratio analysis with brief institutional details of divested 
firms. 
The study analyzed the financial  
Performance of privatized firms in pre and post 
privatization regimes. It revealed both efficiency 
and profitability decreased after privatization. 
 
 
 
Source:   Compiled from:  
               Vernon and Lawrence (1989). 
               Megginson et al. (1994). 
               Galal et al. (1994). 
               Aftab and Khan (1995). 
               Bengali (1998). 
               Mehdi (1998). 
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3.3. Recent Literature on Ownership, Deregulation and Performance 
 
Since the turn of the century, some significant effort has gone to evaluate the 
performance of firms in pre- and post privatization by using simple financial ratios as 
well advanced parametric methods such as stochastic production and cost function 
estimation and the subsequent derivation of production/cost efficiencies and 
productivity estimates. Some authors on the contrary used non-parametric methods 
such as data envelopment analysis (DEA) to address the issues concerning parametric 
methods. Following, I present some broader conclusions from a selection of some 
studies that had addressed the issue of performance under public and private 
ownerships. For the simplicity and to get a perspective on the business constraints, I 
divide the recent literature into different categories based on the nature of business 
(manufacturing, finance, transportation and utilities).    
 
3.3.1. Manufacturing 
 
Chirwa (2001) used DEA inter-temporal frontier for Malawi firms for the period 
1970-97. This paper uses sample of 6 firms, 3 firms each from privatized and private 
category. His study found improved technical efficiency of privatized, state-owned 
and private ownership companies. The author suggested that competitive process is 
more effective than privatization in increasing the technical efficiency.  
 
Saygili and Taymaz (2001) used stochastic production frontier on Turkish cement 
firms. This study covers the period 1980-95 encompassing nine years pre 
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privatization period. Sample firms included are public, private and privatized and 
mixed ownerships. Study observed that privatization and change of ownership had no 
effect on technical efficiency. 
 
Jones and Mygind (2002) evaluated the privatization effect in Estonia. Using a large 
random sample of 666 Estonian firms for the period 1993-97, authors estimated fixed 
effect production function. Based on different specifications, this study documented a 
positive effect of change of ownership. Private firms were more efficient and 
productive compared to state-owned firms. Study also separated firms based on 
ownership type and concluded that managerial owned firms are for more productive 
and domestic insiders the least. 
 
Chirwa (2004) estimated stochastic production frontier using Malawian public, 
private and privatized firms during 1970-97. This study reported high mean technical 
efficiency in privatized, competing state owned and private companies. Competition, 
multi-nationality and structural adjustment process is more valuable than privatization 
in increasing the technical efficiency.  
 
Bartel and Harrison (2005) looked at all Indonesian manufacturing companies (1981–
1995) including private and public companies. The authors aimed to investigate 
whether reforms could replace full divestiture of public enterprises and due to the 
presence of agency problem, public sector manufacturing firms could be less 
effective. If both ownership firms were inefficient or efficient at a particular time, 
then environment in which public firms operate could be a significant determinant of 
productivity and efficiency. Study concluded that public sector enterprises (PSEs) 
perform worse than their private-sector counterparts. PSEs receiving government 
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subsidy or shielded from import competition or foreign ownership performed worse 
than the private companies. 
 
Brown et al (2006) carried out a study to determine the effect of privatization on 
multifactor productivity of manufacturing firms in Romania, Hungry, Ukraine and 
Russia. The authors estimated the long term effect of privatization by first introducing 
measures to control selection effect of privatization. This study documented an 
immediate and long term positive impact of privatization on productivity 
improvement for three countries (15% in Romania, 8% in Hungary, and 2% in 
Ukraine), but negative effect for Russia (-3%). 
 
Okten (2006) evaluated productive and allocative efficiency of 22 Turkish privatized 
cement companies for the period 1983-99. Ownership change effects labour 
productivity. Allocative efficiency is dependent on changes in the competitive 
environment. All plants improved their labour productivity by reducing the work 
force. Plants privatized to overseas buyers also increase their capital and investment 
significantly.  
 
Amess and Roberts (2007) evaluated the effectiveness of privatization on 2164 Polish 
producer cooperatives. They used parametric approach to estimate total factor 
productivity change. Their sample comprises of private and public enterprises over 6 
years time span. They concluded that firms improved their productivity in the first 
three years of post privatization period by a range of 3-20%. These figures were 9-
36% for labour productivity and -16 to 6% for capital productivity. They concluded 
that competition had forced firms to restructure and operate more efficiently. 
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Asaftei et al (2008) looked at the effect of ownership change and business conditions 
on the productivity of Romanian manufacturing firms during 1995-2003. The study 
concluded that ownership change is not sufficient to guarantee a better performance 
in term of productivity improvement. Competition plays an crucial role in forcing 
firms to become efficient in running the business. Fully private firms did well in a 
highly competitive sector, but this cannot be said for less competitive sector. 
Privatized firms did not perform any better than public enterprise. The study 
identified the role of institutional restructuring alongside privatization to boost 
productivity. 
 
3.3.2. Financial Sector 
 
Of those studies that have specialised in banking, there is a general trend indicating 
that deregulation has a negative impact on TFP.  For example, an examination of the 
Tunisian banking sector by Chaftai (1997) revealed that TFP increased following the 
1986 liberalisation program exercised by the country and concluded that, on average, 
banks were less efficient in the post-liberalisation period.  These results were borne 
out by Grifell Tatje and Lovell (1996).  Their study examined Spanish banking over 
the period of deregulation between 1986 and 1991, and concluded that TFP declined 
over that period. 
 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) use TFP growth as the measure of banking 
performance over the period 1985-1996.  Measures of output employed in this study 
include weighted values of financial figures, including deposits and investments. 
Labour and capital are the variable inputs, while equity and reserves are a quasi-fixed 
input. The study finds that there is a significant over employment of labour relative to 
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capital, particularly in the public sector, both pre- and post deregulation and that the 
entire growth in TFP of private sector banks comes from the scale component.   
 
Mendes and Reblo (1999) study the Portuguese banking sector, and illustrate that 
deregulation in that specific case did not lead to an increase in cost efficiency, but 
rather to technological regress. 
 
Gilbert and Wilson (1998) use Malmquist indexes of productivity change to 
investigate the effects of privatization and deregulation on the productivity of Korean 
banks.  The study finds that Korean banks responded to privatization and deregulation 
by substantially altering their mix of inputs and outputs, yielding large enhancements 
in productivity.   
 
Fukuyama and Weber (2002) use panel data on Japanese banks over the period of 
1992-1996, productivity growth is measured and decomposed into changes in output 
allocative efficiency, input technical efficiency and technical change. The study 
concludes that Japanese banks experienced productivity declines over the period of 
analysis and that each bank could have used somewhere between 78-93% of actual 
inputs if they had chosen the most efficient, revenue maximizing combination of 
outputs. 
 
3.3.3. Transportation 
 
Estache et al (2002) estimated total factor productivity of Argentinas and Brazil 
railways companies for the period 1994-99. Authors calculated productivity of 
operations before and after privatization. Study concluded improvement in 
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productivity after privatization. Growth of TFP was due primarily to an improvement 
in output rather than reduction in input use. 
 
Cullinane and Song (2003) estimated cross sectional production function frontier 
under different distribution assumption alongside panel data structure using Korean 
container terminal for the period 1978-96. Study concluded that privatization 
improved container productive efficiency. Involvement of private sector had a 
positive effect on efficiency. 
 
Tongzon and Heng (2005) using stochastic frontier model looked at 25 container 
terminals efficiency. Study results showed private participation improved port 
operation efficiency and competitiveness. This study also accepted the premise that 
efficiency promotes competitiveness. 
 
Cullinane et al. (2005) using DEA efficiency scores of worlds‟ leading container 
ports examined the effect of private participation on efficiency of ports operation for 
the period 1992-99. This study rejected the proposition that greater private sector 
involvement in the container port sector irrevocably leads to improved efficiency. 
 
3.3.4. Utilities 
 
Saal  and Parker (2000) estimated multiple output cost function for the period 1985-
99 using UK water and sewerage firms data. Study identified that economic 
efficiency improved post privatization. Overall, better regulation promoted economic 
efficiency rather than privatization.  
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Sall and Parker (2001) estimated productivity growth using quality adjusted output 
indices for the period 1985-99 using UK water and sewerage firms data. Study was 
unable to show any productivity improvement in post privatization period despite 
significant reductions in labour usage. Better financial performance was a result of 
growth in output prices. 
 
Resende and Faceanha (2002) examined Brazilian telecommunication companies‟ 
efficiency using DEA frontier. The study period covered only two data points July 
1998 and December 1999. This study documented evidence of decreasing returns to 
scale and no improvement in efficiency in post privatization period. 
 
Li and Xu (2004) looked at the privatization and competition effect on 
telecommunication sector around the world for the period 1990 to 2001. The study 
concluded that privatization and effectiveness of competition had a positive effect on 
labour and total factor productivity. This article also distinguished the partial and full 
privatization effect on pricing and productivity and concluded that full privatization 
effect was also significant in raising productivity levels. These conclusions were 
robust to alternative model specifications. 
 
Sall et al. (2007) studied the effect of privatization on privatized English and Welsh 
water and sewerage industry. This study used parametric stochastic frontier 
techniques to estimate total factor productivity alongside its components 
(technological change, efficiency change and scale change) for the period 1985-2000. 
This study period covers four years pre privatization and fourteen years post 
privatization.  This study did not show any improvement in productivity due to 
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efficiency decline, but showed a technical progress after privatization. The authors 
suggested that expansion of scale alongside a loss in efficiency might have 
contributed toward decline in productivity.  
 
Rossi (2001) estimated the post privatization performance of 8 Argentinean gas 
distribution companies. This paper uses stochastic frontier method to estimate the 
efficiency in distribution of gas over 5 years. This study concluded that, as a 
consequence of shift in the frontier and catching up, efficiency improved in post 
privatization period for all firms in the sample. 
 
It can be concluded that although there exists a vast body of literature on public-
private efficiency comparison and privatization itself, but it lacks the consistency in 
results due to several reasons
13
:  
 
i. Differences in market structure 
Difference in market structure is the most important determinant of efficiency. Galal 
(1994) stated that studies which found private ownership superior has compared the 
competitive enterprises with monopoly. When reasonable competitive enterprises 
were compared, private enterprises dominated the public enterprises and finally when 
private and public monopolies were compared, results were ambiguous.  
 
ii. Differences in variables used 
Secondly, the indicators used to evaluate the performance of those enterprises have 
been the major factor for ambiguous results, where profit measure generally favors 
                                                 
13
 For detailed discussion and review of literature in this regard see Galal et al. (1994). 
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the private ownership‟s role, while, productivity measures are either biased in favours 
of public ownership or in most cases ambiguous for imperfectly competitive 
industries.   
 
iii. Small number of observations 
A third problem encountered in many case studies is the small number of firms being 
compared (single telecommunication company in a country). International 
comparison, in this sense, does not make sense because of geographical and economic 
differences of the countries.  
 
Contribution of this study is that  first, I  cover at least five business cycles (26 years) 
of Pakistani cement industry which has evolved over time and has become significant 
in term of main export earner (Pakistan being the world‟s fifth largest cement 
exporter) and contribution to the national exchequer (30 billion Rupees tax 
contribution). Second, studies that addressed the issue of privatization/deregulation 
and firms performance since 2000 limit to either developed countries or countries at 
the advanced stage of their economic with  relatively stable political system, 
established property rights and good industrial base. Pakistan being underdeveloped, 
having extremely low per capita income, political instability (5 times change of 
government since the first phase of the privatization program) provides compelling 
case and hopefully shall be a good case study when it comes to analysis of the effect 
of change of ownership on firms productivity and efficiency.  
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3.4. Methodological Issues 
 
(a) Choice of Criteria: A Theoretical Analysis 
 How can one decide, whether firm i, in private sector is more efficient compared to 
firm j in public sector? or alternatively firm i or j is operating more efficiently at time 
t compared to t-1. What should be the appropriate criteria for efficiency 
measurement? The difference in objectives and constraints of public-private 
enterprise makes the comparison on the basis of some fixed criteria relatively 
difficult
14
 . Private enterprises are usually set up for the accomplishment of set criteria 
of commercial profitability. The concept of public enterprises, however, implicitly 
assumes the existence of two dimensions that are enterprise and public dimensions. In 
the enterprise dimension‟s, the main objectives are production of some specific goods 
or services at competitive prices, marketing of output produced and documentation of 
transactions in the form of profit and loss accounts.  The public dimension on the 
other hand, assumes the public interest as its prime objective. 
 
In the literature discussed above, three types of indicators of public enterprise 
performance evaluation have been used. The details of each one with merits and 
demerits is given below:      
 
 Private Profits and Financial Ratios: Most of the studies of the enterprise 
performance evaluation have used the private accounting profit or net 
income
15
 .  But private profit is generally criticized on the grounds that it 
                                                 
14
 See Sheikh (1985) for detail of choice of criterion for performance evaluation of a public enterprise. 
15
 For example see Boardman and Vining (1989). 
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tends to suffer conceptual, pricing, attribution, accounting and distributional 
flaws, which render it, incapable of reflecting the true economic performance 
of a firm (see Figure 3.1). This is worked out by costs and benefits through 
prices which are either directly regulated by government or through indirect 
measures. So the relationship between input/output remains unclear. There 
have been developed some other indicators, which are based on taking into 
account the costs and benefits simultaneously, generally called financial 
ratios. Financial ratios do provide the base for performance evaluation
16
.  
Return on sale expressed in current prices can provide a powerful insight for 
the performance of a firm with relatively little effort. A historical comparison 
may lead to useful analysis with minimum efforts and expenditures. Financial 
ratios are, however, criticized, being of its static nature. Further, financial 
ratios calculation through private profits is criticized on the same grounds as 
that of private profits. 
 
 Other Partial Indicators: Besides, private profits and financial ratios some 
authors have used the other partial indicators for efficiency measurement such 
as capacity utilization, physical unit of production and labour productivity 
etc
17
. These are partial indicators in the sense that labour productivity only 
describes the contribution of labour, while ignoring the capital efficiency side. 
Similarly, capacity utilization is based on some technological characteristics 
                                                 
16
 Financial ratios has been widely used indicators of performance in the studies so for conducted for 
privatised firms performance evaluation i.e. Bishop and Kay (1989), Magginson et al. (1994), Aftab 
and Khan (1995), Naqvi and Kemal (1997), Bengali (1998) and Mehdi (1998).    
17
 Authors such as Koo (1985), Aftab and Khan (1995) had used such indicators. 
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such as, maximum possible output, which is a guess based on engineering 
characteristics of the plant. Some authors have used some other popular 
indicators based on the weighted average of some partial indicators. But in 
some cases these indicators tend to account for some benefits or costs more 
than once. While, ignoring some other benefits or costs entirely, thus, 
violating the generally acceptable definition, that benefits and costs should be 
counted once and only once. 
 
Public Profits: Financial ratios and partial indicators of performance have been 
subject to severe criticism, due to the fact that they do not take into account the firm‟s 
social objectives adequately. The indicator, which addresses the flaws in private 
accounting profit, have been used is called public profits. The calculation of public 
profits at shadow prices can simultaneously take into account the commercial as well 
as non-commercial objectives of the enterprise.  But, shadow prices are notoriously 
difficult to measure because of large data set requirement, institutional details and a 
significantly time consuming. There is, however, a short cut, which works fine in the 
cases where non-commercial objectives of public enterprise are less significant. 
Public profits expressed in current as well as constant prices can serve the task as 
underlined by public profits measured in shadow prices
18
.  
 
From the above discussion, it can be arguably concluded that starting point of 
performance evaluation should be financial ratios based on private accounting profit, 
expressed in terms of total sales or assets used. However, it should be supplemented 
by partial indicators of performance. Then, in the next stage, performance of the firms 
                                                 
18
 Authors such as Sheikh (1985) and Galal (1994) heavily relied on this type of criteria.   
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in fulfilment of social objectives should be analyzed by making adjustments in the 
private accounting profits.  Once, it has been decided, that firm has done good or bad. 
The sources of differences in managerial efficiency over the time can be worked out. 
The overall managerial efficiency can increase due to the increase in one of the 
following kinds of efficiency: 
 
1. Increase in technical efficiency is closely related to improvement in use of 
labour, fixed and working capital
19
 as well as other inputs.    
2. Increase in the price efficiency is closely related to cost efficiency or 
allocative efficiency, in which the factors of production are used according to the 
changing prices of inputs and outputs. This involves the estimation of cost efficiency 
component of managerial efficiency.     
 
  
                                                 
19
 For detail of discussion on sources of variations in efficiency, see Sheikh (1985).   
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Figure 3.1: Private Accounting Profit as Public Enterprise Performance Indicator  
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3.5. Choice of Criterion: My Preferred Methodology 
 
In this section I outline my preferred methodology for answering the question: what 
happened as a result of public enterprise divestiture and its implications. To study the 
economic and financial effects and, to attribute the observed changes of that policy, I 
divide my sample firms into three categories: 
 
(1) The “Treatment group firms” [privatized firms];  
(2) The “Control group” [public sector firms until their eventual privatization]; and 
(3) The “Neutral group” [private firms]. 
 
The treatment and control groups are different in the sense that one group was 
privatized and the other was not. Any observed differences could, with some 
justification, be largely attributed to privatization. I begin the analysis of each case by 
comparing the actual performance in post and pre divestiture regimes. I covered six 
years of public (pre divestiture 1986-91) and 20 years private (post divestiture 1992-
2011) periods. The comparison of divested firms with group of firms either in public 
or private, working under the same economic conditions makes sense
20
. Fortunately, 
this option is open to us, as against many studies on post-privatization performance 
evaluation.  
 
                                                 
20
 Some authors have compared the performance of the same enterprise in post- and pre- privatization 
regimes and then attributed the observed changes to privatization. This approach, however, can be 
applied in a stationary situation. In the real world, however, policy may change and observed changes 
in performance could be driven by changes in economic policies rather than divestiture. 
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My approach to performance evaluation is divided into three subsections: The first 
part of performance evaluation takes into account the firms commercial objectives 
and is termed as financial performance evaluation (chapter 5). Second, that captures 
the non-commercial and distributional objectives, as economic performance 
evaluation (chapter 6). The former covers financial profitability and efficiency ratios. 
This includes profitability in terms of margins on sales and assets. Efficiency is tested 
in terms of financial soundness of the firm that covers the short time liabilities partial 
labour productivity indicators, investment growth and payout behaviour. In the 
second part, adjustments are made in private accounting profit and define the concept 
and methodology to calculate public profits and profitability and total factor 
productivity in current as well as at constant prices.  
 
In subsequent analysis, I will discuss and estimate the technical and cost efficiency 
components of managerial efficiency. I also estimate a total measure of productivity 
that accommodates the growth in inputs and output and find sources of growth. I shall 
discuss the role of technological progress (regress) in productivity growth as well as 
the scale of operation and related scale efficiencies. This sort of analysis is 
necessitated due to significant additions in capacities in the last 10 years. Then I 
separately, estimate labour use efficiency to establish that golden handshake scheme 
imitated at the time of privatization has any bearing during later years. Finally, I 
estimate the extent of competition in pre and post reform period by jointly estimating 
demand and supply equation.  
 
                                                                           Chapter 3 
                                                              Performance and Choice of Criterion 
 
 75 
I believe that detailed analysis of such as mentioned above shall provide more 
complete picture in term pre and post privatization experience for the privatized firms 
as well as industry as a whole.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Post Privatization Qualitative Assessment 
 
This chapter provides information on the qualitative and quantitative adjustments made 
as a result of change of ownership and their impact on the day to day running of the 
privatized firms and their competitors. The chapter sources information by looking at 
the annual reports of the companies, interactions with the industry experts, producer 
association and consumers. 
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4.1. Introduction  
 
Privatization wave of 1991/92 was a major reversal of the nationalization policy by 
the government. This was in part due to the fact that although lot of efforts were made 
to make the public sector enterprises effective and productive, no serious effort was 
made by the managers of these firms to run the organizations on commercial footing. 
One such effort in 1980s was the creation of a cell called „Expert Advisory Cell‟ 
(EAC) under the ministry of industries and production to look after these enterprises 
and to devise mechanism to reward efficient managers. The Cell involved lot of 
international consultant and economists to evaluate the performance of these firms 
based on input use and productions achieved, financial strengths of the enterprise, 
achieving of goals set by the government in term of capacity utilizations etc and social 
welfare.  
 
These consultants devised the statistical models, wrote down the programmes and 
trained local staff at the Cell to run those programmes. Based on those templates, 
EAC produced publications comprising of financial and operational data for general 
public, but at the same time graded these public sector firms in achieving those targets 
set by the Cell. This system remained in place for more than two decades but nothing 
concrete came out of this exercise. Public sector firms continued losing tax payers 
money in the form of subsidies.  
 
The question is why this rewarding of efficient managers did not work to make these 
firms more productive and efficient and financially sound. To answer these questions, 
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one would have to look at agency problem literature and this is beyond of scope for 
this chapter. Nonetheless, in 1991/1992, government started privatizing these units to 
private sector. The immediate impact of change of ownership in some cases was 
astonishing. These firms not only were financially restructured within a short period 
of time, but some extraordinary decisions were made to make these enterprises viable 
in the long run. In the following discussion, a qualitative assessment is made in term 
of change in management style, operational changes, and demand and supply 
constraints and how they were addressed by the new private sector management.  
 
4.1.1. Changes in Operating Days  
 
Before the privatization, public sector firms were usually operating with excessive and 
unnecessary pressure from labour union groups. The ultimate effect was less operating 
days, lower working hours and higher rent seeking from the labour unions.  However, 
after privatization, the situation changed where the intensity of labour union pressure 
was now less due to job insecurity and better remuneration packages. As a result 
working hours and operating days improved. 
  
Interviews with the new management of the privatized group of firms reveal that the 
new management paid greater attention to increase operating days by carrying out 
heavy repair and maintenance, better working environment and incentives
21
 to the 
                                                 
21
 As D.G. Khan Cement company Chairman in his remarks in annual report of the company stated: 
“I would like to ensure my employees that the new management is looking to creating more job 
opportunities for my staff and their families. Furthermore no retrenchment of job will be carried out, a 
concerned expressed by many privatised units”.   
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permanent workers. Except Zealpak and Dandot where labour-management dispute 
forced a shutdown of the plant for a short while, overall management-labour relations 
were fairly stable. After privatization, production targets were stiffer, numbers of leaves 
were curtailed to the legal maximum and the extra leaves negotiated by the previous 
unions with public sector management were no longer honoured and non-pecuniary 
benefits were also eliminated. Result was higher working days and longer working 
hours.   
  
A good example in this context is D. G. Khan Cement, where the record operating days 
were observed (see box-5.1). On the other hand, except Mustahkam Cement, all other 
public sector firms at that time period were operating as usual and in some cases even 
lower than the historical operating days of the company. The poor law & order 
condition of the country affected both types of ownership firms badly, but its intensity 
was higher in public sector firms because of union pressure and job security. On the 
other hand, privatized and private sector firms employees hesitated to enjoy these 
unscheduled holidays.   
  
4.1.2. Modernization, Rehabilitation and Optimization Program 
 
A company can produce more output from the existing plant by keeping it in a good 
working condition, so that it can be used at close to 100 percent capacity. The years of 
negligence in repair and maintenance services during the public sector ownership 
regime resulted in low capacity utilization, loss of operating days and the delays in 
committed supplies.  
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As soon as the cement industry was privatized, the monopoly of SCCP gradually got 
eliminated. The price war between private and state-run companies led to an urgent 
need of replacement of the relatively older kiln that has reached the expiry date, 
replacing with new, better, modern, and cost efficient and computerized dry process 
plants. Elimination of fixed price formula and rising prices of output provided the 
lubrication for the new management to opt for Building, Modernization and 
Rehabilitation (BMR) of existing operating fixed assets. Dandot and D.G. Khan 
Cement companies implemented this plan immediately after the transfer of ownership 
and remaining privatized firms except Gharibwal Cement implemented the BMR 
during 1993-95.  
  
The results show that under BMR programmes, the companies immediately achieved 
productive and cost efficiency. However, it will take time to reap the full benefits of 
optimization program.   
  
4.1.3. Management of Working Capital 
 
Indirect effects of privatization such as better access to mobilization of resources, and 
enough input-output inventory stocks for windfall gains in the period of uncertain 
demand are numerous. Shaikh (1985) estimated 6.5% improvement in technical 
efficiency of working capital in case of private ownership period for ghee industry 
during 1970-71  
  
The building of sufficient working capital is important because of the fact that in case 
of default on payment of public sector firms, state usually intervenes and rescues the 
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firm from ceasing production operation. Private sector firms do not enjoy such benefits. 
The quantity of working capital of the privatized firms improved immediately after 
privatization. This ensured the new management for better competition in input market 
with the public firms that enjoyed a support from the state-owned institutions and 
corporations like WAPDA for electricity, Sui Northern and Southern Gas for gas and 
Pakistan State Oil (PSO) for furnace oil purchase. 
 
4.1.4. Competition  
 
The most important consequence of liberalization and privatization is certainly the 
expected increase in competition among the firms. It provides the base for efficiency 
improvement. A significant increase in investment spending for capacity expansion and 
maintenance was necessary for the privatized firms to compete in new competitive 
environment after change of ownership and withdrawing of subsidies and this is what 
they did. On the other hand, those firms which were not privatized in 1991/92, still kept 
relying on government finances. Tight fiscal policies and ultimate withdrawal of 
subsidies had little room for modernization of these public firms after 1991. The 
uncertainty of privatization of these units also kept them away for easy mobilization of 
resources from stock market. The ultimate effect of that policy was relatively older 
plants, cost inefficient production process, lack of incentives and real threat of 
privatization for this group of firms. They have to face a stiff competition from 
powerful private and privatized firms in every sphere of activity ranging from 
production to marketing. So, in a nutshell, the period of 1993 to 2002 saw a developing 
competition among public, private and privatized firms  
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4.1.5. Trade Policy and Protection 
 
With the nationalization of cement plants in 1972, both internal and external trade in 
cement became a state monopoly. In 1976, Pakistan became net importer of the cement. 
The powers to import the cement were delegated to SCCP. In July 1981 the private 
sector was authorized to import cement without any restriction, and in 1985 
government removed the SCCP right to import. With the beginning of 1990s the 
government initiated a phase program of tariff reforms. As a result, excise duties and 
nominal protection have been lowered
22
. This brought for-reaching effect on healthy 
competition in overall industrial activity as well as cement industry from the 
international competitors.   
  
4.1.6. Capital Requirements 
 
Capital requirement for setting up a cement plant is high. According to APCMA 
estimates, the average cost for setting up a grass root cement plant is around Rs.1500 
per ton of clinker as of 1988 prices. On this basis, a million-ton plant would require 
about Rs.1500 millions. Further, with the increase in marketing cost and distribution 
network due to competition, it became necessary for the manufacturers to extend better 
credit lines to the distributors. This has further raised capital requirements in the 
industry. The necessity for installation of captive control equipment to check dust 
                                                 
22
 The cement industry of Pakistan has been subject to custom duties. It was initially subject to tariff of 
Rs.550 per ton and import surcharge of 10% of the CIF prices. In January 1982, the tariff was raised 
from 10% to 25% as well as the imposition of extra surcharge of 5%. The tariff was again raised to 
40% in January 1983 and 70% in June 1984. 
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emission and installation of captive power generators to overcome problem of power 
shortage, have also raised the capital requirements. Therefore, the large financial 
resources are required for installing cement manufacturing facilities, which can be 
considered as a barrier to entry. But the strategy adopted by government during 1980s 
has worked positively
23
. This strategy has made the entry conditions relatively easy, 
which, translated into new entrants and resultant competition in 1990s. 
 
4.1.7. Capacity Utilization 
 
The rising demand does not ensure the higher capacity utilization which could lead to 
economies of large-scale production. The older kiln did not have the ability to work as 
efficiently as new modern dry process plant. In this case, higher capacity utilization 
may result in higher maintenance costs and some time it can offset the increase in profit 
due to economies of scale. Despite rising demand, the management may opt to remain 
at sub-optimal level of production if they face such situation. Private and privatized 
group of firms invested highly in technology upgrade and maintenance and achieved 
higher capacity utilization and in some cases exceeded the rated capacity (see box-1) 
immediately after privatization against the dismal performance in term of capacity 
utilization by their competitor public sector firms (firms still operating under public 
ownership). 
 
 
 
                                                 
23
 During this period government introduced significant changes in the prudential regulation. These 
include the change of debt-equity ratio and underwriting procedures.   
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Box-1: Director’s Opinion towards Performance after Privatization 
 “With the blessing of Almighty Allah and the efforts of officers and workers of the company I have been awarded with 
success i.e. achievements of historic highest production. Clinker and cement production and dispatches records are as 
clear as crystal from following figures. 
  1993 Previous Record 
Clinker Production (ton)  663431 622836 (1990) 
Cement Grinding (ton)  685400 692861 (19887) 
Dispatches (ton)  683142 608364 (1987) 
The production figure achieved for clinker, cement grinding and dispatches have not only excelled the budgeted targets by 
substantial margin but set new records in every sphere of activity. The plant was operated for 326 days which is also a 
record”.  
Source: Director’s Review, D. G. Khan Cement, Annual Report, 1993 and 1996. 
 
 “It is gratifying for us that during the year the company achieved the highest ever production results”. 
Source: Director’s Review, Gharibwal Cement, Annual Report, 1995.  
 
 “I may point out that the production of clinker and cement was highest ever in the history of company”. 
Source: Director’s Review, Mustehkam Cement, Annual Report, 1993.  
 
 “In the year under review company achieved highest production record on the basis of only five kiln operation”. 
 Source: Director’s Review, Zealpak Cement, Annual Report, 1992. 
 
 “The report under review is the first complete year of operation under the new management after privatization. I am 
pleased to report that the clinker production, cement sales and profit of the company during the year were highest ever 
achieved in the history of company”. 
Source: Director’s Review, Dandot Cement, Annual Report, 1993. 
 
 “Yours directors are pleased to inform you that the company had produced 110% rated capacity of cement in 1990 and 
this year 123% of rated capacity. It is not out of to mention here that at the time when project was initially started, the 
GOP had assured 20% return on equity capital. Hence Dadabhoy opted sub-optimal plant having a capacity of 
production 1000 metric tons per day. After deregulation of cement prices and with-drawl of government assurance on 
20% return on capital, it become obvious that the project without optimization was not viable”.      
Source: Director’s Review, Dadabhoy Cement, Annual Report, 1991.    
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4.1.8. Threat of Bankruptcy 
 
The bankruptcy chances are multiplied by the depressed demand and stagnant 
economic activity. As mentioned earlier, the real threat of bankruptcy was a powerful 
challenge for a new management after subsidies were removed as a result of 
privatization of these firms.  D.G. Khan Cement director‟s report stated: “At present 
cement industry as a whole is moving toward decline in earnings growth as competition 
increased with the advent of extra capacity. This means that I am heading toward the 
survival of the fittest, that is, the most efficient plant will survive in the high 
competitive environment”. In the backdrop of these conditions, privatized firms opted 
for technology upgrades to survive in the long run. 
  
4.1.9. Low Cost of Excessive Employment and Extra Benefits 
 
Immediately after privatization the new management took some extra measures to 
curtail the wage bills. All the extra benefits which new management considered illegal 
were withdrawn. Employees who obtained the “golden handshake” have been re-
employed on contract basis, now they are working at much lower wage rate than 
earlier, having no extra-benefits such as, leaves, medical facilities, holidays, pension 
etc. The strategy played a dual role in lowering costs and employing the most efficient 
workers among the workers who opted for golden handshake. 
 
 
 
                                                                              Chapter 4 
                                                                                  Qualitative Assessment 
 
86 
 
4.1.10. Costs and Economic Viability of the Industry 
  
Over the years, Pakistan remained an economic producer of cement
24
. In the past, 
cement plants derived their cost advantages from cheap natural gas, low wage rates and 
low financial cost of the old wet process plants. But, in recent past, increasing 
maintenance costs and substitution of fuel oil for low-cost natural, gas, rising cost of 
electricity and furnace oil, and constantly increasing price of paper and labour charges 
have eroded these comparative advantages. Furthermore, the elimination of 
transportation costs and massive increase in indirect and direct taxation has reduced the 
retained price. As a result, trend has been changed in cost advantage. All these factors 
have contributed significantly in efficient use of resources over the time
25
 .  
 
4.1.11. Other Exogenous Factors 
 
Political will is the most important factor for industry growth. Since 1992, successive 
governments have kept the privatization, liberalization and deregulation policy on their 
political agenda. The fear of policy change in the near future is almost nonexistent 
                                                 
24
 Based on the fact that calculated domestic resource cost is well below one. Also by the fact, that 
industry has generally received negative effective protection (for details see World Bank (1985). 
25
 The price of furnace oil and electricity charges almost doubled to Rs.5868 from Rs.3843 in 1994. 
Similarly, electricity tariff was Rs.2.13 per unit in 1994, which surged up to Rs.3.06 per unit in 1996. 
In 1995, the cost of manufacturing one bag of cement was calculated at around Rs.56, made up of 
Rs.23 for cost of furnace oil, Rs.21 for electricity and Rs.12 for the cost of paper. Adding up Rs.90 
worth of taxes, a sum of Rs.29 was left with the manufacturers to cover the costs of raw material, 
labour, stores, depreciation, financial costs and all overheads. They used to save Rs.60 per bag, 
excluding taxes to enable them to cover all the above mentioned overheads. 
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because of internal and external macroeconomic pressures. This has encouraged 
competition in the private sector, which could have helped firms in achieving efficiency 
and growth in productivity. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
Financial Performance 
 
 
  
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of industry performance based upon purely 
financial indicators and proxies in pre- and post privatization periods. Industry and 
individual firms‟ performance is assessed with the use of profitability, solvency and 
efficiency ratios. Simple and widely used non-parametric techniques are used to see 
any statistical difference in the value of these ratios in pre- and post privatization 
periods. Subsequently, these ratios are used in the regression framework to find out 
the determinants of profitability, efficiency, output and capital investment.  
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Since the widely cited work of Megginson et al. (1994), an overwhelming number of 
authors had used financial ratios to assess the impact of privatization on the financial 
and operational performance of the firms
26
. These studies had not been just limited to 
developed economies, but recently, a significant number of researchers have started 
using the similar methodology to evaluate pre- and post privatization experience of 
privatized firms in developing and former socialist countries. Some widely cited 
studies in this regard include: Megginson et al. (1994), Villalonga 2000), Harper 
(2001), Boubakri and Cosset (2002), Jackson et al. (2003), Wei et al. (2003), 
Boubakri et al. (2004), D‟Souzaa et al. (2005), Boubakri  et al. (2005), Chen et al. 
(2006), Mathur and Banchuenvijit (2007), Farinós et al. (2007), Naceur et al. (2007), 
Cook and Uchida (2008), Huanga and Yao (2010), Huang and Wang (2011), and 
Zhang et al. (2012).  
 
The reasons for the popularity of this type of analysis are that ratios are simple to 
understand, intuitive and easy to implement. Some commonly used financial ratios 
include: return on sales/investment, value of real output, investment as a % total 
assets, cash ratios and dividend payout. These ratios are considered as a good starting 
point but insufficient to paint a complete picture as well as issues with different 
accounting standards across the globe which makes international comparison difficult. 
Hence, this chapter is dedicated for simple financial analysis with the aid of financial 
                                                 
26
 The popularity of using financial ratios could be gauged by the fact that Megginson et al. (1994) 
study has been cited in more than 1300 research pieces worldwide.  
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ratios and then these ratios are used to econometrically model the determinants of 
profitability, efficiency, investment and output growth.  
      
 5.2. Testable Hypothesis 
 
All the governments opting for privatization expect that this policy would result
27
 in 
the following changes in post privatization period. 
 
i) Increase in profitability of the firm  
State owned enterprises are often chronically unprofitable, at least, in part, because 
they are, often charged with objectives such as, maximizing employment and 
developing backward regions. These social objectives are obtained by giving a soft 
bribe to public sector managers in the form of subsidy to compensate for operating 
losses and provision of inputs at reduced prices. Privatization is designed usually, to 
achieve single most important objective of getting firms commercially profitability. It 
is, therefore, assumed that strict monitoring of financial markets, penalization to 
inefficient managers and clear-cut signals of no further subsidy, would work. The 
immediate threat of bankruptcy would also force the new management to accelerate 
commercial profitability for the long term survival.  
  
Many ratios can be used, as proxies of profitability measures. In this chapter, I use 
two types of profitability ratios: profit margin ratios, including gross, operating and 
net return on sales, return on assets and equity employed.  
                                                 
27
 For detail description of government expectation toward privatized firms and ratios, this represents 
these objectives see Megginson (1994). 
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ii) Increase in operational efficiency of the firms 
By selling public enterprises to private owners and letting them to face competition, 
one would expect that firms will employ their human, financial and technical 
resources more efficiently. By removing non-economic objectives from state-owned–
enterprises (SOEs), government expects an increase in operating and financial 
efficiency; maintain enough liquidity in its portfolio to meet the daily expenses and 
financial charges. Similar to profitability measures, many ratios could be used as a 
proxy for efficiency. I use five ratios in this chapter to evaluate firms operating 
efficiency. These include labour productivity, capacity utilization, interval measure; 
average collection period and inventory turnover.  
    
iii) Cause the firms to increase their capital spending 
 It is believed that the public sector firms may invest more as compare to private 
sector firms, as the former are the principle vehicle of investment for government. 
Boycko et el. (1993) also suggested that government should be willing and able to 
subsidize inefficient high output in SOEs, in order to maximize employment or to 
achieve socially desirable non-economic goals.  But in my case I expect that 
investment spending in public sector firms will be lower due to two reasons: 
 
a) Already large-scale public sector development program;  
b) Tight budget constraint imposed by government as an effective tool of 
controlling these enterprises. 
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I expect that privatized firms will increase investment spending because of greater 
access to private debt, especially from equity market. Two proxy ratios are computed 
to measure the investment intensity; capital investment to sales (CAPSAL) and capital 
investment to total assets (CAPAS).   
 
iv) Increase in output of the firms   
Government hopes that better incentives and flexible financing opportunities will 
increase real sales after privatization. However, another competing hypothesis is that, 
ending of subsidies could cause a decrease in production relative to pre-divestiture 
period. I will test this prediction by using inflation-adjusted sales in pre and post-
privatization regimes. For this purpose, I compute inflation adjusted sales volume. 
 
v) Improvement in solvency and liquidity position  
Governments usually do not pay attention on financial soundness of firms. I expect 
that after privatization, leverage ratios will decline because traditionally SOEs had 
high debt level, at least in part, because the firms would not sell equity to private 
investors and the only source of funding is retained earnings and capital injections by 
government. For measuring the intensity of hedge against financial insolvency of the 
divested firms, I use ratios, such as, cash ratio, working capital ratio, net worth 
relative to total liabilities ratio, inventory turn over time, debt-equity ratio and the 
time interest earned. 
 
vi) Improvement in dividend pay-outs of the privatized firms 
Tough competition ensures, at least theoretically, that privatized firms will improve 
their track record of low dividend payout. This may be due to enough surplus 
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generation for dividends payouts. I examine the dividend pay-out pattern by using two 
proxy ratios measured as, total cash dividend relative to net income (PAYOUT) and 
total cash dividend relative to net sales (DIVSA).   
 
Given these objectives, summary of testable predictions of profitability, operating 
efficiency, capital investment spending, output, leverage and pay-out are given in 
Table 5.1. These predictions are less likely to be mutually exclusives because firms 
changed behaviour is less likely to be limited to one element of their behaviour.  To 
test my predictions, first I compute empirical proxies and then, use Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test as my principal method of testing for significant change in post 
privatization period over the public ownership period. This procedure will test 
whether, the median difference in proxy value between pre-and post-privatization 
period is zero. I base my conclusion on standardized test statistic, which follows 
normal distribution
28
. 
                                                 
28
 As the number of observations exceed 30 in most of the cases discussed. 
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Table 5.1: Summary of Testable Hypothesis 
Financial Indicators Proxy Ratios Computed As: Testable Hypothesis 
Commercial Profitability 
 
i) Return on Sale (ROS) 
ii) Return on Equity (ROE) 
iii) Return on Investment (ROI1) 
iv) Return on Investment (ROI2) 
v) Operating Profit Margin (OPM) 
vi) Gross Profit Margin (GPM) 
vii) Net Profit Margin (NPM1) 
 
viii) Net Profit Margin (NPM2) 
ix) Time Interest Earned (TIE) 
 
 
i) Net incomea  Net Salesb 
ii) Net incomea  Net Equityc 
iii) Net incomea  Total Assetsd 
iv) Gross Profite   Total Assetsd 
v) [Gross Profit e- Operating Exp.f ] Net Salesb 
vi) [Gross Profit e + Depreciation]  Net Salesb 
vii) [Gross Profit e – Operating Exp.f - Taxesg ]  Net Salesb 
viii) [Net Income a + Depreciation]  Net Salesb 
ix) [Gross Profit e – Operating Exp.f + Depreciation] 
Financial Exph. 
i) ROSpri   ROSpub 
ii) ROEpri   ROEpub 
iii) ROI1pri   ROA1pub     
iv) ROI2pri   ROA2pub 
v) OPMpri   OPMpub 
vi) GPMpri  GPMpub 
vii) NPM1pri  NPM1pub 
 
viii) NPM1pri  NPM1pub 
ix) TIEpri   TIEpub       
 
Commercial Efficiency i) Net Income Efficiency (NIE) 
ii) Sales Efficiency   (SE) 
iii) Capacity Utilization (CAPUT) 
iv) Interval Measure (IM) 
v) Inventory Turn over (ITO) 
vi) Average Collection Period (ACP) 
vii) Depreciation To Sales (DEPNS) 
 
i) Net Incomea  Number of EmployeesI 
ii) Net Salesb  Number of Employeesi 
iii) Actual Production  Production Capacity 
iv) [Cashj + Short Time Investmentk]  Financial Exp. 
v) Cost of Good Soldl   Average Inventorym 
vi) Average Recieveables Average Daily Saleso 
vii) Depreciation Cost  Net Salesb 
i) NIEpri   NIEpub  
ii) SEpri   SEpub  
iii) CAPUTpri  CAPUTpub 
iv) IMpri   IMpub 
v) ITOpri   ITOpub   
vi) ACPpri   ACPpub 
vii) DEPNSpri  DEPNSpub    
Capital Investment i) Capital Expenditure to Sale (CES) 
ii) Capital Expenditure to Assets (CEA)   
i)               [Fixed Assetst – Fixed Assets t-1 ]  Net Salesb  
ii)              [Fixed Assetst – Fixed Assets t-1 ]  Total Assetsd                    
i)              CESpri  CESpub 
ii)             CEApri  CEApub 
Output i) Real Sales (RSALE)  
 
i)               Gross Salesp   CPIq          
 
i)              SALEpri RSALEpub       
Leverage (solvency & bankruptcy) i) Cash Ratio (CR) 
 
ii) Working Capital Ratio (WCR) 
 
iii) Inventory Turn Over of Time (ITOT) 
iv) Net Worth To Total Liabilities (NWTL) 
i) [Cash + Short Term Investmentk ] Current          
Liabilities 
ii) [Current Assets – Current Liabilities]  Current         
Liabilities  
iii) Net Salesb  Average Inventorym  
iv) [Total Assetsd – Current Liabilities]  Total   Liabs.   
i)               CRpri  CRpub  
 
ii)               WCRpri  WCRpub 
 
iii)              ITOTpri  ITOTpub 
iv)              NWTLpri  NWTLpub             
Pay-out (distribution of surplus) i) Dividend to Sale (DIVSAL) 
ii) Dividend to Income (DIVNPT) 
 
i) Cash Dividend  Net Salesb 
ii) Cash Dividend  Net Income a            
 
i) DIVSALpri DIVSALpub 
ii) DIVNPTpri DIVNPTpub 
Notes: Subscript pri stands for private ownership and pub for public ownership.   
a.  Net profit after tax.  f. Selling, general and administrative expenses k. Investment in associated companies and stocks   
b. Gross sales-indirect taxes g. Direct taxes l.  Including raw material, fuel and energy, labour and other misc. costs  
c. Total net equity h. Interest payment on long and short- term loans m.  Including average of start and end of year input-output inventory. 
d. Total current assets i. Total number of employees  
e. Net sales-costs of good sold j. Cash-in-hand  
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5.3. Profitability Results 
 
One of the objectives of privatization has been to make firms profitable to cover their 
financial expenses as well as being able to make new investments. The purpose of this 
section is to explore that whether this objective has been achieved for privatized 
cement industrial units. Results of the profitability ratios show a one-time upward 
movement immediately after a stagnant trend in profitability ratios in pre-divestiture 
period for divested companies, followed by a decline in all profitability ratios during 
1995-99. However, the decline in profitability ratios during this period has not been 
limited to privatized firms, as the overall industry followed the same trend.   
 
There are a number of proxy ratios that serve as a profitability measure. However, two 
types of profitability ratios are used in this study: profit margin ratios and return on 
assets or equity employed. Profit margin ratios measure the firm‟s ability to control 
expenses relative to sales, while, return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) 
measure the firm‟s ability to use its assets and equity profitably. I use different 
alternative profitability measures in my study to keep the results robust irrespective of 
choice of measure. However, I mainly concentrate on the ratio of return on sales 
(ROS) as a principal measure of profitability. This ratio is less affected from inflation 
and accounting techniques, because it is expressed as a current rupee measure of flow.  
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5.3.1. Net Profit Margin (NPM)
29
    
 
Net profit margin (NPM) is comprised of three alternative financial ratios: return on 
sales (ROS), return on sales excluding other income (NPM1) and return on sales 
including other income and depreciation (NMP2). The NPM defined as net income 
divided by total net sales relates after tax profit to sale and reflects management 
ability to generate enough resources to recover the firm‟s manufacturing, operating as 
well as borrowing costs while, also giving owners a reasonable rate of return on their 
investment. First, return on sales improved initially for all types of ownership firms as 
well as overall industry average (see Figure 5.1). Then, again, industry witnessed a 
significant boom during 2004 to 2007 accompanied by another decline in profitability 
during 2008 to 2010. Again, irrespective of ownership, all firms behaved in a similar 
way. This may be an indication of cyclical behaviour rather than ownership per se. 
However, all those firms who could not be privatized in 1992 did not do well compare 
to firms started as a private or privatized companies. However, overall, I am unable 
see the differences in ROS between two periods (pre- and post privatization).   
  
On the average (median), industry witnessed a decrease in ROS post 1992. Private 
group firm‟s margin was high relative to other ownership in post 1992. Public sector 
firm performance on the other hand, did not improve after 1992 privatization policy.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 I mainly discussed the results of profitability by using net income as a numerator.   
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Figure 5.1: Cement Industry Profitability: Return on Sales (1986-2011) 
 
 
What about, return on sales excluding other income and then including both other 
income and depreciation? The results are robust after using these modified measures 
and returns one sale declined for all ownership firms in post 1992 period.  
 
In case of a private firm, the power to set the level of working capital is almost 
delegated to chief executive officer (CEO) by the shareholders and the board of 
directors. The assumption is that the manager will keep as much working capital as 
necessary for efficient operation, since the funds have alternative uses and can 
generate income directly. In economic term, with given autonomy, managers would 
require working capital only up to the point where marginal cost equal to marginal 
revenue product. The profit of the firm may be directly influenced by the correct 
decision made by managers regarding the optimum amount of working capital.  The 
management efficiency can be judged on the basis of profit which, will rise or fall 
according to the correctness of the decision on the level of working capital. The 
management might divert funds to more productive uses by keeping level of inventory 
and cash at the point which ensure smooth operation of the firm. A public sector 
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manager, with little autonomy, regarding decision of necessary working capital may 
find himself with extra or lower working capital compare to actual optimal 
requirement.  
     
After privatization, the new management of privatized firms adopted an aggressive 
strategy of investing the money in different activities
30
. Other income growth which 
was in the range of 4-5% during 1986-91 for these companies jumped to 42% during 
immediate period of post privatization 1993-96 (see Figure 5.2). This explains the 
variations in the profitability results in term of return on sales initially going up and 
then declining, making overall effect not significant. 
 
                 Figure 5.2: Other Incomes of Firms by Type of Ownership (1986-96) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 As explained in the political economy of privatization of cement industry, units were sold to the 
buyers already running business in different fields including cement industry. The new management 
kept the cash money in their other businesses and earned a reasonable rate of return. 
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The funds can be invested:  
i) in stocks and earned the capital gain or dividend. 
ii) keep the cash in bank deposits in both form of time and demand 
deposits and earned a fixed rate of return. 
iii) investment in miscellaneous activities.      
 
The management decision to invest depends on the expected revenues from the asset 
(security). With the exception of some blue chips companies, dividend in Pakistan has 
not been paid regularly and is subject to withholding taxes
31
. Then, the only other 
reliable source of income is the second category. The new management kept the 
money in time and demand deposits and earned a reasonable rate of interest (see 
Figure 5.3) during 1992-96 generally and 1994-96 particularly. 
 
 
                       Figure 5.3: Privatized Firms: Break-up of Other Income (1986-96) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 I will discuss this issue later on in the dividend pay-out pattern of privatized firms. 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Values 
(Rs. millions)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Years
Interest
Dividend income
Misc
                                                             Chapter 5 
                                                              Financial Performance 
  100 
 
 
5.3.2. Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
ROE defined as net income divided by total net equity expresses the rate of return on 
shareholders‟ equity and measures the management performance. A higher ROE is 
associated with effective management control as well as overly leveraged firm. Low 
ROE indicates a sign of ineffective management as well as conservatively financed 
firm. This ratio has vital importance to the owners and shareholders because it shows 
the return on their investment.  
 
Similar to ROS, return on equity (ROE) improved significantly immediately after 
privatization for private and privatized group against a decline for public sector group 
of firms (see Figure 5.4) in post privatization period. It remained flat during 2000 to 
2004, increasing subsequently during 2005-2007 and then declining. The maximum 
increase has been for private firms of 8.5% followed by privatized firms (2.9%) as 
against industry average of 2.4% during 1992-96. However the increase/decrease are 
statistically insignificant for all ownerships. Privatized group firms, in pre 
privatization period earned a reasonable rate of return on government equity (20%) 
which is better than very attractive saving schemes introduced by different financial 
institutions and commercial banks and even higher than average return on stocks (e.g. 
Karachi Stock Exchange rate of return on stocks remained 17-18% during 1992-96). 
After privatization this ratio however, improved to more than 23%. Public sector 
firms on the other hand, with conservative financial structure although enjoyed a 
positive ROE, peaking to 20% during 1987-88, but then declined afterward. In 1992-
93, this ratio showed a roughly 6% decline. The decrease may be due to lower sales or 
increase in taxes or operating expenses etc. The first reason does not seem to be 
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realistic as these companies achieved an increase in return on sales. The increase in 
equity is the next alternative source of decline as compared to income during 1993-96.  
But due to dependence on government, probability of fresh funds injection could be 
ruled out. 
Figure 5.4: Cement Industry Profitability: Return on Equity (1986-2011) 
 
 
 
5.3.3. Return on Assets (ROA) 
 
 Third measure is return on assets (ROA) or investment (ROI), defined as net income 
divided by total assets. The return on total assets focuses on earning power of ongoing 
operations. The decline in ROI shows that the firms‟ ability to employs its asset 
effectively is deteriorating. The decline may also reflects such factors such as 
incremental investment in fixed assets
32
 , the lower assets turnover ratio, higher 
interest expenses etc. I use three alternative measure of return on investment.  First 
                                                 
32
 The rupee invested in time t may take time to earn a reasonable rate of return at time t+1, t+2, and so 
on. 
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ratio (ROI1) is net return on investment, second is net profit before direct tax divided 
by total assets, and third ratio is gross return on investment.  
 
As explained in next sections, the privatized firms pursued an aggressive policy of 
capital-investment spending, causing a decline in rate of return on investment for this 
group of firms (see Figure 5.5 ), whereas, private firms showed a significant increase 
in the return on investment in post reform period. 
 
Figure 5.5: Cement Industry Profitability: Return on Assets (1986-2011) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the trend of ROI in the cement industry during the sample period 
(1986-2011). The trend is same as in case of ROE and ROS. By using some other 
alternative profitability ratios, broadly speaking I could arise at the same conclusion 
(see Table 5.2). By looking at other alternative measure of profitability, broadly 
speaking I could arrive at similar conclusions 
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When firms are grouped according to the process of production and by location, 
following conclusions could be made: 
 
Dry process firms outperformed the wet and semi wet process firms due to cost 
efficient nature of dry technology. Return on sales; return on investment and net profit 
margin all increased significantly during 1993-96 compared to 1986-91 but then 
declined in subsequent years. Dry process firms are relatively new and needs higher 
investment and equity. This leads to lower return on equity in the initial years of 
operation. Return on equity has been higher for other process firms compared to dry 
process firms. When firms are grouped according to location, north zone firms earned 
higher profit margin compared to south zone firms. The difference was clear even in 
pre privatization regime and, the reforms policy did not change the trend. 
 
Summary of Commercial Profitability: The upshot of the profitability discussion 
could be summarized as: after privatization gross and operating profit margin of 
privatized companies increased immediately and had been higher than public sector 
group firms and comparable private sector group firms. But, later on, margins 
declined during 1996 to 2003, raised again during 2004 to 2007 and then decline after 
2007. Immediately after privatization, new management used cash reserves wisely 
and earned a reasonable rate of return in terms of other income. By adding other 
income component, the margins on sales, equity and investment of privatized firms 
has been comparable to private sector group firms. The decline in the margins during 
1995-2003 has been probably due to decline in output price as a consequence of price 
war.  
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Table 5.2: Summary of Profitability Results  
 The table presents empirical results of proxy ratios of commercial profitability for overall cement industry of Pakistan and by different classes of ownerships. This table presents the medium 
values for pre- and post-privatization periods. Before privatization period covers the period between 1986 and 1991and after privatization covers the period between 1993 and 2011. For 
the tests of the significance of median change, I have used the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with its Z statistics) as my principal statistic. Prob column shows the significance level for the null 
hypothesis that the difference between two median values is zero. Ratios are calculated by using following formulas: 
ros= net after tax income/gross sale ;  roe= net after tax income/total equity ;  roa= net after tax income/assets ;  roa1= net profit before tax/assets ;  roa2= gross profit (loss)/assets 
 opm=  (gross profit (loss)-neral and adminstrative expenses-selling and distribution expenses)/net sale;  opm1= (gross profit (loss)-neral and adminstrative expenses-selling and 
distribution expenses)/assets ;  opm2=(gross profit (loss)-neral and adminstrative expenses-selling and distribution expenses)/gross sale;  opm3=(gross profit (loss)-neral and adminstrative 
expenses-selling and distribution expenses)/total equity;  roprf= (gross profit (loss)-neral and adminstrative expenses-selling and distribution expenses)/consumer price index 
 gpm=  (gross profit (loss)+depreciation)/net sale;  npm1= (gross profit (loss)-neral and adminstrative expenses-selling and distribution expenses-tax)/net sale 
 npm2= (net after tax income+depreciation)/net sale ; tie=   (gross profit and loss-neral and adminstrative expenses-selling and distribution expenses+depreciation)/financial expenses 
 asto= gross sale/assets
Indicator Industry Privatized Public Private 
 Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
z prob Before After z prob Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
z prob Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
z prob 
ros 0.032 0.017 1.644 0.100 0.027 0.010 1.598 0.110 0.028 -0.040 0.298 0.766 0.014 0.030 0.343 0.732 
roe 0.167 0.073 3.240 0.001 0.107 0.068 1.207 0.227 0.083 0.140 0.021 0.983 0.113 0.077 1.463 0.143 
roa 0.040 0.011 2.862 0.004 0.021 0.006 2.003 0.045 0.021 -0.026 0.999 0.318 0.012 0.024 1.270 0.204 
roa1 0.055 0.012 2.686 0.007 0.030 0.007 2.067 0.039 0.028 -0.025 1.020 0.308 0.014 0.030 0.016 0.987 
roa2 0.135 0.076 5.216 0.000 0.098 0.063 3.241 0.001 0.093 0.066 1.467 0.143 0.084 0.096 4.604 0.000 
opm 0.167 0.102 2.907 0.004 0.127 0.082 2.053 0.040 0.133 0.052 0.478 0.633 0.091 0.149 3.934 0.000 
opm1 0.108 0.043 5.045 0.000 0.075 0.036 2.923 0.004 0.066 0.031 0.967 0.334 0.047 0.077 4.851 0.000 
opm2 0.118 0.069 3.014 0.003 0.083 0.054 1.930 0.054 0.087 0.036 0.563 0.573 0.057 0.102 4.036 0.000 
opm3 0.406 0.144 6.241 0.000 0.218 0.145 2.093 0.036 0.195 0.117 1.498 0.134 0.194 0.186 5.435 0.000 
roprf 1.809 1.280 1.301 0.193 1.508 1.229 0.619 0.536 1.734 0.320 0.744 0.457 1.221 1.902 1.635 0.102 
gpm 0.313 0.247 3.291 0.001 0.263 0.245 2.177 0.030 0.275 0.183 2.359 0.018 0.232 0.296 4.240 0.000 
npm1 0.138 0.090 2.745 0.006 0.111 0.087 1.385 0.166 0.123 0.043 0.606 0.545 0.080 0.137 4.942 0.000 
npm2 23.971 33.391 -0.390 0.697 28.031 35.580 0.960 0.337 40.028 -5.512 1.307 0.191 19.308 49.368 -1.345 0.179 
asto 1.180 0.671 5.306 0.000 0.772 0.639 3.179 0.002 0.683 1.219 -0.829 0.407 0.777 0.673 3.211 0.001 
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5.4. Efficiency 
  
Production of more output from a given input is called efficiency improvement. There 
is evidence to suggest that governments implementing privatization policies clearly 
expected that privatized firms will use their financial, technological and human 
resources more efficiently. By removing the non-economic objectives, governments 
expects increased operating and financial efficiency (Megginson et al. [1994]). The 
management, in a corporate culture is answerable to shareholders for their 
performance regarding capital/labour efficiency gains or losses.  
 
Overall results of my efficiency analysis show some improvement in some efficiency 
indicators during post reform period. Analogous to profitability ratios, I use eight 
ratios as a measure of efficiency improvement/decline in pre and post reforms 
periods. These ratios are derived from various studies conducted so far in this area. 
These are discussed below:  
 
5.4.1 Labour Efficiency 
 
It is generally argued that public enterprises suffer from innate inefficiency because 
they fail to exploit the available human resources efficiently. A sense of job security 
under public sector ownership alongside non-competitive in-cash wages and 
payments is perhaps considered a major cause of less than optimal labour use. After 
privatization, it is generally argued that new private management would exploit these 
resources more efficiently. Due to job insecurity and efficiency wage, workers would 
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pay more attention to the production activities, which would ultimately improve 
labour productivity. I test these predictions by measuring  
 
labour efficiency by using three ratios: 
i) Net income efficiency (NIEFF) defined as net income divided by number 
of employees. It expresses the net surplus generated per employee during 
the year.  
ii) Sales efficiency (nominal) defined as gross nominal sales divided by 
number of employees. 
iii) Sales efficiency (real) defined as real gross sales divided by number of 
employees. 
 
I estimate labour use efficiency by parametric methods in a chapter on labour use 
efficiency by using parametric translong cost function of labour demand later. But 
here in this chapter, I aim to calculate and analyze labour use efficiency with the help 
of simple ratios. 
  
Table 5.3 shows the results of testing efficiency differences between pre and post 
reforms periods. One of such measure is the growth in profitability over time. By 
looking at the median values (effg) for privatized firms, I am unable to find any 
significant differences in post reforms periods compare to pre reform years. Similar 
conclusions could be drawn from other ownership forms too. Similarly, for private 
and privatized firms net income efficiency (nie) improved marginally during 1992-
2011 as against 1986-91 but differences are not statistically significant.  
 
                                                             Chapter 5 
                                                              Financial Performance 
  107 
 
 
Public sector firms showed an insignificant marginal decrease during post 1992 
period. Immediately after reforms were introduced, nominal labour value added index 
also improved significantly for all firms irrespective of ownerships during 1992-96. 
The improvement for privatized firms was, however, higher than private and public 
sector firms as well as industry average during initial years of reforms.  When values 
are expressed in real term, the increase was significant for privatized (Figure 5.6) and 
private firms. Public sector firms showed a decrease in their real labour value added 
index during this initial response period.  
 
                    Figure 5.6: Privatized Firms: Real Labour Value Added Index (1986-96) 
 
 
 These gains were however, not observed in the later part of reform period and 
differences between pre and post reforms were statistically insignificant. Results 
showing an improvement in labour value added index in the initial years are an 
important effect of privatization. These initial gains should be analyzed by taking into 
account the fact that gains were made at a time when the overall economy, as well as 
the large-scale manufacturing sector witnessed a relatively stagnant labour 
productivity index in post privatization regime as seen in Figure 5.7. The trend in 
labour productivity index of privatized firms in the pre-divestiture period was more or 
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less same as the overall economy and the large-scale manufacturing sector. But after 
1992, the trend of labour productivity for privatized firms is significantly higher than 
the economy and the large-scale manufacturing sector.  
 
Figure 5.7: Initial Response to Reforms: 
 Labour Productivity Indices (1986=100) 
 
 
5.4.2. Capacity Utilization 
 
Capacity utilization is a partial measure of the firm‟s operating performance and is 
defined as actual output divided by maximum out that could be produced by given 
technology. This measure is closely related to firms‟ demand structure, faced by the 
firm. Higher capacity utilization is generally cited as an improvement in the firm‟s 
efficiency, as it may be the product of aggressive marketing strategy, better 
maintenance of the plant, quality control measures, etc. In my case, capacity 
utilization increased significantly for both private and privatized firms during initial 
years of privatization (see Figure 5.8 & Table 5.3).  
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On the average, capacity utilization increased by 4% (from 98% to 102%) for 
privatized firms during 1993-96. This increase is statistically significant.  While, on 
the other hand, private firms achieved more than 39% increase in capacity utilization 
but there were large fluctuations over time. Public sector firms faced a marginal 
decline in their capacity utilization over the 1986-96 periods. Firms, however, were 
unable to maintain this trend, and industry as a whole witnessed a substantial decrease 
(from 93% to 77%) in capacity utilization in overall post reform period. This is true 
for all firms irrespective of ownership and the decrease is statistically significant too. 
 
Figure 5.8: Cement Industry: Capacity Utilization (1986-2011) 
 
 
War on terror and related terrorism activities coupled with poor law and order 
conditions in Karachi and Sindh may be partial reason for the falling capacity 
utilization ratios of this group
33
. The significance of deteriorating law and order 
conditions that could dampen demand for cement is reflected in Pakistan‟s economy 
where GDP growth in the last few years has been low compare to 60 years historical 
                                                 
33
 Public sector firms comprise of 60% of firms including Thatta, Javadan and General Refectories 
comprised of south zone which has been under severe political unrest in the last 15 years. 
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rates. Further, a significant (highest) share of these capacities is concentrated in the 
north region of Pakistan sharing border with Afghanistan.  
 
Poor law and order conditions and cross border activities also contributed in unrest in 
this region and had affected not only demand for cement but also overall construction 
industry at large. The variations in the capacity utilization among the firms in the 
three ownerships might have generally determined the cause of variations in the 
profitability results of these groups. Figure 5.9 shows the capacity utilization and 
profitability in term of return on sales. A strong relationship between these two 
variables is evident by the Figure 5.9. The profitability in this sense is determined not 
only by production levels and cost as well as demand conditions which in turn 
determine capacity utilization. 
 
Figure 5.9: Privatized Firms: Capacity Utilization and Profitability  
(1986-2011) 
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5.4.3. Interval Measure 
 
Interval measure defined as total most liquids assets including cash and short term 
investment divided by financial expenditures measures the firm‟s strength to meet the 
short run financial obligations. A higher ratio indicates that the firm‟s management is 
keeping a good hedge against its short time liabilities. The results in Table 5.3 
indicate that irrespective of ownerships, firms decreased their strength in term of 
lower interval measure ratio. But decrease is only significant for private ownership 
firms. 
 
5.4.4. Average Collection Period (ACP) 
 
Average collection period is defined as average receivables divided by average daily 
sales and is an activity or asset utilization ratio to assess how well the management 
uses its productive resources. These ratios measure the number of days that the 
average receivable is outstanding during the year and is closely associated with 
management efficiency to handle the tied up assets. The lower the ratio, the lower will 
be the time of collection of tied up assets. It also indicates the firm‟s policy toward 
lenient/tight policy of credit sales. Higher competition levels could make this level 
higher. It could then lead to higher cost of sinking funds.  
 
The average collection period showed a significant increase for private and privatized 
firms indicating a more lenient policy of credit sales in the post privatization regime 
(see Table 5.3). This result is expected because as the competition gets tense, the 
amount of credit sale would increase to keep the loyal customers happy. On the other 
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hand, the average collection period for the public firms declined but the difference 
between pre and post reforms period is not statistically significant. 
 
5.4.5. Inventory Turnover (ITO) 
  
After account receivables, the most liquid assets on the balance sheet are inventories 
of raw material, finished goods and work in process. Inventory turnover defined as 
total cost of goods sold divided by total inputs and output inventories measures the 
spread with which the goods flow through a company. The higher the firm‟s turn 
over, the faster the inventory moves through the company and generates sales. Thus a 
higher inventory turnover may indicate better management skills and liquidity. The 
results in Table 5.3 indicate that overall; cement industry did not significantly change 
its inventory policy. Privatized as well as private firms show a somewhat lower value 
in post 1992 period indicating overstocking and inventory build up by the 
management to cope with sudden fluctuations in demand. 
 
Summary of Efficiency Results: The results of the efficiency discussion show that 
labour efficiency of the privatized firms improved initially after privatization partly 
due to labour reduction by using golden handshake programs alongside an increasing 
level of effort. After privatization these firms have used technological resources more 
efficiently and as a result capacity utilization has initially improved significantly. All 
types of ownership firms strengthened the hedge against short-term liabilities. Asset 
utilization ratio in terms of average receivables has increased which shows the lenient 
policy in term of credit sales by the new management of these privatized companies.         
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Table 5.3: Summary of Efficiency Results 
 The table presents empirical results of proxy ratios of efficiency for overall cement industry of Pakistan. This table presents the medium values for pre- and post-privatization period. 
Before privatization period covers the period between 1986 and 1991and after privatization covers the period between 1992 and 2011. Table also shows the medium values in pre- and 
post-privatization period. For the tests of the significance of median change, I have used the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with its Z statistics version) as my principal statistic. Prob. column 
shows the significance level for the null hypothesis that difference between two median values is zero.  
Notes: 
effg= (return on assets -return on assets[lag])/return on assets[lag] 
 nie=  net after tax income/labour 
 se=   net sale/labour 
 aspe= assets/labour 
 lever= (long term loans +short term borrowing)/assets 
 lever1= long term loans/total equity 
 caput= actual production/production capacity 
 im=    (cash and bank balance + short term investment)/financial expenses 
 ito=   cost of goods sold/store spare and loss tool 
 acp=   trade receivables/(net sale/360) 
 depns= depreciation/net sale
Indicator Industry   Privatized   Public   Private   
 Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
Z prob Before After z prob Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
z prob Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
z prob 
effg -0.035 -0.263 2.350 0.019 -0.220 -0.238 0.939 0.348 -0.259 -0.072 1.035 0.301 -0.190 -0.316 1.866 0.062 
nie 0.022 0.055 -0.822 0.411 0.041 0.048 1.257 0.209 0.069 -0.020 0.999 0.318 0.021 0.095 -1.147 0.251 
se 0.467 2.158 -12.237 0.000 1.592 2.044 -3.908 0.000 2.061 0.567 -6.100 0.000 1.051 2.680 -6.513 0.000 
aspe 0.512 4.932 -11.619 0.000 2.808 4.467 -4.476 0.000 4.090 0.796 -5.037 0.000 2.008 6.844 -6.014 0.000 
caput 0.933 0.768 4.228 0.000 0.796 0.763 2.483 0.013 0.793 0.774 2.157 0.031 0.791 0.789 2.621 0.009 
im 1.143 0.747 1.442 0.149 0.797 0.751 0.437 0.663 0.747 0.930 -1.307 0.191 1.152 0.532 -3.779 0.000 
acp 3.932 5.098 -1.364 0.173 3.709 6.700 -2.663 0.008 5.070 3.787 1.605 0.108 4.591 5.070 1.998 0.046 
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5.5. Output 
 
It is expected that by improved incentives, more flexible financing opportunities, 
increased competition and greater scope for entrepreneurial skills, real sale will 
increase after privatization (Megginson et al. [1994]). After an extensive study of the 
performance of the Egyptian state-owned-enterprises (SOEs), Handoussa et al. (1986) 
stated that productivity and financial performance often move in opposite directions. 
Boycko et al. (1993) argued that effective privatization will lead to a reduction in 
output, since the government could no longer force and bribe the managers to 
maintain a high level of output.  I test these competing predictions by using inflation 
adjusted sales volume for post- and pre-privatization period (see Figure 5.10). The 
Wilcoxon test shows that real median sales increased marginally after privatization 
for privatized firms (see Table 5.4). The trend however did not remain stable with 
increasing and then declining pattern. However, from 2004 onward, industry as a 
whole witnessed significant increase in sale volume. In statistical term, however, 
increase in post reform is only significant for private firms. 
 
Improvement in real sales volume of the privatized firms in 2004 onward is an 
important result in the sense that during this period, overall economy and large-scale 
manufacturing sector experienced a stagnant growth in the output.  
 
  
The case for inverse relationship between productivity and profitability stated by 
Handoussa et al. (1986) has not been verified in my sample of privatized firms. Figure 
5.11 shows the real sales and profitability index of the divested firms. The positive 
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relationship between these two values is evident by the trend. This explains the 
variations in the profitability of all three ownership firms. 
Figure 5.10: Cement Industry: Real Sales (millions Rs.) (1986-2011) 
 
 
 
Table 5.4:  Real Sales 
The table presents empirical results of real sales for overall cement industry of Pakistan and by wonerships. This table 
presents the medium values for pre- and post-privatization period. Before privatization period covers the period between 
1986 and 1991and after privatization covers the period between 1992 and 2011. Table also shows the medium values in 
pre- and post-privatization period. For the tests of the significance of median change, I have used the Wilcoxon rank sum 
test (with its Z statistics version) as my principal statistic. Prob. Column shows the significance level for the null hypothesis 
that difference between two median values is zero. 
 Industry   Privatized   
 Pre-1992 Post-1992 z prob Before After z prob 
Sales 15.514 21.764 -4.096 0.000 20.024 21.103 -1.419 0.156 
 privatized 1992 Public 
 Before After z prob Pre-1992 Post-1992 z prob 
Sales 20.024 21.103 -0.782 0.434 21.783 16.064 0.510 0.610 
 Private     
 Pre-1992 Post-1992 z prob     
Sales 18.279 22.624 -4.267 0.000     
Notes:    a.     Before privatization policy (1986-91). 
              b.    After privatization policy (1992-2011). 
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Figure 5.11: Real Sale and Profitability Relationship (1986-2011) 
 
 
 
 
5.6.    Capital Investment Spending 
 
Theoretically, I would expect privatized firms to increase investment spending if the 
demand for their product is expected to increase in post deregulation period. Two 
proxy ratios are computed to measure the investment intensity; capital investment 
divided by sales (CAPSAL) and capital investment divided by total assets (CAPAS). 
Table 5.5 and Figure 5.12 show the pattern of investment spending in pre and post 
privatization period. By looking at the trend and statistical significance I could say 
that all types of firms made changes in their investment spending, but the most 
impressive increase is shown for privatized firms group. The increase is statistically 
significant for both ratios (capital expenditure to sale and capital expenditure to 
assets). On the average, privatized firms increased their capital investment spending 
from 0.1% to 2.1% of their sales after privatization.  Similarly, capital expenditure to 
total assets figure rose from 0.1% to 1.4% in post privatization period. 
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Figure 5.12: Cement Industry: Capital Investment (1986-2011)  
 
 
Other firms however, did not adopt the similar aggressive investment strategy. 
Following observations could be made to explain the significant increase in the 
investment by the new management: 
1. Privatized companies now have more options to source funds including equity 
market as well as private finances.  
2. These firms during their initial year of private operation (immediately after 
privatization) perform well in term of earning, which provided them opportunity to 
tap internal as well as capital market by floating the new shares.  
3. As discussed earlier these firms were sold mostly to the people already with 
businesses in different industrial sectors. They got the expertise to exploit the rising 
demand by borrowing in financial markets.  
4. The impressive increase was unavoidable due to years of financial stress during 
public ownership period, which often could lead the firms to defer even routine 
maintenance work. 
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Notes: ces= (operating fixed assets-operating fixed assets[lag])/net sale 
            cea= (operating fixed assets-operating fixed assets[lag])/assets 
 
Finally, new management also opted to replace least efficiency wet process as well as 
adding new capacities. 
 
5.9. Financial Leverage and Solvency 
 
Financial leverage ratios are calculated to measure a firm‟s financial risks. While 
devising privatization policy government though did not give importance to improve 
the financial soundness of the newly privatized firms, most do however; expect to see 
a decline in leverage ratios of privatized firms so that they could survive against 
changing business environment. Balance sheet as well as income statement accounts 
are used in this context to measure the leverage position of the privatized firms 
particularly and industry generally. Given the autonomy in the financial decision 
making regarding liquidity position of the firm (i.e. decision to keep certain amount of 
cash in hand and demand deposits to meet the contingency expenditures), One would 
expect, at least theoretically, the liquidity position of the privatized firms improve 
Table 5.5:  Capital Investment Spending 
The table presents empirical results of proxy ratios of capital investment for overall cement industry of Pakistan and by ownerships. 
This table presents the medium values for pre- and post-privatization period. Before privatization period covers the period between 
1986 and 1991and after privatization covers the period between 1992 and 2011. Table also shows the medium values in pre- and 
post-privatization period. For the tests of the significance of median change, I have used the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with its Z 
statistics version) as my principal statistic. Prob. Column shows the significance level for the null hypothesis that difference between 
two median values is zero. 
 
 Industry   Privatized   privatized 1992   
 Pre- 
1992 
Post- 
1992 
z prob Before After z prob Before After z prob 
ces -0.001 -0.001 -2.047 0.041 -0.007 0.021 -1.708 0.088 -0.005 0.015 -0.564 0.573 
cea -0.001 0.000 -1.707 0.088 -0.006 0.014 -1.893 0.058 -0.002 0.010 -0.685 0.494 
 Public   Private       
 Pre- 
1992 
Post-
1992 
z prob Pre-
1992 
Post-
1992 
z prob     
ces 0.018 -0.028 0.987 0.324 -0.010 0.037 0.768 0.443     
cea 0.011 -0.025 1.144 0.253 -0.010 0.012 1.604 0.109     
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significantly. I use the ratios, which uses the most liquid current assets such as cash in 
hand and short-term investment in stocks divided by current liabilities generally 
called cash ratio.  
 
Table 5.6 shows the summary of leverage ratios. As expected, cash ratio for privatized 
firms increased from 10% to 13% during the post privatization period. The increase is 
statistically insignificant generally though I am not able to see similar pattern for 
other ownership i.e. public and private. Second measure of liquidity ratio, I employed 
is working capital ratio. This ratio is calculated by using the difference of current 
assets and current liabilities and then dividing by current liabilities. Using this ratio, I 
come to the conclusion that similar to CR, differences in post reforms period are not 
significant. By using another measure such as net worth to total liabilities, the 
improvement is again statistically insignificant for privatized group firms similar to 
insignificant change in case of private and public sector firms.    
 
The second approach to measure solvency is the use of income statement ratios. I 
employed time interest earned (TIE) defined as gross profit plus depreciation minus 
operating expenses divided by financial expenses. This ratio measures the number of 
times resources are available to pay back financial commitment. Table 5.6 shows that 
on the average, after privatization, time interest earned for privatized firms increased 
marginally from six times to roughly seven times. Improvement is statistically 
insignificant. The story for other group firms is same with minor variations. 
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Table 5.6: Summary of Financial Leverage Results  
The table presents empirical results of proxy ratios of financial leverage for overall cement industry of Pakistan and by 
ownerships. This table presents the medium values for pre- and post-privatization period. Before privatization period 
covers the period between 1986 and 1991and after privatization covers the period between 1992 and 2011. Table also 
shows the medium values in pre- and post-privatization period. For the tests of the significance of median change, I have 
used the Wilcoxon rank sum test (with its Z statistics version) as my principal statistic. Prob. Column shows the significance 
level for the null hypothesis that difference between two median values is zero. 
 
Indicator Industry Privatized 
 Pre-1992 Post-1992 z prob Before After z prob 
cr 0.134 0.106 1.895 0.058 0.107 0.130 -0.929 0.353 
wcr -0.098 -0.127 0.276 0.783 -0.123 -0.117 -0.627 0.531 
tie 3.668 2.181 2.675 0.008 2.772 1.844 2.123 0.034 
itot 81.615 53.780 2.375 0.018 71.196 38.756 3.524 0.000 
nwtl 0.564 0.725 -4.972 0.000 0.703 0.705 -0.878 0.380 
lever 0.379 0.307 2.031 0.042 0.316 0.310 0.981 0.326 
lever1 0.522 0.398 0.649 0.516 0.466 0.323 2.199 0.028 
 privatized in 1992 Public 
 Before After z prob Pre-1992 Post-1992 z prob 
cr 0.107 0.154 -1.374 0.170 0.107 0.124 -0.946 0.344 
wcr 2.528 1.983 1.543 0.123 2.733 1.048 1.541 0.123 
tie -0.130 -0.049 -1.093 0.275 -0.074 -0.209 1.031 0.303 
itot 67.843 37.044 3.319 0.001 53.693 90.525 -0.557 0.578 
nwtl 0.709 0.703 -0.601 0.548 0.737 0.504 1.254 0.210 
lever 0.320 0.300 2.176 0.030 0.289 0.496 -0.298 0.766 
lever1 0.470 0.291 2.453 0.014 0.429 0.545 1.621 0.105 
 Private     
 Pre-1992 Post-1992 z prob     
cr 0.151 0.066 0.429 0.668     
wcr -0.125 -0.110 -1.222 0.222     
tie 2.141 2.637 -1.828 0.068     
itot 64.989 50.517 -4.194 0.000     
nwtl 0.633 0.763 -2.428 0.015     
lever 0.354 0.266 1.195 0.232     
lever1 0.382 0.450 -0.670 0.503     
Notes: Following formulas are used to calculate leverage ratios: 
cr= (cash and bank balance + short term investment)/current liabilities 
wcr= (current assets-current liabilities)/current liabilities 
tie=   (gross profit and loss- general and administrative expenses-selling and distribution expenses +depreciation)/financial 
expenses 
itot= net sale/trade receivable 
nwtl= (assets-current liabilities)/total liabilities 
lever= (long term loans +short term borrowing)/assets 
lever1= long term loans/total equity 
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5.8. Dividend Payout 
 
From a distribution of wealth point of view, pay-out ratio is very important. All the 
governments who adopted the privatization programs did not explicitly stated this as 
one of their main objective but it would be fair to say that new management is likely 
to distribute efficiency gains. Theoretically, it is difficult to ascertain priori about 
dividend pattern of the privatized firms due to the fact that new management could 
opt to use cash flow for maintenance or replacement of old plants and other 
infrastructure. The increased capital expenditure can be financed by combination of 
internal and external finance. A higher internal finance ratio over time could 
ultimately decrease the dividend. Further, the dividend pattern of the firms is 
determined usually by the overall corporate culture of the country. Despite of these 
priori difficult to determine payout outcomes, anticipation is that privatized firms will 
increase dividend pay-out as it could signals the firms‟ financial health, which is 
important in the initial years of the private operation. Two types of ratios are used. 
These are net dividend to income and net dividend to sale. The advantage of the 
second ratio is that it is the ratio of two current rupees insensitive to accounting 
anomalies.  
 
By looking at Figures 5.13 and 4.15, I could observe that dividend payout is not 
regular and rather cyclical. Two sub-periods 1990-95 and 2001 to 2007 are potential 
candidate to see the story of dividend in the cement industry generally and privatized 
firm particularly. Almost zero dividends during 1996 to 2001 is consistent to 
profitability story. A significant decline in margins led to abandoning payouts. Except 
2001-03 for private firms I am unable to note any significant shift in dividend policy 
in post privatization period. This is in contrast to Magginson (1994) study, which 
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notified a significant increase in dividend to sales for the privatized firms for the 
sample of 61 companies from 18 countries.  
 
An inspection of the Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14 provides an insight of the dividend 
pay-out pattern of the privatized firms. Figure 5.13 show that during 1986-91 these 
firms paid the dividend in the range of 2 to 3% of their sales. After privatization these 
firms paid the dividend in the range of 3-7% of sales during 1993-95. From onward 
the fragile financial condition did not permit the new management for dividend 
declaration. But, then again dividend came back during 2001 to 2007 for industry as a 
whole as well as for privatized firms.  Dividend to income story is same except the 
fact that the size of the pie significantly increased during 1993-94 due to non-
operating income of the divested firms. 
 
Figure 5.13: Cement Industry- Dividend to Sales (1986-2011) 
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Figure 5.14 Cement Industry- Dividend to Net Profit after Tax (1986-2011) 
 
 
The decline in the dividend pattern during 1995-96 to 2001 has not been limited to 
privatized firms alone. Figure 5.15 shows the dividend pattern of the manufacturing 
sector during 1994-96. During 1995-96, overall cement industry as well as sugar, 
tobacco, cable, and electric industry has witnessed a decline or static dividend pattern. 
This rather confirms the fact that dividends in Pakistan are cyclical. 
 
Figure 5.15:  Manufacturing Sector: Dividend Pay-out Pattern (1994-96) 
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5.9. Modelling Determinant of Performance 
 
Up until now my focus was to address a simple question: whether change of 
ownership leads to better use of resources. Alongside change of ownership a list of 
other factors also could potentially affect performance independent of ownership. 
Some authors have addressed this issue by modelling profitability on political, 
economic, organizational, industry specific and dynamic factors. Authors such as 
Villalonga (2000), Garia and Anson (2012) looked at factors which could contribute 
toward performance of a firm in post privatization period. I followed above 
mentioned studies and modelled profitability, efficiency, leverage and capital 
expenditure on firm specific, industry specific and macroeconomic factors.  
 
I introduced a host of initial conditions to separate the effect of ownership change 
from other factors. I categorized period of privatization period into four, namely yrp5, 
yrp10, yrp15, yrp20 for 1-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, and 16-20 years post 
privatization period. I include initial conditions such as log of firm assets- 1 year 
before privatization, firm performance -1 year before privatization, leverage -1 year 
before privatization and Industry profitability -1 year before privatization. Some 
macroeconomic conditions to separate the effect of external conditions such as 
inflation, employment and interest rate (discount rate) are also included. Some firm 
specific factors included are firm age, production process (dry=1, 0 otherwise), and 
regions (north=1, 0 otherwise). 
 
Industry specific variables include industry profitability and herfindhal index (a 
measure of competition) to again separate the effect of ownership change from broad 
industry trends. I also experimented with alternative measures of profitability, but 
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broadly, speaking results do not change. Hence in my subsequent analysis, I present 
the results for one profitability measure (return on assets). After conducting the test of 
autocorrelation, I use generalized panel least square with correlated disturbance, to 
account for cross panel autocorrelation. The main focus of this section is to evaluate 
the performance of privatized firms after change of ownership, my discussion and 
sample is limited to those firms who were operating before policy reforms and then 
they were privatized in subsequent years. 
 
GLS results are presented (see Table 5.7) for profitability, efficiency, output (real 
sale) and investment (capital expenditure). I present results for profitability with two 
specifications. In first specification I introduce dummy variable =1 for the firms‟ post 
privatization period and 0 in public sector. In second specification, I introduce three 
dummy variables for post privatization period as discussed above. Overall, 
profitability is lower in post reforms period as compare to when firms were in public 
sector. But second specification results show that similar to my previous analysis by 
using financial ratios, immediately after privatization, firms earned higher returns on 
assets compare to public sector ownership period. But again, firm were unable to 
maintain this performance and they experienced a decline in profitability in 
subsequent years but decline is statistically not significant. This is an interesting result 
and confirms my earlier findings of non-parametric methods.  
 
One criticism of non-parametric methods is that they ignore the control variables and 
thus serves as a mere descriptive statistics. As for as the effect of privatization on 
other dependent variables is concerned, I am unable to say that change of ownership 
had any effect on output or capital expenditures as the coefficients of yrp5, yrp10 and 
yrp15, are statistically insignificant. Net income efficiency though increased between 
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10-15 years post privatizations. Again these results do confirm my earlier findings of 
non-parametric tests on financial ratios. As for as other variables in the regression are 
concerned following observations could be made: 
 
1. Firm performance is representation of industry trends as the coefficient of 
industry profitability is positive and statistically significant. The cyclical 
pattern I discuss in the above discussion to some extent is substantiated by my 
regression results. 
 
2. Interest rate has a negative bearing on profitability and the effect is statistically 
significant. This result is not surprising as most of the firms borrowed 
significant amount of money in post privatization to add capacities, develop 
infrastructure and invest in marketing and distributions channels. 
 
3. Firms using cost efficient technology (dry) are more profitable compare to 
those firms who are using relatively less efficient methods such as semi dry 
and wet which is more fuel consuming and less labour efficient. Age of the 
firm is positively correlated with profitability. Well established firms with 
updated technology are likely to be more experience in dealing with peaks and 
trough in macroeconomic environment, demand uncertainty and cost 
inflations. 
 
4. As for as the effect of these variables on other performance measures such as 
output and net income efficiency, coefficients signs are similar and 
statistically significant. 
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5. As for as the other initial conditions variables are concerned, larger size firms 
at the time of privatization maintained their better performance in post 
privatization time period. Hence this to some extent confirms that it is more of 
firm characteristics and macro economic conditions rather than ownership that 
matter. 
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Table 5.7: Determinant of Profitability, Net income Efficiency, Output, and Capital Expenditures 
Variable     Definition PROFIT PROFIT NIE OUTPUT CAPEX 
pvz =1 if privatized, 0 otherwise  -0.82826     
  (2.37527)     
yrp5 =1 for the first 5 years of post privatization , 0 otherwise  5.72212** 0.38649*** 0.19393 0.2542 
   (1.98436) (0.0923) (0.13571) (0.15653) 
yrp10 =1 for the next 5 years of post privatization, 0 otherwise  -1.57125 0.14739 0.12025 0.13933 
   (2.31105) (0.10701) (0.1594) (0.17912) 
yrp15 =1 for the next 5 years of post privatization, 0 otherwise  -1.65474 0.56933*** -0.15752 0.19649 
   (2.58166) (0.11968) (0.17774) (0.20038) 
fsize Initial condition: Log of firm assets- 1 year before privatization   5.50324 5.26137 0.72924** 1.88138*** 1.00588** 
  (5.29929) (4.88013) (0.23393) (0.33988) (0.36652) 
aspe0 Initial condition: performance -1 year before privatization   -0.62092** -0.61102** 0.00182 -0.10574*** -0.03654* 
  (0.20754) (0.19586) (0.00919) (0.01344) (0.01541) 
lever0 Initial condition: Leverage -1 year before privatization   -4.67460*** -4.44775*** -0.18150*** -0.38014*** -0.01732 
  (0.91471) (0.85723) (0.04133) (0.05925) (0.06498) 
perf0 Initial condition: Industry profitability -1 year before privatization   -0.56532* -0.52776* 0.02440** -0.05237** 0.05212** 
  (0.25575) (0.23761) (0.01128) (0.01634) (0.01834) 
t Time trend -1.62761** -2.04404*** -0.00024 -0.13249*** -0.02312 
  (0.57286) (0.57765) (0.02664) (0.03799) (0.04731) 
indroa3 Industry profitability 0.96287*** 0.87837*** 0.02104*** 0.02008** -0.00246 
  (0.10699) (0.11437) (0.00523) (0.00741) (0.00957) 
hhi1 Competition: Herfindhal index 0.38657 0.04043 -0.00378 -0.03231 0.03805 
  (0.42808) (0.4418) (0.02015) (0.02861) (0.03725) 
inf Macroeconomic  environment: Inflation -0.04243* -0.05956** -0.00204** -0.00045 0.00174 
  (0.01906) (0.01986) (0.0009) (0.00129) (0.00168) 
employ1 Macroeconomic  environment: Employment 32.28301 44.80230* -0.31601 3.99658** 2.16042 
  (19.85546) (20.04047) (0.92223) (1.31899) (1.63676) 
discr Macroeconomic  environment: Interest rate -0.38862 -0.58394** -0.03090** -0.0102 0.00487 
  (0.20981) (0.2174) (0.01016) (0.01463) (0.0172) 
dry Production process dry=1, 0 otherwise 18.43833*** 17.66870*** -0.00461 1.46506*** -0.69356* 
  (4.05424) (3.60244) (0.16644) (0.2474) (0.27572) 
region Region north=1, 0 otherwise 5.03866 5.75177* 0.47695** 0.51176* 0.64671** 
  (3.29872) (3.10593) (0.15102) (0.21599) (0.21833) 
age Firm age 16.07114*** 15.97417*** -0.09705 1.52541*** -0.09494 
  (3.43543) (3.08877) (0.14125) (0.21238) (0.23908) 
_cons Constant -3.85E+02 -5.06e+02* 1.28013 -47.64467*** -25.5618 
  (201.3698) (202.9315) (9.3339) (13.36451) (16.5745) 
N  231 231 231 231 231 
Notes: Figure in parenthesis are standard errors
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5.10. Conclusion  
 
Similar to trend analysis and non-parametric techniques, I reach to the same 
conclusion that reforms had initially positive effect on the firm‟s performance but 
then due to some tight macroeconomics and international environment, firms could 
not maintain the profitability and efficiency level in subsequent years. Evaluation of 
firms‟ performance based on purely strict financial criteria could be misleading if my 
objective is to evaluate the effect of policy reforms more thoroughly rather than just 
corporate profitability and efficiency. I aim to address this in my next chapter when I 
discuss the cost and benefits of privatization policy in a broader way. Hence, in a way, 
I move from accounting framework to social cost benefit analysis of privatization and 
deregulation policy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
Social Costs Benefits Analysis 
 
 
 
This chapter deals with social cost-benefits analysis of the privatization policy. The 
discussion moves from pure private or corporate profit and profitability (previous 
chapter) to public profit or social profit/total return to capital and profitability. A link 
is established between private and social profitability and an effort is made to 
reconcile the difference in private and social profitability. Thus by converting private 
profit to social profit, the study is able to make a like for like comparison. This type of 
assessment was carried out in the initial years of post privatization (early and mid 
1990s) in the studies sponsored by the donor agencies such the World Bank.     
                                                                  Chapter 6 
                                                                     Social Costs Benefits Analysis 
 
  131 
 
 
6.1. Economic Performance Evaluation 
 
In the financial analysis chapter, while discussing the financial performance, I mainly 
concentrated on the net return to shareholders or bottom line of income statement, 
namely private accounting profit. It surely provides the base for the performance 
evaluation. But due to accounting anomalies and ignoring of true cost and benefit to 
society, this measure is considered inappropriate for performance evaluation from an 
overall society point of view. In this chapter, the analysis start from private profit and 
then move to public profit; the modified version of private profit that shows the return 
to all of society‟s resources.   
 
To represent the profit relevant to society, one could measure the public profits or 
quasi rent or rents to fixed capital which is a modified version of private accounting 
profit by treating some items, which are considered as costs in income statement but 
benefits in public profits
34
. Public profit is defined as followed: 
 
Public profits = value of output - value of intermediate inputs - employees compensation -factor 
rental - opportunity cost of working capital.  
 
In notation, it is defined as: 
CCWFRESAWVIIGSPPR                          (1) 
 
                                                 
34
 This section has been drawn from the studies by Jones (1981), Sheikh (1985) and Galal et al. (1994). 
For comprehensive detail of economic performance evaluation methodology see these above-
mentioned studies. 
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Where, 
PPR     = Public profits; 
GS       = Gross sales; 
VII        = Value of intermediate inputs (fuel, power and raw material); 
ESAW  = Employees salaries and wages; 
FR        = Factor rental; and 
CWC     = Opportunity cost of working capital
35
. 
 
6.2. Real Public Profitability and Productivity 
  
To measure the productivity and profitability, I employed total factor productivity 
(TFP) and public profitability criteria. TFP is the ratio of benefits generated by the 
enterprise to its incurred costs, including the opportunity cost of fixed capital. It is 
defined as: 
TFP  = Total benefits generated ,   
                                                       Total costs incurred 
 
It is defined in notation as: 
CC CFCWFRESAWVII
GS
TFP

     (2) 
 
                                                 
35
 A careful examination of equation (1) shows that the public profits differ from private profit in three 
way: first, as against private profit, it considers the items such as interest (return to debt holders), direct 
and indirect taxes (return to government) benefits rather than costs. Second, by considering the true 
economic benefits of the enterprise operation it excludes the earnings in terms of other income and 
opportunity costs of working capital. Third, because I am going to measure the return to fixed capital, 
so public profit is measured gross of depreciation.   
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Where GS, VII, ESAW, FR and CWC are the same as defined earlier and CFC is the 
opportunity cost of fixed capital. 
 
The second measure of performance is public profitability. The idea here is to deflate 
the public profits by stock of fixed capital used in operation of enterprises during the 
year. It measures the return on fixed capital and is defined as: 
 
Public Profitability = Benefits- Variable costs  
                                          Fixed capital 
in notations, 
C
C
F
CWFRESAWVIIGS
PROF

          (3) 
 Where PROF is public profitability; FC is stock of fixed capital and other variables 
are same, as defined earlier. 
 
Current versus constant prices 
All of the results of the above-mentioned methodology are presented in current as 
well as constant prices. Using 2001 as base year, indices are used to deflate the 
corresponding categories in current prices to arrive at constant price of output, inputs, 
public profits and profitability and total factor productivity. The selected criteria have 
been GDP deflator.  
 
Output: Total gross sales have been considered as firm‟s output. The real output has 
been worked out by deflating the nominal sales by GDP deflator. 
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Inputs: Inputs used in my case are labour, fixed and working capital, fuel and energy 
and a residual category comprising of raw and packing material. GDP deflator is 
again used to convert nominal values into real numbers. 
 
Working Capital: Working capital is defined as the sum of stores, trade receivable, 
short term advances, deposits and cash. GDP deflator has been used to deflate current 
working capital. The cost of working capital, then, is worked out by multiplying the 
constant series by real interest rates.  
 
Labour: A continuous data series on number of workers is not available for privatized 
and private firms in post-privatization period for few years. For this purpose, I used 
materials from my detailed meetings with APCMA, a World Bank study (1986), and 
Government of Pakistan (1991). For the firms privatized in 1992, the data is available 
till 1992. From the Privatization Commission of Pakistan, I gathered data on number 
of workers who opted for golden handshake at the time of privatization. Bengali 
(1998) in a study of 8 privatized industrial enterprises, including two cement units, 
concluded that approximately 25% of the workers who opted for the golden 
handshake scheme were retained as contract workers. My detailed interviews with the 
new management confirmed this conclusion.  Hence, for few missing year number of 
workers for privatized firms is calculated as total number of workers at the time of 
privatization minus number of workers who opted for golden handshake + 25% of 
reinstated workers. For private firms, I have three data points 1986, 1991 & 1996. 
Calculation of the remaining years is as: 1986 figure   % annual average change 
during 1986-91. The same procedure is applied for 1992-96. Data is available on this 
variable from 1997 onward, with some gaps. These gaps were filled by missing values 
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imputation methods wherever needed. Thus the series on number of workers 
calculated in this way is roughly at best a possible measure on the workers strength. 
To come across at real value of expenditures on workers, nominal expenditure on 
wages and allowances are deflated by GDP deflator. 
 
Fixed Capital: The stock of fixed capital is measured by using the perpetual inventory 
method by adjusting disposal and deterioration in the stock. A detailed account of 
fixed capital component including machinery; land, vehicles and other miscellaneous 
are deflated by various assets classes related inflation indices. Cost of fixed capital is 
worked out by multiplying the nominal and constant price fixed capital series with the 
central bank discount interest rate.        
 
6.3. Calculation of Public and Private Profit 
 
Figure 6.1 shows that even from a strictly commercial point of view privatized firms 
performance in term of private profit after tax increased significantly during 2003 to 
2007 in post privatization relative to pre privatization periods. However, private profit 
from beginning of 2008 up until 2011 declined significantly. On the average, during 
pre divestiture period, private after tax profit for the privatized firms group remained 
Rs. 0.220 billions. It rose to Rs. 0.82 billion during 1993-96 showing a four times 
increase over the pre reform period.  
 
There are five turning points to explain: one corresponding to period of relatively 
stable performance in public sector operation during 1986 to 1991. During this period 
private profit after tax remained steadily (median profit of 0.22 billion). This amount 
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was to Rs.  0.567 billion in 1987, which, was the best year of public sector group 
firms operation in my sample. This increase was accompanied by a full commercial 
operation of D.G. Khan Cement which earned Rs. 0.175 & Rs. 0.206 billion net after 
tax profit in 1986 and 1987, over 30% of total earned profit of this group firms in 
1986 and 41% in 1987. However this momentum could not be maintained for a 
variety of reasons and subsequently private profit after tax declined steadily.  Second 
turning point is 1991, this caused a one-time decline in private after tax profit and it 
shrunk to a figure of Rs. 0.20 billion showing a decline of 68% over the 1987 figures. 
This decline corresponds to announcement of privatization of these firms. 
 
Third point to explain is the story of post privatization period, a significant rise in 
private after tax profit in the initial years of private operation (1.01 billion in 1993 and 
1.13 billion in 1994). During 1993 and 1994 private profit reached to a peak of more 
than one billion. However, this trend also proved temporarily and profit declined to 
Rs. 0.215 billion in 1996. However, the contribution in total private return of 
privatized group firms in case of D.G. Khan Cement still remained significant during 
this period (e.g. approximately more than 50%), and explains more than half of the 
variations in privatized group firms private profit after tax). During 1996 to 2003, 
private profit did not remain stable and reverted to overall negative (Rs. -0.28 billion). 
A significant turning point however was 2002 to 2006 where these sums were 4.5 
billion in 2006 and average 1.34 billion during this period. But then again, from 2008 
to 2011 it declined significantly with 2010 figure of negative 4 billion.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  Chapter 6 
                                                                     Social Costs Benefits Analysis 
 
  137 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Privatized (1991-92) Firms: Public and Private Profit at Current 
Market Prices (Rs. Billion) 
 
 
Private profit although is very useful to start with but in term of social cost benefit it 
tells little (only relevant for shareholders). Public profit could serve as a good proxy 
for this purpose and has been used widely in 1990s when researcher wanted to know 
the impact of privatization policies in a broader way. By looking at the above Figure 
6.1 and trend of public profit, it showed a relatively sustained rise and smooth pattern 
with just one blip (2007-08) compare to significant variations and decline in private 
profit in late 1990s and 2007 onward. It looks like that the size of pie has grown 
substantially but its distribution got much skewed over time. Hence, total return to 
resources used has gone up from mere 2 billion in 1991 to 22 billion in 2009 (11 
times more). This could be analyzed better by looking at the decomposition of quasi 
rent to resources (public profit). Table 6.1 shows this decomposition.  
   
During 1986-91, the years of public operations, public profit remained Rs. 2.35 
billions. After privatization, public profit like private profit rapidly increased in the 
initial years of private operation and overall it rose to Rs. 5 billion for post divestiture 
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regime (1993-96), showing an increase of more than 100% over the pre divestiture 
period. During 1993-95, total incremental change in total return to capital was Rs. 
2793 million and government share in this pie was Rs. 1695 million (60%). Hence 
government was major beneficiary of immediate impact of reform period. During this 
period, increase in total surplus was distributed in a sense that government received 
60%, equity holders got 25%, creditors 3% and remaining 12% has gone to non-
operating and depreciation costs. In sum, in the immediate period of privatization, 
inspection of current public profit and its distribution yields two discontinuities 
accompanying divestiture, one: 1993 and 1994 a period of high growth and second: a 
one-time decline in 1996. 
 
This discussion leads to question that private profit after tax has declined during 
1988-91, while public profit remained more or less stagnant during this period. 
Similarly, 1992 witnessed a maximum decline in the profit after tax profit while 
public profit showed a moderate recovery. During 1993-94 public profit has increased 
more than the increase in private after tax profit. The answer to this discussion needs 
some explanation regarding the growth of the total size of the pie and its distribution 
among different economic actors. Table 6.1 shows that over time, not only the size of 
the pie has fluctuated but its distribution also. During 1988-90 total surpluses and its 
distribution in term of direct taxes, interest and non-operating cost remained more or 
less stagnant but increase in indirect taxes reduced the private profit after tax. This 
was particularly accompanied by the fact that in 1988, government introduced the 
sales tax on the cement industry. This caused a regressive effect on the overall 
industry‟s financial performance. This eroded the after tax surplus during this period. 
1991 although witnessed an improvement in total surplus but increase in surplus was 
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now partly eaten up by increase in indirect as well as direct taxes and private profit 
after tax further reduced to all time low in my sample period.  
 
Thus during 1988-92, total surplus and public profit although did not significantly 
changed and remained more or less stagnant but reduction in private after tax profit 
has been due to government fiscal policy in term of taxation. This is the reason that 
private after tax profit is considered a weak measure of performance evaluation. A 
significant turn to total return to shareholders however, happened during 1999-onward 
when at the peak it reached to Rs. 17 billions (8 time more compare to public 
ownership period).  
 
In the above discussion, I have discussed the privatized firms‟ performance in term of 
private and public profit. The question still to be answered is, that whether the 
performance of the privatized firms has been better than the firms in other ownerships 
structure. I looked at total return to resources for all three types of ownership (public, 
private and privatized). I do not report those figures here, but overall, privatized 
firms‟ performance in term of public profit, which has been more or less same in pre 
divestiture period, marked a significant improvement in post divestiture regime 
relative to private sector firms group. Whereas public sector firms group performance, 
which deteriorated during 1990-92 showed a relatively better performance in post 
privatization period. 
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Table 6.1: Firms Privatized in 1992: Cumulative Return to Capital at Current 
Market Prices (Rs. Billions) 
 Private 
profit 
Gross after tax 
return on 
equity 
Gross before 
tax return on 
equity 
Public 
profit 
Total return 
 to capital 
1986 0.22 0.43 1.57 1.69 1.77 
1987 0.57 0.83 2.16 2.31 2.40 
1988 0.49 0.77 2.22 2.35 2.49 
1989 0.20 0.46 2.20 2.37 2.49 
1990 0.22 0.47 2.19 2.35 2.49 
1991 0.20 0.44 2.44 2.58 2.72 
1992 0.34 0.58 3.14 3.31 3.49 
1993 1.01 1.29 3.88 4.10 4.44 
1994 1.13 1.48 4.86 5.07 5.56 
1995 0.82 1.17 5.43 5.69 6.52 
1996 0.22 0.59 4.49 4.78 5.75 
1997 -0.57 -0.22 4.21 4.49 5.08 
1998 -0.64 -0.10 2.99 3.36 4.05 
1999 -1.42 0.34 5.02 6.28 6.59 
2000 0.00 1.60 6.12 7.34 7.80 
2001 -1.02 0.26 4.70 6.01 6.26 
2002 0.02 0.96 6.40 7.76 8.05 
2003 0.30 1.35 6.00 7.16 7.46 
2004 1.34 2.32 8.00 8.68 9.24 
2005 3.02 4.01 10.77 11.46 12.21 
2006 4.44 5.47 14.43 15.47 16.61 
2007 0.59 1.81 6.54 7.99 9.09 
2008 -2.05 0.48 7.27 11.18 13.89 
2009 -1.63 1.31 12.18 19.43 22.00 
2010 -4.21 -1.22 9.28 15.17 17.19 
2011 -2.53 0.75 11.41 17.10 18.97 
 
 
CURRENT AND CONSTANT PROFITS: Public profit may change in response to not 
only changes in efficiency but also in output prices as well as in other non-efficiency-
related factors. The adjustments are necessary to the particular period of public 
ownership where prices may be exogenously determined and are beyond the control 
of the management and their effect on enterprise‟s performance should be adjusted to 
understand the real changes in efficiency
36
.  Hence, the next step was the calculation 
of public profit in constant prices.  
 
                                                 
36
 The situation in this case is not much complicated because as discussed before, government 
gradually reduced the control on cement prices and the presence of private sector kept the public sector 
to adopt competitive prices despite of monopoly power of SCCP during 1986-91. 
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Using 2001 as the base year, output and input prices indices were calculated and used 
to deflate the nominal values to arrive at the values of output, inputs and public profit 
in constant prices. The consequence of making adjustments for changes in prices is 
given in 5.2, which shows the public profit and its derivation at constant market 
prices. Some points are noteworthy: Real public profit remained same 1986 to 1999, 
and then increased impressively and peaked to 30 billion in 2011. This is impressive 
in the sense that labour, rental and cost of working capital steadily increased during 
the corresponding periods. 
 
Figure 6.2: Privatized Firms: Real Public Profit  (Rs. Billions) (1986-2011) 
 
 
PROFITABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY: Public profit, in constant prices, can change 
(increase/decrease) not only due to the change (increase/decrease) in technical 
efficiency, but also due to the change in endowments of fixed factors which represents 
technology as well . As discussed in previously, I do not expect a wide spread 
expansion programme during public sector regime, but new management could opt 
for a major restructuring in term of replacement of older plants or may opt for 
capacity additions. Hence public profit at nominal as well as real prices may change 
due to scale of operation. Thus, it becomes necessary to deflate public profit by some 
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suitable measure of scale of production. A general practice has been the use of fixed 
assets or gross fixed capital formation and rated capacity of production as a measure 
of scale of production. I adopt the first methods for my subsequent analysis.  
 
Gross fixed formation at nominal prices was essentially stable in pre divestiture 
period (see Figure 6.3), but it rose thereafter. This upward change in fixed capital 
formation is potentially an important change in management decisions accompanying 
divestiture. 
Figure 6.3: Privatized Firms: Stock of Fixed Assets Formation (Rs. Billions) 
(1986-2011) 
 
The results of the performance evaluation on the basis of public profitability and total 
factor productivity in current and constant prices are shown in Figure 6.4 and Figure 
6.5.  
 
Following conclusions for privatized firms‟ performance can be drawn: 
Like public profit at nominal as well as real prices, nominal and real public 
profitability was higher during 1986-88, but the increase in public profitability has 
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been more than the increase in public profit. This was, however, discontinued in 
1989-90, which showed a decrease in both nominal and real profitability. This is in 
contrast to any change in fixed assets during this period. During 1992-94, there has 
been a steady decline of both nominal and real public profitability.   
 
The period of 1999-2006, overall showed a stable trend in both nominal and real 
profitability. But since 2007, real profitability has been on the rise. 
Total factor productivity since 2007 improved significantly. 
 Figure 6.4: Privatized Firms: Public Profitability at Current and Constant               
Prices (1986-2011) 
 
Note: PROFN= Public profitability (nominal) 
          PROFR= Public profitability (real) 
The comparison of the privatized firms‟ performance in term of public profitability at 
nominal as well as real prices cannot be completed without comparing to other 
ownership firms. As these ratios are the true return to society‟s resources, the 
magnitude of the return can lead to important policy conclusion. In pre divestiture 
period the performance of divested and public sector firms has not been inferior in 
term of profitability relative to private sector firms either evaluated at nominal or real 
prices (figures calculated but not reported here). These results are quite accordingly to 
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Naqvi (1991). However, after divestiture the firms remaining in public sector has not 
performed better relative to private or privatized firms. 
 
 Figure 6.5: Privatized Firms: Total Factor Productivity at Current and 
 Constant Prices (1986-2011) 
 
 
 Notes: TFPN=  TFP(nominal) 
             TFPR= TFP (real) 
 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
  
A major point emerging from the above analysis is that: during 1986-91, the 
productivity and profitability trend remained more or less same (as the upward 
movement in one or two years was offset by an equal decrease in the following one or 
two years). The exception is 1987, which witnessed an overall increase for all types of 
firms.  But during 1992-94, the trend showed clearly upward movement for privatized 
firms. But still this type of conclusion is less satisfactory without comparing it to 
control as well as neutral group firms in term of productive and cost efficiency and 
productivity under different process of production and location. All these points will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next chapters.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Estimation of Efficiency and Productivity  
 
 This chapter is comprised of modelling technology of production. The chapter starts 
with the discussion of efficiency and then moves to estimation of technical and cost 
efficiency and total factor productivity. The objective of this assessment is to detect 
the key sources of changes in the efficiency and productivity by using parametric and 
non-parametric techniques. The study supplements pure parametric method of 
efficiency estimation with non-parametric linear programming based order-m 
efficiency techniques. Qualification to and explanation for the observed results are 
provided in this chapter. 
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7.1. Introduction 
 
An intuitive notion of efficiency refers to the achievement of maximum output from a 
given set of resources: the greater the output relative to input, the higher the level of 
efficiency. Because an increased represents a kind of “manna from heaven”, it is not 
surprising that the study of efficiency measurement has received much attention in 
last thirty years, culminating in some significant analytical innovations. The purpose 
of the chapter is to find the evidence that either subdued financial performance in 
cement industry of Pakistan in post-privatization period of 1992 onward has been 
accompanied by improved efficiency and productivity or mere an increase in output 
price. 
 
Secondary objective of the chapter is testing the relative productive and cost 
efficiency of public and private firms. The chapter comprises of several sections. 
First, I present some review of literature on industrial reforms and productive 
performance, second, conceptual consideration and measurement of technical and 
allocative (price efficiency), third, I relate theoretical discussions to firm level 
efficiency model specification and estimation. 
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7.2. Literature Review - Reforms and Efficiency 
 
Since Farrell (1957), a long literature has developed around the problem of efficiency 
measurement. These includes stochastic frontier, parametric and non-parametric 
(linear programming) approaches. Since major liberalization and privatization waves 
of industrial units of Pakistan, there has not been any specific study to address the 
issue of productive efficiency measurement and comparison of pre and post-
privatization performance for cement industry specifically. There is a wide spread 
disagreement on the relative efficiency of private and public sector firms.  Mainly the 
point of controversy is related to technical or productive efficiency. On the matter of 
allocative efficiency, most industrial economists believe that market competition 
ensures that resources would be used according to market signals and firm are likely 
to become allocative efficient. 
 
There is vast body of literature that does not demonstrate that public enterprises in 
LDC‟s are always outperformed by private enterprises. However, there are now 
studies being carried out in which comparison of relative performance of privatized 
firms with the firms already in private or public sector has been made. Some studies 
are related to Chinese industrial reforms and their impact on efficiency.  A worth 
mentioning pioneering study in this regard is that of Zinan (1996). By using Translog 
and Cobb-Douglas production function, the author concluded those reform variables 
such as performance-related wage policy and substantial managerial autonomy in 
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output and input decision-making has significantly contributed to the improvement in 
productivity. 
 
The second earlier study is that of Cackmak (1992), by using Translog Non-Stochastic 
Production Function, for comparing the private, public and mixed (public and private) 
cement firm‟s technical efficiency. The author concluded that there were no 
significant differences in technical efficiency between different types of ownership 
structures. Kalirajan (1997) et al. using Chinese data of iron and steel industry derived 
the same results as discussed in Zinan (1996) study. 
 
7.3. Measurement of Technical Efficiency -- Stochastic Frontier 
A deterministic frontier production function may be written as: 
 
           
                                                                                                         (1) 
Where yit represents the production level of the i
th
 firm at the t
th
 time period and     is 
a vector of core inputs used in production. The variable     is the best possible 
maximum output that can be produced given the known technology and techniques 
available. The maximum output may vary for the same firm in different time periods.  
 
As the firm gets maximum information about the true and best relationship of its 
inputs and output it moves to the best level input-output of the panel. Therefore a 
stochastic production function can be written as: 
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                                                                                                           (2) 
 
Where     is the statistical white noise with       
     and is associated with factors 
not under the control of the firm such as weather, sudden blast of machinery and luck 
etc, which cause its production to vary across its mean level. However, in practice, 
many firms due to institutional and non-price related factors such as poor quality of 
labour and lack of incentives may not operate at maximum best practice output level 
and may be at any point inside of frontier. Best practice is also conditional on the 
knowledge of the management about the true technical relation of input-output. Thus 
it becomes imperative to examine whether the firms are able to apply successfully the 
technical aspects of production. As the improvement in efforts has the direct bearing 
on improving technical efficiency of the firm, then the realized production function 
can be model as follows: 
                         
                                                                                                       (3) 
Where     is a non-negative random variable of i
th
 firm specific characteristic such as 
age process, scale and location, which influence the firm to operate at inside the 
frontier.  
 
Transfer of ownership is implicitly perceived to improve in productivity. Thus if 
policy succeeded to achieve this objective, the firms under new management should 
be on their frontier and     would have to be equal to zero or at least decline. 
However, if policy is partially successful then the potential gap between actual and 
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frontier output must reduce although     would be greater than zero. Now a measure 
of the level of the technical efficiency of the i
th
 enterprise can be defined as the ratio 
of observed to the maximum possible output when       as follows: 
 
                               
                                                                                                      (4) 
It is also rational to assume that policy may effects with different intensity to different 
firms. In this case a firm‟s specific efficiency estimation becomes imperative to judge 
the impact of policy on firm level. Now two behavioural assumptions can be imposed: 
i. There is no improvement in technical efficiency over time which means 
    remains constant. 
ii.     decreases remains constant or increases which implies that technical 
efficiency may improve, remain constant or decline over time. I stick to 
the second assumption for the following reasons: As my mentioned 
hypothesis to be tested is that either policy promoted the level of efforts, 
alternatively     decreased over time. Due to technological characteristics, 
my concern is also to test the response of policy at a firm level rather than 
for whole industry for a specific period of time. 
 
Following Battese and Coelli (1992), the above characteristics of the technical 
efficiency can be modeled as: 
                  
                                                              (5) 
                                       
                                                                                             (6) 
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Where     is independent random variable and h is an unknown parameters, and      
represents the set of Ti time period among the t period for which observation for the i
th
 
enterprise are available. Now     decreases, remain constant or increase depends on 
whether    , h = 0 or      respectively. 
 
Battese and Coelli (1992) worked out best predictor, which is a measure of efforts 
(technical efficiency) of the i
th
 firm at the t
th
 period. Various statistical hypotheses 
concerning the modelling of the frontier production function including the modelling 
of firm specific and time specific efficiency can be tested. These tests have been done 
in latter stage in my study. 
 
Batteese and Coelli (1995) proposed a Technical Efficiency Effect model in a search 
to find out the factors responsible for the efficiency differences among the firms. The 
main advantage of this type of model specification and estimation is the simultaneous 
estimation of the input-output coefficients and predicted technical efficiencies. It 
avoids the statistical criticism of first estimating firm specific efficiency estimates and 
then regressing on some well-defined set of variable, which influence the efficiency.   
 
The model specification by Battese and Coelli (1995) is as follows: 
                                                  (7) 
                                 
                                                                       (8)   
 
Where t is time period, FS are firm‟s specific variables such as capacity, age, location, 
process etc., PS is policy specific variables and  ‟s are unknown parameters to be 
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estimated. It is important to note that the above model for inefficiency can only be 
estimated if the inefficiency effects are stochastic and have a particular distributional 
specification. The hypothesis of no technical inefficiency and inefficiency effects are 
not stochastic should be tested before making any concrete conclusion. A specific 
model specification and distributional assumptions are discussed in greater details in 
the following sections. 
 
A stochastic production frontier is a very useful way to judge the performance of 
different firms, but there is limitation to this construct. A production process can be 
inefficient in two ways, only one of which can be detected by estimated production 
frontier (that is technical efficiency).  It can be technically inefficient, in the sense that 
it fails to produce maximum output from a given input combination due to over 
utilization of inputs. It can be allocatively inefficient in the sense that the marginal 
revenue of product of input might not be equal to the marginal cost of that input: 
allocative inefficiency results in utilization of inputs in the wrong proportions, given 
input prices. Since estimation of technical inefficiency is usually carried out on output 
and input only, such an exercise cannot provide evidence on the matter of allocative 
inefficiency and hence cannot be used to draw inferences about total or economic 
inefficiency. 
 
A firm is allocative inefficient if it operates off its least cost expansion plan against 
the technical inefficiency where a firm operates below the feasible stochastic frontier. 
Incorporating these features, a derivation of system of factor demands frontier and 
then from them, a stochastic cost frontier can be derived. 
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For specification of a cost function, which assumes both technical and allocative 
inefficiency involved, I can follow the model specified by Schmidt et al. (1979).  
 
The specification is defined as follows: 
           
 
 
   
 
                                                                                                           (9) 
Where     is production and     is vector of inputs  ‟s are parameters to be estimated 
and;            are error terms as defined earlier. If a firm is assumed to be 
allocatively efficient, then it will make no mistake in cost minimization factor 
proportion which is given by the solution to: 
 
                        
                                                                                                     (10) 
Where        
    
    
 ,              are prices of inputs respectively. But if the 
allocative inefficiency is incorporated in the model, then,                  
Whereas before        
    
    
 , and    represents the amount by which the i
th
 firm 
first order condition for cost minimization is violated. The analysis can be extended 
to a panel data. I further assume that there is no systematic tendency of over or under 
utilization of any input relative to other input.  
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Schmidt et al. (1979) derived the factor demand equations, and then from the factor 
demand equations, they derived the cost function that is: 
 
 
   
  
     
 
 
       
  
 
    
  
  
    
 
 
                 
 
   
 
                                                                                                               (11) 
Where C is costs and   is return to scale parameter and term         is the amount 
by which i
th
 firm operates above its least cost expansion plan (allocative inefficiency). 
 
I divided the cost function by factor price of an input to normalize the equation. 
Schmidt et al. (1979) believed that it does not matter which factor is used to normalize 
the equation. The model shows that allocative inefficiency and return to scale are 
inversely related to each other. The estimation of parameters of the above model is not 
quite simple involving maximum likelihood estimation of parameters of   and   and 
predicted efficiencies. It needs some programming involving maximum likelihood 
estimation of parameters of  ,   and predicted efficiencies that I will discuss in 
greater detail later. 
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7.3.1. Determinants of Efficiency and Pakistani Cement Industry 
 
i) Process 
Process is the most important determinant of efficiency of cement industry. Mainly 
there are two types of manufacturing process used for the production of cement 
throughout the world, including Pakistan. These processes are: i) Wet process ii) Dry 
process. In Pakistan, the old cement plants, which were set up before 1975 uses the 
wet process for the production till late 1990s and now have gradually moved to dry 
process, whereas the plants being set up afterwards use the new technology i.e. dry 
process, which is very cost efficient.  However, some of the plants use both dry and 
wet processes for the cement production. My sample firms use both processes. Table 
7.1 shows that the group of public sector firms comprises of wet and semi-dry process 
except Thatta Cement, which uses dry process.  
 
The privatized group is mixed of dry and wet process, whereas, private group firms 
are using mainly dry process. In Pakistan, the wet plants operate at a fuel efficiency of 
approximately 1,800-kcal/kg clincher while the dry process plants operate at 
approximately 800 kcal/kg. In comparison, in West Germany where wet process only 
comprises 1.4% of the total, the average fuel consumption is 740-kcal per kg cement. 
The total power consumption in a dry process is about 105-120 Kwh per ton of 
cement as against 105-110 Kwh in a wet process plant. The saving in coal 
consumption in dry process over wet process will more than offset the increase in 
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power consumption. Hence, theoretically, the firms using dry process will be more 
efficient compared to firms using either semi-dry or wet process. 
 
ii) Age 
The plants of cement industry of Pakistan can be divided into three categories: 
[1] Very old plants, now beyond their useful life and being replaced with newer 
plants 
[2] Middle aged (15 years or so) plants 
[3] Modern dry process plants 
 
The older kilns are near the end of their life, and unless fuel costs drop substantially 
are not very economic.  The middle-aged plants in spite of the fact that they are wet 
process plants are relatively comparable to dry process plants. Modern dry process 
plants on the other hand were mainly set up in the eighties and later and are 
considered the most efficient plants. The inspection of Table 1 shows that public 
sector firms group using mix of dry as well as wet processes were the most aged firms 
having a mean age of 17 years varying from highest 32 years to lowest 4 years. 
Privatized firms on the other hand with equal distribution of both processes were 
categorized as middle-aged firms varying the ages from lowest 1 year to highest 28 
years with mean age of 14 years. Private firms were the youngest firms in my sample 
having celebrated their first or second year of commercial operation in 1986. 
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iii) Size 
Size of the plant is an important factor of efficiency determination. The large-scale 
operation often has positive effect on the plant‟s efficiency. It is seen that the cement 
plants in Pakistan till late 1990s were very small, 34% of the capacity comes from 
plants with less than 1100 ton per day (tpd) capacity. This compares to a worldwide 
average plant size of 3000 tpd.  The average kiln size for public, privatized and 
private sector plants were 751, 938 and 1080 respectively and are particularly very 
small (see Table 7.1). The existing kilns have an average daily capacity of 690 tpd in 
1986 and 890 tpd in 1991.  While, in most countries, modern plants employ kilns with 
capacities ranging from 2,500 tpd to 4,000 tpd.  In fact the 1,100 tpd initial plant 
capacity is considered uneconomical by world standards. 
 
Table 7.1: Technical Data Description (1991) 
Firms Names Process 
Capacity per 
day in tons 
Heat Consumption 
per ton clinker (in 
Kcal) 
Electricity (in 
Kwh) 
Number of 
kilns 
(numbers) 
Age of 
kilns 
(years) 
Number of 
workers 
(numbers) 
Public Sector Firms        
Associated Cement Wet+Dry 638 1757 135 5 32 1793 
Javadan Cement 
Semi 
Dry+Dry 667 1000 120 3 16 1026 
Mustahkam Cement Wet+Dry 700 1320 115 3 16 1137 
Thatta Cement Dry 1000 955 113 1 4 673 
Mean  751 1258 121 3 17 1157 
Privatized Firms        
Dandot Cement Dry 1000 880 115 1 4 743 
D.G. Khan Cement Dry 2000 857 108 1 1 504 
Gharibwal Cement Wet 600 1560 106 3 25 844 
Kohat Cement Dry 1000 950 138 1 4 754 
Mapple Leaf Cement Wet 425 1650 90 2 28 551 
Zealpak Cement Wet 600 1680 97 6 24 1675 
Mean  938 1263 109 2 14 845 
Private Firms        
Dadabhoy Cement Dry 1000 980 126 1 1 506 
Cherat Cement Dry 1100 845 108 1 1 363 
Pakland Cement Dry 1140 1050 107 1 2 250 
Mean  1080 958 114 1 1 373 
Industry Mean  884 1188 118 2 11 832 
Source: Compiled from:  
1. Cement directory (1991), NDFC, Government of Pakistan.  
2. Annual Reports of Expert Advisory Cell, MOP, GOP (Various issues). 
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The small kiln sizes prevent the industry from attaining economies of scale in the 
areas of labour productivity and unit capital cost. The new public sector plants set up 
during 1980-85 had a design capacity of 1,000-1,100 tpd, which was also the initial 
capacity of the private sector plants. However, the private sector plants were designed 
for an expansion if needed, which could add 70% to 100% to the initial capacity.  The 
comparison shows that the initial unit capital cost is nearly 10% lower for private 
sector plants, and that this difference will have to be increased significantly when the 
private sector plant capacities increased to full capacity.  
 
These facts lead to the conclusion that even though initially public sector units with 
comparable capacity may be more efficient but the gap may be narrowed down as the 
private sector capacity is extended. A World Bank (1985) study estimated that 
manufacturing cost in Pakistan varies considerably accordingly to process. Variable 
costs in 1986 for dry process operation were approximately Rs.156/tonne lower and 
labour costs by dry process was approximately Rs.90/tonne lower comparing to wet 
process plants and that difference was more due to larger size production units and 
more modern plants design than to process difference. 
 
iv) Scale 
In the cement industry, there exists a definite advantage of operating at large scale, 
particularly in the production process.  It is estimated that size and utilization of 
capacity could explain about 60 per cent of the difference in the cost of production 
among the existing units. For 10 percent difference in utilization of capacity, cost of 
production differs by about 3.5 percent. The advantage of the established firms is that 
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they would have already reached optimal scales, while the new entrant will have to 
gradually reach this level. Unless the management entrepreneur opts for large size 
plants and higher capacity utilization, economies of scale cannot be enjoyed. So, there 
exists a definite direct causation. Table 7.2 sets the scene in term of initial conditions 
prevailing in the industry. Public sector firms were less labour productive and private 
firms were less capital productive (due to significant investment in capital in initial 
years. 
 
Table 7.2: Technical Efficiency Indicators in the Initial Periods  
Years 
 
Real Value of Output/Fixed 
Capital(Rs.) Real Value of Output/Labour (Rs.) 
Real Value of Output/Working 
Capital (Rs.) 
 
 Public Privatized Private Public Privatized Private Public Privatized Private 
1986-91 3.01 3.12 1.04 11.2 20.21 23.67 3.59 4.27 3.3 
1986-92 3.01 3.12 1.04 11.2 20.21 23.67 3.59 4.27 3.3 
1988-91 3.16 3.27 1.16 10.8 20.43 25.09 3.62 4.33 3.29 
1993-96 3.3 3.68 1.57 8.83 22.44 38.87 3.18 4.58 3.41 
1993-95 3.6 3.32 1.7 9.96 23.44 38.65 3.72 4.34 3.08 
% Change1986-91 to1993-96 
             9.74 18.04 50.02 -21.15 11.03 64.16 -11.62 7.27 3.06 
Source: Author’s calculation from various sources discussed in data section. 
 
 
7.3.2. Model Specification 
 
For technical efficiency measurement I use the model proposed by Battese and Coelli 
(1992 &1993 & 1995) which is equivalent to the Kumbhakar et al. (1991) 
specification with exception that allocative efficiency is imposed, the first order profit 
maximization removed and penal data is permitted.  The Battese and Coelli (1992 & 
1993) model could be expressed as: 
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Yit = Xit ß + (Vit - Uit),  i = 1,2,3,.......,N, t = 1, 2, 3, ......, T 
                                                                                                                (12) 
Where, Yit is logarithm of the value of output of the i
th
 firm in the t
th
 period; Xit is a 
k×1 vector of (transformation of the) inputs quantities of the i
th
 firm in the t
th
 period; ß 
is a vector of unknown parameters; the Vit are random variables which are assumed to 
be iid.N (0,  2v ), and independent of the Uit  which are non-negative random 
variables assumed to be account for technical inefficiency in production and are 
assumed to independently distributed as truncations at zero of the N (mit, σ
2
u ) 
distribution. 
 
Two specific forms of frontier production function are commonly used in applied 
research of production function estimation. These are Cobb-Douglas type production 
function and more flexible form of translog production function. These two types of 
production function are also used in my study. The stochastic Cobb-Douglas frontier 
production function for the whole cement industry may be defined as: 
 
LogYit = ß0 + ßi Xi+ ßtT + eit ................ (13) 
 
Where Yit represents log of real value of production (in million of rupees) of the i
th
 
firm in the t
th
 period; and Xit represents the vector of inputs. I use labour (L), fixed 
capital (K); real fuel cost (F) and real expenditures on raw material (M). All these 
inputs are expressed in logs. The inclusion of time trend as an independent variable is 
due to separate the time invariant efficiency  
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The Cobb-Douglas Production Function is based on some strict assumption i.e. 
constant return to scale. A more flexible form of production function that is translog 
production function of equation 1 could be explained as: 
 
                                                
                                                  
                                                                           
 
                                                                                                                (14) 
 
Although stochastic production frontier is a useful construct, there are some serious 
limitations in the information it contains. As discussed previously, a production 
process can be inefficient in two ways: only one of which can be detected by an 
estimated production frontier. It can be technically inefficient in the sense that it fails 
to produce maximum output from given inputs. It can also be inefficient in the sense 
that marginal revenue product might not be equal to the marginal cost of that input, 
generally called allocative inefficiency. It occurs as a result of using of inputs in 
wrong proportion, given inputs prices.  
 
Since estimation of production frontier is carried out with observations on output and 
inputs only, such exercise cannot give evidence on the matter of allocative 
inefficiency, and hence cannot be used to draw inferences about total or economic 
efficiency. The primary purpose of this section is to find evidence on total 
inefficiency in production process. Following Schmidt et al. (1979), Battese and 
Coelli (1992 &1993) stochastic cost function can be specified as: 
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Yit = Xitß + (Vit + Uit), i= 1, 2, 3,......., N, t = 1, 2, 3, ......, T ................... 
                                                                                                               (15) 
Where Yit is the (logarithm of the) cost of production of the i
th
 firm in the t
th
 period; 
Xit is a k×1 vector of (transformation of the) input prices; ß is a vector of unknown 
parameters; Vit are random variables, which are assumed to be iid.N(0,  
2
v ), and 
independent of Uit which are non-negative and assumed to account of cost 
inefficiency (technical and allocative) and distributed as N (0,  2u ). 
 
By following Schmidt and Lovell (1979) and Coelli (1995) and Kumbhakar, 
Nakamura & Heshmati (2000), I have used the following cost frontier function 
specification: 
 
                                                  
                                                    
                                                      
                                               
                          
                                                                                                                  (16) 
 
Where lnc is cost of production, w1, w2, w3 are prices of labour, fuel and capital, and y 
is output.  Cost of raw material (limestone) is used as to normalize other input prices 
and to impose homogeneity assumption. Use of four factors of inputs in this case is 
due to following reasons: 
 
1. Labour and fixed assets (capital) are two very important factor of production 
used almost all studies conducted on efficiency and productivity estimation. In 
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this study, labour variable is actual number of workers. It includes all workers 
including production and non production. Fixed capital is a proxy of capital 
stock. Use of this proxy is common in empirical literature and I use this 
measure in my study as well.   
 
2. Inclusion of fuel and raw material (called intermediate inputs) is extremely 
important given the fact that fuel cost is almost 60% of the total cost. 
Excluding these costs would have compromise the total cost estimation. I am 
not able to get physical quantities of these inputs, hence the use of 
expenditures on these inputs. 
 
7.3.3. Efficiency Prediction 
 
The measure of technical efficiency of a specific firm can be calculated as the ratio of 
its mean production value given its realized firm effect, to the corresponding mean 
production value if the firm effect was zero. Thus the technical efficiency of the i
th
 
firm denoted by EFFit is defined by: 
          
 
  
                 
               
                                                                                                                   (17) 
where, y* is value of production or cost of production of i
th
 firm in the t
th
 period . This 
measure necessarily has values between zero and one for production function and 
from one to infinity for cost function. If a firm‟s technical efficiency is 0.85, then it 
implies that the firm realizes, on average, 85% of the production possible for a fully 
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efficient firm having comparable input values. In case of cost function, if the 
efficiency measure value is one, it means that cost of technical or both technical and 
allocative inefficiency is zero. However, the interpretation of the efficiency measure 
in cost function is strictly based on the assumption about    . Since, parametric cost 
and productions are subject to serious debate, I also estimated production efficiencies 
by using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques and compared the efficiencies 
across these two methods.  
 
I also estimated production function estimates to calculate total factor productivity 
(TF) in the cement industry in pre and post reform period. TFP measures in my study, 
is composed of scale efficiency and technical change. Hence increase in TFP may be 
due to these two contributors if efficiency has not risen in post reform period. I used a 
series of estimators proposed by different authors but present here very popular time 
trend estimator where time trend enters as an explanatory variable alongside its 
interactive and square terms in translog production function.    
 
7.4. Data and Empirical Results 
 
For estimation of technical and cost efficiency, most of the data has been collected 
from the following sources: 
[1] Annual Report, Expert Advisory Cell, Government of Pakistan (GOP), 
Islamabad (various issues). 
[2] Annual audited accounts of the respective companies (various issues). 
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[3] Annual un-audited accounts of the public sector companies (various 
issues). 
[4] Annual report of the State Bank of Pakistan (various issues). 
[5] Economic Survey, Ministry of Finance, GOP (various issues). 
[6] Census of Manufacturing Industries (CMI) [various issues). 
[7] Cement Directory (1991), National Development Finance Corporation, 
Government of Pakistan. 
[8] Fifty years of Pakistan Statistics.  
 
Following is the snapshot of the data used in my estimation of production parameters 
to calculate efficiency score. 
   
Table 7.3: Descriptive Statistics of Input Output Data   
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min 
y 407 7.567833 0.965161 2.808573 10.08742 
l 407 6.424894 0.56199 4.70048 7.843849 
f 407 6.316591 0.882131 2.135786 8.448721 
k 407 7.237368 1.200868 2.665772 9.625122 
m 407 5.19923 0.797437 0.914115 7.040757 
t 407 13.9828 7.373378 1 26 
 
In my presentation of estimates of the parameters of Cobb-Douglas and Translog 
Production Function, I considered three models; one for Cobb-Douglas and two for 
translog production function (Table 7.4). I carried out the adequacy of models before 
finally choosing the final model. Based on LLR test, my preferred model is the 
translog time varying production function model. The hypothesis that all translog 
variables are equal to zero is rejected conveniently by LLR test. Next step involved 
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the choice between translog time invariant model which assume that persistence of 
inefficiencies are time invariant across firms is not justified based on the fact that 
privatization policy was adopted to address these persistent inefficiencies and I would 
expect that as a result of change of ownership, firms would have changed their 
input/output mix and would have become more efficient over time. Second one could 
test the validity of this claim by testing the statistical significance of parameters which 
are estimated alongside translog variables parameters. Three of these extra parameters 
estimated are mu, eta and gamma.  
 
The maximum likelihood estimates for the parameter mu (µ) is associated with the 
distribution of in-efficiency effects during the last period of panel and is indicative of 
the possibility of somewhat less in-efficiency that would be indicated by half normal 
distribution. The maximum likelihood estimate eta () shows the time-varying 
inefficiency effects. The most significant and important parameter is gamma () which 
measures the variances in in-efficiencies effects across the firms.  
 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the Cobb-Douglas and translog production 
function for overall industry represented by different ownerships are presented in 
Table 7.3. The statistical significance and negative sign of eta in my preferred model 
indicates that for the firms used in my sample, degree of inefficiency has increased 
over time. It is based on the last period base level of inefficiency and other periods are 
compared against this last period base inefficiency. The maximum likelihood 
estimates of , which shows the variation in efficiency across the firms is very high, 
showing the greater variations in efficiency among different firms. The significance of 
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 parameter suggests that traditional response function with no inefficiency is not 
adequate representation of the data. Zinan (1996) pointed out that results derived from 
the efficiency parameters and predicted efficiencies of this type of production function 
are highly sensitive to the selection of the model and related parameters. The value of 
eta is significant and is indication of time varying effect to be important. mu (µ) is 
almost insignificant.   
 
Elasticity estimates derived from translong production could reveal the extent of role 
played by each input in the production of output. By calculating these estimates of the 
elasticities at means input, I get the impression that fuels cost plays an extremely 
important role in the variations of production and sale of cement. My interaction with 
Cement Manufacture Association does confirm this and rising fuel cost was 
highlighted one of the major impediment to industry revenues, profits and 
competitiveness. Industry has seen a lot of change in term of fuel mix in the last few 
years where coal is being substituted against furnace oil. It could take few years 
before this has any statistically significant effect on production function. 
    Labour   Fuel Capital Material 
.0577831 .5975482 .0636295 .2727655 
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Table 7.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Parameters of the Stochastic Frontier 
Production Function:
  
Dependent Variable is log of Real Value of Output 
Variable  Cobb-Douglas Translog  
time-Invariant 
Time-varying 
Decay 
αl  0.08288** 0.11243 0.05004 
αf  0.57453*** 0.40303*** 0.46215*** 
αk  0.08112*** 0.12818*** 0.11217*** 
αm  0.34811*** 0.35512*** 0.34457*** 
αt  0.42713*** -0.07546 -0.06235 
αll   -0.01193 0.02219 
αff   0.048 0.04158 
αkk   0.02651* 0.01452* 
αmm   -0.09789* -0.09056* 
αlf   -0.13737 -0.12228 
αlk   0.04727 0.03865 
αlm   0.21604** 0.13566 
αfk   -0.10994** -0.08658** 
αfm   0.00552 0.02568 
αkm   0.05196 0.04643 
αlt   -0.02532 0.03364 
αft   0.15912* 0.09787* 
αkt   -0.0381 -0.03415 
αmt   -0.04438 -0.05505 
αtt   0.24116*** 0.35506*** 
constant  -0.30549*** -0.02135 -0.15296* 
Hypothesis H0: (_b[ll]=0) (_b[ff]=0) (_b[kk]=0) (_b[mm]=0) (_b[lf]=0) (_b[lk]=0) (_b[lm]=0) (_b[fk]=0) 
(_b[fm]=0) (_b[km]=0) (_b[lt]=0) (_b[ft]=0) (_b[kt]=0) (_b[mt]=0) (_b[tt]=0) 
chi2( 15) =  177.75    Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
lnsigma2  -3.05979*** -3.33358*** -2.70764*** 
ilgtgamma  -0.86162 -1.20583** 0.44828 
_cons     
mu  0.22774* 0.29773 0.54751* 
eta  -0.01629  -0.05469** 
Statistics     
N  407 407 407 
ll  97.75378 134.57552 137.62465 
chi
2
  4.61E+03 6.01E+03 3.48E+03 
df_m  5 20 20 
sigma
2
  0.0469 0.03567 0.06669 
gamma  0.297 0.23044 0.61023 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 7.5 reports average production efficiency levels in each year predicted by 
coefficients of translog production function presented in Table 7.3 by industry as well 
as by type of ownerships. Main results of the Table 7.4 are summarized below:     
 
1. Average efficiency levels for the industry are 75% over the entire sample 
period. These figures are 76% for public sector firms, 73% for privatized and 
74% for private firms. This confirms that private and privatized firms were 
operating almost homogenously. In a way it is difficult to differentiate these 
two types of and this is what I have predicted that after change of ownership, 
privatized firms would have behaved similar to private firms. 
 
2. When firms are grouped by their size, large size firms are more efficient 
(77%) compare to small size firms (71%). The small group consists of firms 
using semi or wet process, which have little room for improvement due to 
technological drawbacks even in case of relatively stable economic conditions 
(1992-94). Medium size firms though are very similar to large size firms.  
 
3. Firms operating in North region are 5% more efficient compare to firms 
having their factories in the South. The lower efficiency of south zone during 
the sample period may be due to the fact that group consists of firms located 
either in Karachi or nearby areas of Karachi industrial zone. The city has been 
badly affected by deteriorating law & order conditions during the sample 
period, causing the loss of working days and delays in deliveries. Firms 
located in north have the natural advantage of easy excess to raw material and 
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export access to Indian and Afghani markets. This translates into lower cost of 
raw material i.e. limestone, gypsum and clay etc.   
 
4. Energy efficient dry process technology produces more efficient operations. 
Firms also using semi dry process are more efficient. Marginal increment of 
moving from wet to dry process is 5%. 
 
5. In term of temporal patterns, industry as a whole operated at roughly 10-12% 
lower than pre reform period. These figures are consistent across different 
ownerships. This could be due to variety of reasons. One possible reason could 
be that the gap between least and most efficient has widened as a consequence 
of reforms that include change of ownership, pricing and competition. Further, 
decline seems to be industry wide rather than individual firms. 
 
 
6. The technical efficiency estimates are derived from translong production 
function with strong assumptions about technology of production and priori 
functional form. 
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Table 7.5: Translog Production Function: Median Technical Efficiency Estimates 
 Industry Public Privatized Private Small Medium Large V. Large North South Wet Dry Semi-dry 
1986 0.846 0.846  0.862 0.835 0.858 0.845 0.879 0.875 0.842 0.840 0.871 0.862 
1987 0.842 0.838  0.846 0.836 0.851 0.838 0.873 0.869 0.836 0.832 0.855 0.855 
1988 0.834 0.829  0.838 0.828 0.843 0.829 0.866 0.862 0.827 0.824 0.848 0.848 
1989 0.825 0.821  0.830 0.819 0.835 0.821 0.860 0.855 0.819 0.815 0.840 0.840 
1990 0.816 0.812  0.821 0.810 0.827 0.812 0.852 0.847 0.809 0.805 0.832 0.832 
1991 0.807 0.802  0.812 0.801 0.818 0.802 0.845 0.839 0.800 0.796 0.823 0.823 
1992 0.792 0.792 0.826 0.795 0.779 0.809 0.792 0.837 0.831 0.788 0.786 0.803 0.814 
1993 0.782 0.782 0.817 0.785 0.768 0.800 0.782 0.828 0.823 0.777 0.775 0.793 0.805 
1994 0.771 0.771 0.808 0.774 0.757 0.790 0.771 0.820 0.814 0.766 0.764 0.783 0.795 
1995 0.766 0.760 0.772 0.772 0.745 0.798 0.760 0.811 0.804 0.744 0.753 0.785 0.785 
1996 0.755 0.749 0.788 0.753 0.738 0.761 0.748 0.801 0.788 0.743 0.749 0.761 0.775 
1997 0.749 0.737 0.778 0.749 0.725 0.750 0.736 0.789 0.782 0.731 0.737 0.756 0.764 
1998 0.752 0.724 0.781 0.744 0.712 0.752 0.761 0.778 0.772 0.718 0.724 0.759 0.752 
1999 0.732 0.711 0.763 0.732 0.699 0.740 0.750 0.765 0.757 0.705 0.684 0.747 0.740 
2000 0.719 0.697 0.751 0.719 0.685 0.727 0.738 0.754 0.745 0.691 0.670 0.735 0.728 
2001 0.723 0.683 0.739 0.724 0.643 0.714 0.767 0.742 0.733 0.677 0.684 0.731 0.715 
2002 0.693 0.669 0.718 0.701 0.656 0.701 0.712 0.730 0.719 0.665 0.640 0.710 0.702 
2003 0.687 0.654 0.705 0.697 0.670 0.687 0.699 0.717 0.706 0.654 0.624 0.705 0.688 
2004 0.682 0.623 0.692 0.673 0.625 0.682 0.732 0.703 0.694 0.631 0.577 0.682 0.709 
2005 0.658  0.677 0.658 0.609 0.668 0.671 0.690 0.680 0.619 0.559 0.668 0.659 
2006 0.643  0.635 0.643 0.592 0.653 0.656 0.675 0.665 0.602 0.541 0.653 0.644 
2007 0.647  0.619 0.649 0.564 0.647 0.641 0.661 0.649 0.586 0.523 0.648 0.628 
2008 0.631  0.632 0.621 0.557 0.621 0.698 0.646 0.633 0.564 0.573 0.631 0.652 
2009 0.605  0.555 0.615 0.539 0.615 0.609 0.630 0.616 0.555 0.520 0.616 0.596 
2010 0.599  0.568 0.599 0.521 0.599 0.648 0.614 0.601 0.537 0.501 0.599 0.579 
2011 0.584  0.594 0.584 0.467 0.582 0.655 0.601 0.584 0.572 0.519 0.584 0.605 
1986-91 0.830 0.825  0.834 0.824 0.839 0.825 0.863 0.858 0.823 0.819 0.844 0.844 
1988-91 0.821 0.816  0.826 0.815 0.831 0.816 0.856 0.851 0.814 0.810 0.836 0.836 
1993-96 0.769 0.766 0.798 0.773 0.751 0.794 0.766 0.815 0.809 0.755 0.758 0.784 0.790 
1993-95 0.771 0.771 0.808 0.774 0.757 0.798 0.771 0.820 0.814 0.766 0.764 0.785 0.795 
1997-2006 0.706 0.690 0.729 0.710 0.663 0.708 0.734 0.736 0.726 0.671 0.655 0.720 0.712 
2007-2011 0.605  0.594 0.615 0.539 0.615 0.648 0.630 0.616 0.564 0.520 0.616 0.605 
1992-2011 0.706 0.724 0.729 0.710 0.663 0.708 0.734 0.736 0.726 0.671 0.655 0.720 0.712 
1986-2011 0.741 0.760 0.729 0.738 0.706 0.745 0.749 0.772 0.765 0.711 0.704 0.752 0.746 
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7.5. Technical Efficiency Estimation - Data Envelopment Analysis 
 
One of the serious criticisms on the parametric approaches of efficiency and 
productivity estimation methods is that these techniques are based on some strict 
assumptions. Violations of these assumptions could lead to unreliable and less 
efficient estimates and then consequently conclusions purely based on these methods. 
Recently, a vast body of literature has started coming using some alternative methods 
which are not based on priori assumptions. These techniques are data driven and are 
based on the belief that data speaks itself. One of such technique that had been 
utilized successfully is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA).  
 
The technique of DEA involves the analysis of the rate at which firms convert a given 
quantity of inputs into a quantity of outputs.  From this analysis, it is possible to 
estimate the most efficient feasible output/input combinations so as to construct an 
efficiency frontier. A comparison can then be made between each individual firm‟s 
input and output quantities and the efficiency frontier, so as to generate an (in) 
efficiency rating specific to each particular firm in the sample across time periods. 
The further the distance from the frontier (e.g. less output produced by each firm, 
given the level of input), less efficient the firm. Tracing the distance from the frontier 
reveals the amount by which each firm could maximize outputs subject to given 
inputs.   
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As I do not have complete information, but instead rely upon a finite data sample for 
the estimation of the frontier, it is likely that the estimated efficiency frontier will not 
be representative of the true frontier, but might be a very close approximation.  
Taking this into account, I construct a measure of efficiency in the same way as 
Wheelock and Wilson (2003).  I divide the quantity of output produced by each firm 
by given level of input and compare this firm with a firm operating on the efficiency 
frontier producing maximum output by using least inputs. Intuitively, this measure 
will be equal to 1 if the firm is itself on the frontier.  The more out produced by the 
firm relative to the frontier, the higher this measure will be.   
 
The estimated frontier is subject to the same standard assumptions outlined in 
Wheelock and Wilson (2003), namely that the frontier itself is smooth, convex and 
closed, that production requires the use of some positive quantity of disposable inputs 
on order to produce a disposable output, that the observations used in the calculation 
of relative efficiency levels are representative of a probability density function (which 
is strictly positive at all points) with bounded support over the production set, and that 
the density is continuous as you move toward the interior from any point along the 
frontier. 
 
I employ an expected maximum output frontier (order m) as proposed by Cazals et al. 
(2002).  This methodology has certain benefits over the use of some DEA alone – for 
example in the reduced dependence on individual observations (lessening the impact 
of extreme observations on the nature of the frontier) as well as the relaxation of the 
assumption that the efficiency frontier is convex.  More importantly, the inclusion of a 
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noise effect is possible under this methodology.  This noise effect has an expected 
value of zero, and allows us to differentiate between genuine and persistent inefficient 
operation and random shocks that are not indicative of a long term problem with each 
respective firm, but could otherwise cause an inefficient estimation of the efficiency 
frontier.   
 
The order refers the method by which this measure of efficiency is calculated.  
Effectively, this refers to the k drawings of (m) firms from a pool of those producing 
the same level of output. The firm among this sample of (m) which produces 
maximum output by using lowest quantity of inputs is used in the computation of a 
mean from the (k) repetitions of the drawing of the (m) firms.  The estimated 
efficiency frontier is then composed from the series of mean values generated from 
different input output levels.  It is expected that the estimated frontier will be below 
the true frontier due to the finite sample used to compute the mean values for each 
output level.   
 
Relative inefficiencies for each firm can then be calculated by observing the distance 
of the firm‟s input/output combination from the order-m frontier.  In order to calculate 
this empirically, output quantity is divided by the input quantity that would be 
required if operating on the estimated order-m efficiency frontier. From this ratio, I 
can calculate the amount of more output this firm could have achieved if operating at 
or near to frontier. Empirically, this ratio of output to input should be <1. Any firm 
achieving maximum output and operating near to full potential is likely to achieve 
score near to 1.    
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I estimated output distance function for each year for the population of cement firms. 
Because of the fact that I estimated the efficiency by using each specific year 
output/input rather than pooling the data hence in effect I estimated the frontier for 
each year. Table 7.6 displays the output orientated efficiency estimates for cement 
firms using an order-m efficiency frontier. These efficiency scores are provided as 
median values for each individual year between 1986 and 2011.  Results are also 
provided as averages over different time periods so that comparisons can be made 
between overall efficiency in both pre and post reform periods.  Comparisons are 
therefore drawn between the before and after 1992 (representing the first round of 
major privatization activity).  The figures displayed are an indication of the actual 
output given technology of production as compared to the expected maximum output 
amount dictated by the order-m frontier.   
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Table 7.6: DEA Order-m Efficiency Estimates 
 Industry Public Privatized Private Small Medium Large V. Large North South Wet Dry Semi-dry 
1986 0.80 0.87  0.65 0.35 0.75 0.78 0.98 0.79 0.97 0.92 0.70 0.96 
1987 0.81 0.86  0.73 0.53 0.77 0.87 0.93 0.81 0.85 0.81 0.77 0.95 
1988 0.83 0.86  0.68 0.51 0.75 0.86 0.99 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.75 0.95 
1989 0.79 0.86  0.69 0.50 0.76 0.86 0.99 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.76 0.95 
1990 0.84 0.85  0.76 0.52 0.82 0.87 0.99 0.83 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.93 
1991 0.83 0.83  0.84 0.62 0.83 0.88 0.97 0.83 0.89 0.83 0.83 0.92 
1992 0.82 0.80 0.83 0.74 0.49 0.78 0.83 0.99 0.80 0.88 0.83 0.78 0.94 
1993 0.80 0.70 0.95 0.84 0.51 0.75 0.85 0.95 0.78 0.93 0.80 0.80 0.87 
1994 0.79 0.70 0.94 0.81 0.53 0.78 0.92 0.94 0.78 0.89 0.85 0.76 0.85 
1995 0.80 0.75 0.93 0.62 0.57 0.72 0.90 0.96 0.84 0.69 0.84 0.77 0.85 
1996 0.85 0.63 0.80 0.93 0.56 0.93 0.77 0.91 0.90 0.65 0.91 0.90 0.71 
1997 0.83 0.71 0.83 0.85 0.54 0.91 0.83 0.80 0.91 0.69 0.83 0.83 0.80 
1998 0.86 0.61 0.91 0.88 0.54 0.90 0.92 0.79 0.91 0.60 0.91 0.88 0.65 
1999 0.83 0.60 0.82 0.87 0.57 0.84 0.91 0.76 0.89 0.60 0.79 0.87 0.58 
2000 0.81 0.57 0.93 0.81 0.62 0.79 0.98 0.89 0.89 0.65 0.84 0.81 0.71 
2001 0.80 0.54 0.80 0.84 0.64 0.83 0.73 0.88 0.88 0.68 0.68 0.83 0.70 
2002 0.84 0.51 0.87 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.71 0.78 0.84 0.67 
2003 0.78 0.45 0.74 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.88 0.84 0.72 0.68 0.79 0.66 
2004 0.78 0.46 0.87 0.77 0.66 0.75 1.00 0.87 0.87 0.72 1.00 0.77 0.87 
2005 0.81  0.89 0.74 0.62 0.80 0.90 0.89 0.91 0.71 0.99 0.78 0.67 
2006 0.78  0.86 0.76 0.73 0.74 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.69 0.98 0.77 0.67 
2007 0.79  0.74 0.83 0.753 0.67 0.82 0.93 0.82 0.62 0.60 0.79 0.82 
2008 0.72  0.72 0.74 0.78 0.67 0.81 0.94 0.80 0.69 0.66 0.72 0.94 
2009 0.68  0.63 0.72 0.74 0.64 0.66 0.95 0.72 0.68 0.60 0.70 0.79 
2010 0.75  0.73 0.78 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.95 0.78 0.66 0.61 0.78 0.70 
2011 0.78  0.89 0.76 0.71 0.73 0.89 0.98 0.81 0.73 0.84 0.76 0.96 
1986-91 0.820 0.856  0.711 0.516 0.765 0.866 0.985 0.817 0.860 0.832 0.766 0.953 
1988-91 0.834 0.852  0.728 0.516 0.792 0.866 0.989 0.827 0.836 0.832 0.788 0.940 
1993-96 0.800 0.697 0.932 0.826 0.544 0.766 0.876 0.945 0.811 0.785 0.846 0.784 0.852 
1993-95 0.800 0.698 0.937 0.811 0.531 0.754 0.898 0.954 0.778 0.885 0.839 0.768 0.853 
1997-2006 0.808 0.556 0.862 0.824 0.631 0.818 0.896 0.874 0.888 0.692 0.837 0.818 0.672 
2007-2011 0.752  0.734 0.759 0.741 0.673 0.812 0.951 0.799 0.684 0.609 0.759 0.819 
1992-2011 0.798 0.609 0.844 0.804 0.619 0.772 0.861 0.907 0.851 0.689 0.829 0.784 0.754 
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In term of a comparison between time periods, it would appear that the separation 
around 1992 reveals an interesting fact that immediately after privatization efficiently 
levels marginally improved to 86% from 82% in pre reform period for overall 
industry. But then subsequently, started declining and overall, I am unable to see any 
notable difference in pre and post reforms period for overall industry. There are some 
major decreases in efficiency levels for some years but overall efficiency scores are 
nearer to 0.8 (implying industry firms are using their resources 80% efficiently). 
Hence, reforms do not appear to have any significant effect, indicating a seemingly 
neutral effect of the 1992 deregulations/privatization upon efficiency. 
 
Figure 7.1: Order m Technical Efficiency Estimates by Ownership  
.  
 
 
Figure 7.1 and Table 7.5 shows order-m input efficiency estimates for three type of 
ownerships: public, private and privatized, where order of the m is 5.  The immediate 
trend observable here is that it is difficult to see any significant difference in 
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efficiencies between private and privatized firms, although, private firms did catch up 
in post reforms period. All those firms which were not privatized during first round of 
privatization, their efficiency levels were lower consistently till the time they were 
privatized subsequently. When firms are grouped according to different sizes, small 
size firms did improved their efficiency in post reform period by almost 8-10% but, 
for all other size firms, no significant difference is noticed with some variations across 
the years. There seems to be increasing levels of efficiencies as the firm size 
increases. Larger size firms are roughly 35-40% more efficient compare to very small 
size firms. This difference is 10-12% between medium and large size firms. Firms 
operating in North region appear to be more efficient compare to South regions. This 
is expected given the fact that they are nearer to export markets India and 
Afghanistan. Firms operating in the South region though have one clear advantage in 
term of their close proximity to port (Karachi and Gwadar). Technology of production 
(wet, dry and semi dry) does not appear to have any significant effect with the 
exception of few years differences. This is also expected as majority of the firms since 
1992 had moved to smart dry process.  
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7.6. Estimating Change in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
 
Overall, cement industry witnessed a 3% per annum growth rate during my sample 
period (Table 7.7). Public sector firms, until their eventual privatization, grew by 
1.18% compare to 3.3% for privatized (highest) and 3% for private firms. In term of 
size of the firm, small size firms grew relatively less (2.44% compare to average 3% 
for medium and large size firms). 
 
Deregulation and privatization period appear to mark a significant shift in 
productivity. Productivity growth during 1992-2011 is almost homogeneous across 
different types and ownerships. But within this deregulation period, highest growth 
rate was, during 2007 to 2011, when total productivity grew by almost 5.6% per 
annum. Immediate effect of reform was also noticeable when productivity grew by 
roughly 2% per annum compare to <1% growth rate in pre reform period. 
 
All this lead to conclude, that deregulation and privatization had a desired effect on 
productivity. This is in contrast to technical production efficiency results which 
declined or remained stagnant. Productivity could have increase due to variety of 
sources and efficiency change is just one component. Other components include 
allocative efficiency, scale efficiency, technical progress (technical change) etc. One 
could explore these sources of productivity growth to see from where it has come. I 
would explain this in my next section of cost efficiency estimation and a chapter when 
I explore substitution of inputs by management in response to changing environment 
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in term of competition and rising energy and raw material prices after deregulation 
and privatization policies were introduced in early 1990 which forced management to 
compete in input market to source their input and also as a result of government 
withdrawal of subsidies on petroleum products. Interestingly, for small size firms 
productivity growth was negative in pre- reforms period but then some growth in post 
reforms period. 
 
Table 7.7: Total Factor Productivity by Period, Ownership and Size (%) 
 Industry Public Privatized Private Small Medium Large V. Large 
1987 -0.07 0.00  -0.15 -1.95 -0.17 0.52 0.67 
1988 0.50 0.52  0.07 -2.46 0.05 0.49 0.93 
1989 0.76 1.18  0.74 1.56 0.59 0.62 1.49 
1990 0.87 0.70  1.45 -0.72 0.87 0.60 1.38 
1991 1.55 1.64  1.02 -0.62 1.33 1.74 1.47 
1992 0.78 0.46 0.78 1.40 1.42 0.10 0.66 1.30 
1993 1.80 1.53 1.81 1.70 1.65 0.99 1.98 -0.74 
1994 1.75 0.78 3.03 0.82 0.92 0.66 2.34 1.94 
1995 2.37 2.72 2.16 3.36 2.46 0.92 2.72 2.29 
1996 2.57 2.48 2.62 2.61 -1.41 3.78 2.48 3.77 
1997 2.99 1.45 3.02 2.99 3.25 2.82 3.32 0.68 
1998 2.41 2.32 2.36 2.42 2.42 2.72 3.04 -0.21 
1999 2.67 -0.14 2.77 2.57 8.05 2.17 1.17 2.97 
2000 3.29 4.05 3.29 2.78 -0.06 3.46 3.88 2.44 
2001 3.27 0.48 3.38 3.46 3.60 3.33 2.98 3.55 
2002 3.52 3.52 3.82 3.21 4.31 3.21 3.48 3.68 
2003 3.60 -10.32 3.50 3.93 3.62 3.60 1.27 3.86 
2004 4.33  4.42 4.24 5.43 4.03 4.43 3.63 
2005 4.82  4.82 4.77 4.24 5.24 4.97 4.68 
2006 4.73  4.76 4.54 5.78 4.40 4.52 4.79 
2007 5.24  3.16 6.89 6.12 5.89 3.16 5.43 
2008 5.74  5.74 5.90  5.57 8.61 5.74 
2009 6.49  6.37 6.88 6.88 5.71 7.94 6.61 
2010 3.76  5.41 3.14 -0.57 4.48 4.92 3.14 
2011 5.53  5.53 5.53 5.44 5.61 5.55 4.85 
1987-91 0.76 0.70  0.74 -0.72 0.59 0.60 1.38 
1993-96 2.09 2.01 2.39 2.16 1.29 0.95 2.41 2.11 
1997-2006 3.41 1.45 3.44 3.34 3.93 3.40 3.40 3.59 
2007-2011 5.53  5.53 5.90 5.78 5.61 5.55 5.43 
1992-2011 3.41 1.49 3.33 3.28 3.60 3.53 3.24 3.59 
Overall 2.99 1.18 3.33 2.99 2.44 3.21 2.98 2.97 
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7.7. Measurement of Cost Efficiency  
 
Translog cost function with four input prices and single out is estimated by using 
Maximum Likelihood method. Results of these estimates are shown in Table 7.8. 
Similar to production function, I estimated three models. First model is simple Cobb-
Douglas model with three input prices and an output. Input prices are normalized by 
fourth input price to impose homogeneity restriction on input prices which is a norm 
in empirical studies such as this one. Next two models are translog models with time 
invariant cost inefficiency imposed and a model with time decay inefficiency effect. 
Validity of the translog against Cobb-Douglas was tested using LLR test. I conclude 
that translog terms are needed in the cost function to reflect the nature of the data and 
technology of production. I also tested the presence of some other functional form 
(not reported here) but again results were in favour of translog cost function. 
Elasticities (given below) of costs with respect to inputs and output are in accordance 
to theory. 
Labour Fuel Capital Output 
0.123 0.5645 0.1155 0.8715 
 
Again similar to production function, elasticity of cost with respect to fuel is the 
highest. Labour and capital elasticities combine are less than half of the fuel elasticity. 
Value of gamma indicates some variations in the cost function across different firms. 
This value is though less than production function value. Overall model fit is 
reasonable and predicted inefficiencies based on this model is representative of 
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underlying production process. Predicted cost efficiencies are presented in the next 
section. 
Table 7.8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Parameters of the Stochastic 
Costs Frontier  
Variables Cobb-Douglas Translog  
time-Invariant 
Time-varying 
Decay 
αy 0.74391*** 0.76257*** 0.76039*** 
αw1 0.24175*** 0.05939 0.0842 
αw2 0.35256*** 0.57955 0.56957 
αw3 0.11829*** 0.36463*** 0.36516*** 
αt -0.09965* 0.87740** 0.89854** 
αyy  0.02458** 0.02381* 
αyw1  -0.19126*** -0.18598*** 
αyw2  0.15824** 0.15691** 
αyw3  0.08581*** 0.08572*** 
αyt  0.10384 0.10574 
αw11  0.13184* 0.13832* 
αw22  0.13603 0.13234 
αw33  -0.03433*** -0.03422*** 
αw12  -0.41377** -0.40679** 
αw13  -0.08011 -0.08521 
αw23  0.24757*** 0.24816*** 
αw1t  -0.06597 -0.09357 
αw2t  0.28301 0.29151 
αw3t  -0.30625*** -0.30612*** 
αtt  -0.71327*** -0.71506*** 
constant -0.2917 0.02752 0.0033 
lnsigma2 -3.11197*** -3.53282*** -3.60492*** 
    
ilgtgamma -0.7291 -1.14331 -1.47673 
    
mu 0.55926 0.06721 0.0698* 
    
eta   0.01212* 
Statistics    
N 407 407 407 
ll 111.8926 182.6205 182.666 
chi2 2.99E+03 7.57E+03 7.75E+03 
df_m 5 20 20 
sigma2 0.04451 0.02922 0.02719 
gamma 0.32539 0.24171 0.18592 
Hypothesis H0: yy= yw1= yw2= yw3= yt= w11= w22= w33= w12= w13= w23= w1t= w2t= w3t= tt=0 
chi2( 15) =  177.75    Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Predicted Costs Efficiencies         
 
The results of the predicted costs efficiencies are given in Table 7.9 and summarized 
below: 
 
Overall, firms appear to be responding marginally in the immediate period of reforms. 
But then for the industry overall, these changes are insignificant. When firms are 
grouped according to ownership, then initially during 1986-90, private sector firms on 
the average were marginally more cost efficient (most of the inefficiency may be 
attributed to cost of technical inefficiency if the assumption of allocative efficiency is 
imposed). This result may be due to newer technology and more optimal scale of 
operation. But as competition developed cost inefficiency subsequently has declined 
significantly for these ownership firms. The decline in cost inefficiency may be due to 
higher capacity utilization during 1993-96 and resulting economies of scale. 
Privatized firms on the other hand also did better subsequently and cost inefficiency 
declined in the post-privatization period. 
 
The rate of increase in cost efficiency is roughly 4% for the comparable pre reform 
period. If I assume that in pre-privatization period these firms were both allocatively 
and technically inefficient, then the improvement in cost efficiency may be the result 
of significant decrease in allocative inefficiency and that could have translated into 
higher productivity. In case of public sector firms the cost efficiency has also been 
improved during 1993-96 over 1986-91. However, in case of technical efficiency 
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estimates the efficiency has been declined. If the assumption of allocative inefficiency 
is assumed [see Toda (1976)], then this leads to conclusion that firms has become 
allocative efficient during 1993-96. 
    
Figure 7.2: Cost Inefficiency Estimates 
 
 
i. When firms are grouped according to scale, small scale firms are most 
cost efficient compared to medium and large scale firms during 1986 to 2011.  
 
ii. When firms are grouped according to location the north region firms 
are similar to south region firms. 
 
iii. When firms are grouped according to process, the dry process firms 
were marginally more cost efficient to their counterpart of semi-dry or wet process 
firms. This is also consistent to my technical efficiency estimates.  
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Table 7.9: Predicted Cost Efficiency Estimates 
Years Industry Public Privatized Private Small Medium Large V. Large North South Wet Dry Semi-dry 
1986 1.139 1.14  1.09 1.043 1.057 1.139 1.166 1.14 1.09 1.12 1.10 1.15 
1987 1.117 1.14  1.07 1.055 1.056 1.137 1.164 1.14 1.09 1.12 1.08 1.15 
1988 1.116 1.14  1.07 1.054 1.056 1.135 1.162 1.14 1.09 1.12 1.08 1.14 
1989 1.114 1.13  1.07 1.054 1.055 1.134 1.160 1.13 1.09 1.12 1.08 1.14 
1990 1.113 1.13  1.06 1.053 1.054 1.132 1.158 1.13 1.09 1.12 1.08 1.14 
1991 1.112 1.13  1.06 1.052 1.053 1.130 1.156 1.13 1.08 1.12 1.08 1.14 
1992 1.092 1.10 1.14 1.05 1.041 1.053 1.129 1.154 1.13 1.08 1.11 1.06 1.14 
1993 1.091 1.10 1.13 1.05 1.041 1.052 1.127 1.152 1.13 1.08 1.11 1.06 1.13 
1994 1.089 1.10 1.13 1.05 1.040 1.052 1.125 1.150 1.13 1.08 1.11 1.06 1.13 
1995 1.081 1.12 1.11 1.04 1.040 1.037 1.124 1.148 1.09 1.08 1.11 1.05 1.13 
1996 1.123 1.12 1.13 1.09 1.049 1.094 1.122 1.146 1.12 1.13 1.15 1.09 1.13 
1997 1.123 1.12 1.13 1.12 1.049 1.093 1.121 1.163 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.10 1.13 
1998 1.121 1.09 1.13 1.12 1.048 1.121 1.102 1.161 1.12 1.13 1.14 1.10 1.13 
1999 1.118 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.048 1.119 1.101 1.177 1.12 1.13 1.13 1.10 1.12 
2000 1.117 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.047 1.118 1.099 1.175 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.10 1.12 
2001 1.115 1.09 1.10 1.12 1.037 1.116 1.082 1.173 1.11 1.12 1.07 1.12 1.12 
2002 1.114 1.09 1.12 1.11 1.046 1.115 1.097 1.171 1.08 1.12 1.12 1.10 1.12 
2003 1.113 1.08 1.12 1.12 1.055 1.113 1.096 1.168 1.11 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.12 
2004 1.114 1.11 1.12 1.11 1.045 1.115 1.079 1.166 1.05 1.12 1.17 1.10 1.12 
2005 1.111  1.11 1.11 1.044 1.113 1.093 1.164 1.08 1.12 1.17 1.09 1.12 
2006 1.109  1.11 1.11 1.044 1.112 1.092 1.162 1.08 1.11 1.17 1.09 1.11 
2007 1.112  1.11 1.11 1.050 1.113 1.091 1.160 1.11 1.11 1.16 1.11 1.11 
2008 1.106  1.07 1.11 1.043 1.109 1.069 1.158 1.05 1.11 1.06 1.11 1.12 
2009 1.106  1.10 1.11 1.042 1.110 1.089 1.156 1.05 1.11 1.11 1.09 1.11 
2010 1.102  1.09 1.11 1.042 1.109 1.073 1.154 1.05 1.11 1.11 1.07 1.11 
2011 1.090  1.07 1.11 1.032 1.107 1.066 1.132 1.03 1.11 1.06 1.09 1.11 
1986-91 1.115 1.134  1.066 1.053 1.055 1.134 1.161 1.136 1.088 1.120 1.081 1.143 
1993-96 1.090 1.109 1.130 1.051 1.040 1.052 1.124 1.149 1.124 1.082 1.113 1.062 1.132 
1997-2006 1.115 1.089 1.115 1.118 1.046 1.115 1.096 1.167 1.113 1.120 1.134 1.101 1.122 
2007-2011 1.106  1.088 1.109 1.042 1.109 1.073 1.156 1.051 1.110 1.109 1.091 1.112 
1992-2011 1.111 1.095 1.112 1.110 1.044 1.111 1.096 1.160 1.109 1.115 1.120 1.095 1.122 
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7.8. Conclusion 
 
From the previous discussion I have reached at the conclusion 
[1] After reforms, the firms under new management (privatized) and already in 
private sector has some improvements in cost efficiency 
 
[2] Order-m technical efficiency estimates indicate that on balance, it would appear 
that the 1992 reforms had some positive impact at least in the initial years. I find 
that privatized and private firms operated almost homogeneously while public 
firms operated below the maximum amount they would have achieved. Private 
firms though, seem to have responded most positively to deregulation. Firm size 
does matter and large size firms appear to be more efficient compare to small size 
firms. 
 
[3] The significant improvement occurred in total factor productivity. The period of 
1986 to 1990 shows the trend as usual business for all three groups. The major 
discontinuity occurred in 1990-92, the period of announcement and 
implementation of privatization and transfers of ownership. Privatized firms 
experienced a take-off since the announcement of the privatization program and 
momentum continued afterward. Public sector firms group however, did not show 
similar performance after reforms and their productivity improvement is marginal. 
Labour unrest and a state of uncertainty regarding their eventual privatization 
were one of the several reasons. However, private sector firms experienced the 
continuous growth in productivity. There were some hiccups for privatized 
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companies during this period like Zealpak and Dandot Cement had issues with 
labour and local taxation authorities (Zealpak). 
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CHAPTER 8  
 
Decomposition of TFP Change and Input Biases 
 
This chapter examines technical change, total factor productivity growth and input 
bias for the cement industry over the period 1986 – 2011.  Returns to scale for private 
and privatized firms have increased in the post reforms period, as has the rate of total 
factor productivity growth (particularly since 1997 onward). In addition, it is found 
that the technical change experienced by the average firms is labour and capital using 
and fuel and material saving. These results indicate that the measure of deregulation 
introduced during the early 1990s have had the effect of making average firm more 
efficient in terms of TFP growth and fuel usage. 
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8.1. Introduction  
 
Technical change and increases in productivity can have a strongly positive effect 
upon individual firms, as well as entire industry.  When firms are able to take greater 
advantage of the resources at their disposal, they become more efficient and the 
market in which they operate becomes more competitive. It should come as no 
surprise then, that governments and other agents have overseen changes in regulatory 
and legal frameworks with a view to helping firm better take advantage of technical 
change and to make factors of production more productive.   
 
Studies on total factor productivity growth in response to deregulation and 
privatization have been forthcoming in recent years, often prompted by a particular 
innovation or change within a given industry.  Jorgenson (1995) empirically examines 
TFP growth, as does Salinas-Jiminez et al. (2005) within the EU, for example.  Such 
studies in the banking area have seen huge growth in the last few years, due in no 
small part to the significance of the banking sector upon the growth and stability of an 
economy.   
 
The number of studies on TFP growth of the manufacturing sectors of developing 
countries has also increased in recent years.  As developing countries often have the 
greatest potential for rapid economic growth, the efficient operation of the industries 
to underpin this growth has a greater level of significance attached to it.  Most 
notably, developed countries such as the USA, Europe, and Japan have experienced 
perceived benefits of deregulation and privatization in the last few decades.   
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As many developing countries have followed examples from countries like the UK by 
introducing deregulation and privatization in the later part of the 20
th
 Century, studies 
on efficiency and productivity can therefore be made more meaningful by focusing on 
changes from pre- to post deregulation within those countries which stand to benefit 
the most from improvements in the operation of the industrial sector. When it comes 
to results of previous studies in regard to effect of privatization policy on firm‟s 
efficiency and productivity trends in post reform period, mixed results have been 
displayed by the literature in this regard  
  
8.2. Literature Review: Estimation of TFP and Components 
 
This chapter seeks to estimate rates of TFP and technical change over the period 1986 
– 2011, a period characterized by significant reform in the early 1990s.  The TFP 
methodology has been employed successfully by a number of authors covering a 
variety of subject areas.  A study by Nera (1997) uses a TFP approach to estimate the 
annual technical change in the gas distribution sector in Argentina in the period 1970 - 
1995.   
 
Heshmati et al. (1995) investigate the issues of technical efficiency in the Swedish 
pork industry during the period of 1976-1988. A stochastic frontier production model, 
with the underlying technology represented by a generalized Cobb-Douglas model is 
used. The study indicates that technical change is positive but declining during the 
period 1976-1980 turning into technical regress during the remaining period, 1981 to 
1988.  
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In terms of the methodology employed in TFP studies, Kumbhakar et al. (2000) used 
a „dual‟ approach of time trend (TT) and general index (GI) models to analyse 72 
Japanese chemical corporations from 1968 – 1987. Simpler functional forms such as 
Cobb Douglas were rejected by the data. Technical change (TC) was positively 
correlated with the size of firms.  The study concludes that there is a strong, positive 
correlation between firm size and TC.   It is therefore important to allow better plants 
to get bigger.  This has significant implications for analysing and managing merger 
activity. 
 
Atkinson and Primon (2002) formulate shadow distance and shadow cost systems as 
approaches to estimating firm technology, allocative efficiency, technical efficiency, 
and productivity growth, using panel data for 43 US utilities over 37 years. The two 
models they estimated diagnose an over-use of capital relative to labour and energy 
and the under-use of energy relative to labour. 
 
Kumbhakar (2002) deals with modelling technical change in U.S. airlines over the 
period 1970 to 1984 by using a factor augmenting approach, which represents 
technical change through changes in input efficiency. The study concludes that 
technical change is found to be both labour and fuel saving (and therefore capital 
using) for most of the years of the study, whilst scale bias is found to be negative, but 
very small.  
 
Heshmati (2002) uses data on Swedish Department of Gynaecology and Obstetrics 
data to estimate productivity by decomposing it into technical change and scale effect. 
Use of this methods to evaluate the welfare implications of public spending is not new 
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idea but nonetheless very interesting. Several competing models were estimated and 
results were alarming. It is concluded that these departments were operating 
extremely inefficiently and evidence was derived of large and negative productivity 
growth during the sample period. 
 
Estache and Rossi (2004) investigate the impacts of different regulatory environments 
upon the efficiency of firms.  The study indicates that privatized firms operating under 
price-cap and similar „hybrid‟ schemes are more efficient in their use of labour than 
both public firms and privatized firms under rate-of-return regulations, and that 
privatized firms operating under rate-of-return regulation have, at most, similar labour 
efficiency as public firms.  
 
Chiang et al. (2004) use the technique to estimate potential milkfish farm output and 
efficiency from a survey into 433 aquaculture milkfish farms covering the period 
1997–1999. The study concludes that milkfish farming in Taiwan exhibits 
diminishing returns to scale. 
 
Some more recent studies to decompose the change in total factor productivity into 
technical and scale components include Kumbhakar (2004), Oh et el. 2008), Heshmati 
and Kumbhakar (2011a) and Heshmati and Kumbhakar (2011b). All these studies 
estimated total factor productivity by specifically looking into role of technical 
change and scale efficiency. Authors concluded that by treating technical change as 
an exogenous variable could lead to under estimation of productivity improvements or 
decline. I aim to address this and estimate the total factor productivity of cement 
industry by using a series of alternative competing models. Results of these 
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alternative models are discussed individually and then LR tests are applied to see the 
most appropriate specification that fits the data well. In the following section, I 
discuss the detailed methodology, data requirements, and estimation method and then 
subsequently, results are derived and discussed alongside their limitations.         
 
8.3. Measurement of Decomposition of Productivity 
 
In my effort to evaluate productivity growth in pre- and post reforms period, I 
obtained the TFP growth rates by parametric methods. In this regard I follow Oh et el. 
(2008) in term of notations and symbols. Following discussion summarize the 
theoretical and empirical framework. 
 
8.3.1. Parametric Approaches to Measure TFP 
  
For the measurement of productivity using parametric method, I could start with 
Kumbhakar et al. (1999) method and use the similar notations. Assuming firms are 
producing single output   , using combination of inputs      The production function 
could be written as: 
y  f x t                                          
                                                                                                                        (1) 
Let say   is a vector of variable inputs (j = 1, . . ., J) and   is the time trend variable 
accommodating technology. Now by differentiating the above equation (1), I get: 
y   
fxjxj
y
x j  
ft
y
j
   jx j  
ft
y
j
 
                                                                                                                             (2) 
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Hat over a variable in this case indicates change or growth rate (equivalent of log 
derivative with respect to time); marginal products of the variable is represented by    
and input elasticities by  j . The above equation could be modified to obtain TFP by 
assuming that firms intend to minimize cost by using input quantities purchased from 
the competitive input market. Lot of research has gone to decompose the productivity 
growth to find the sources of growth. By following seminal work of Denny et al. 
(1981), the TFP growth then can be decomposed into different sources such as: 
 
TF P   y   Sjx j   
ft
y
 
j
   RTS 1  Sjx j
j
  
                                                                                                                          (3) 
where    
    
 
  are cost shares; C   wjxjj  is the total cost; wj are input prices; 
and RTS     jj  is the elasticities of scale.  
 
In the above equation, the left hand side can be treated as the TFP growth 
decomposed into a first component technical change 
ft
y
 and second component scale 
effect  RTS 1  Sjx jj . Empirically, the parameters of the above production 
functions are first estimated by using output and input quantities and then 
subsequently used to derive estimates of productivity and its components. In the 
following discussion, I summarize the specification of my production technology 
alongside estimation framework.   
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8.3.2. The Specification of the Production Function 
 
Parametric methods to estimate production technology have become very popular due 
to their ease of specification, estimation and robustness. By specifying and estimating 
the production function using parametric methods, researchers could obtain some 
interesting statistics such as returns to scale, total productivity growth (TFP), input 
elasticities, rate of technological progress or regress (usually termed as technical 
change), and biases in input use and scale due to technical change.  
 
There exists a variety of empirical models that could be used for the estimation of 
production parameters i.e. time trend (TT) model and the general index (GI) model of 
Baltagi and Griffin (1988). There had been some extensions of these two models. For 
example, by introducing firm specific parameters, one could extend GI models. 
Another, extension proposed and implemented by some authors is such that firm 
specific parameters are not completely free but some parameters are constrained to be 
the same for all inputs and output. In my empirical section I use these two basic 
models, their extensions by Lee and Schmidt (1993) alongside the models proposed 
by Stevenson (1980) and Cornwell et al. (1990). For details discussion of these 
extensions and formulation, see Tveterås and Heshmati (2002).  
 
The estimation framework of simple time trend model (TT) is straightforward. In this 
model, the time trend variable is specified as one of the regressor alongside input 
quantities and other variables representing the production characteristics. In term of 
choice of functional form, I choose the popular translog production function, 
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satisfying the usual symmetry and convexity conditions. The model could be specified 
as: 
 
lny    0    jlnxj   tt 
1
2
j
    jklnxjlnxk   ttt
2
kj
    jtlnxjt
j
 
                                                                                                                           (4) 
Contrary to TT model, the continuous time trend variable t is replaced by vector of 
yearly dummies A t  t  1   T  in the general index (GI) model of Baltagi and 
Griffin (1988). By using similar translog functional, the general index GI model is 
written as: 
 
lny   0    jlnxj  A t  
1
2
j
   jklnxjlnxk    jtlnxjA t 
jkj
 
                                                                                                                             (5) 
 
8.3.3. Derivation of Firms’ Performance Statistics 
 
By utilizing TT and GI models mentioned above, I could obtain a number of 
interesting and valuable statistics to assess firms‟ performance over time. Following 
are the main statistics I calculated and presented in my empirical section.     
 
Technical change (TC)  
The technical change index is obtained by taking the derivatives of TT and GI index 
specifications (equation (4) & (5)) with respect to time expressed as: 
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               TCTTI   t   tt    jtlnxj
j
                                          
                                                                                                                                  (6)    
TCGII   A t  A t 1   1    jtlnxj
j
  
                                                                                                                                 (7) 
 
Technical change could further be divided into pure (neutral) and non-neutral 
components. These components in the TT model (TTI) are  t   ttt and   jtlnxjt . 
Similarly, in the case of GI model these components are,  A t  A t 1   and 
  jtlnxj A t  A t 1  j . 
 
Technical Change and Input Bias 
As a consequence of technological change, firm could save some inputs and in some 
cases substitute one with the other. More or less use of a particular input j termed as 
bias  Bj  in technical change can be measured by taking derivative of cost share of the 
input j      as: Bj   Sj  t . A positive value of Bj would indicate that firms are using 
more of this input as a result of technological change. A negative value on the other 
side would be indication of firms saving this input after change in technology.  Oh et 
al. (2008) suggested that technical change in manufacturing would lead to firms using 
capital and material but saving labour and fuel and energy.  
 
Due to the way TT production function model is specified, input bias is constant for 
all time periods (Bj   jt) and is both firm- and time-invariant. Contrarily, in the GI 
model, bias varies over time and is calculated as: Bj   jt A t  A t 1  .  
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Technical Change and Scale Bias 
Scale bias in technical change is another interesting statistics that could be obtained 
from TT and GI model. This is calculated as               In the TT model, the 
scale bias is calculated by             which does not change over firms and time 
periods. In the case of GI model,                              
 
Total Factor Productivity Change (TFP) 
Using the above equations (3) and (4), TFP growth        in the time trend model 
(TT) is calculated from the following: 
 
                          
 
 
                                                                                                                           (8) 
 
where    are input elasticties which are substituted for the input shares in equation 
(3): 
 
   
    
    
                 
 
  
                                                                                                                           (9)  
TFP growth in the GI model is calculated in a similar fashion by replacing the time 
trend (t) in equation (9) with a vector of time dummies, A(t). 
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8.4. Data 
 
The results for this chapter are generated using panel data on cement firms covering 
the period 1986 – 2011. Output is measured as gross sales (domestic as well as 
exports). Four factor inputs are used in the production function that includes labour, 
capital, raw material (limestone), and fuel. Value of fixed assets is treated as a stock 
of capital. Due to significant capacity additions in post reforms period, this proxy is 
appropriate and justifiable. All monetary values are converted into real values by 
using relevant price indices. 
 
8.5. Estimation and Explanation 
 
In common with Kumbhakar et al. (1999, 2000), I estimated seven different models. 
The estimates of R
2
 showed a good explanatory power of different models (R
2
 values 
exceeding 0.9 for almost all models specifications). After carrying out tests (LR and 
J) on nested and non nested models, my best model turns out to be extended general 
index model (gi1).  These tests are although very useful in deciding the best suited 
model for the data being used but suffer due to non-symmetric nature and the lack of 
power if the sample is not large enough. For details of these test and procedure used 
to perform these tests on a variety of non-nested models, see Kumbhakar et al. (1999). 
Within these specifications, a majority of the estimated production function 
parameters are found to be statistically significant at the conventional 5% level of 
significance, whilst simpler model specifications such as Cobb-Douglas are rejected 
in favour of translog by the data structure. As my main objective is to find out the 
impact of reforms on the productivity of firms and its components, I present these 
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estimates evaluated at the mean values of inputs stratified by the different classes of 
ownerships. This would help in differentiating the change of ownership effect from 
the overall business conditions of the time.    
 
8.5.1. Returns to scale 
 
Industry 
Table 8.1 displays results from the various model specifications relating to returns to 
scale. An analysis of the trend of RTS estimates over time show a general mixed 
trend, with overall industry RTS greater than one for most of the specifications 
indicating increasing returns to scale across the years of the study. Despite of the fact 
that there is evidence of increasing returns to scale for the overall industry, the margin 
of improvement is term of choosing the optimal scale of operation is no big enough. 
For almost all the specifications, RTS estimates are not for away from one. Hence, on 
the average, firms in my sample were operating close to optimal scale of production. 
This is more evident from the RTS estimates derived from my preferred flexible GI 
model (gi1). 
 
Looking at individual model specifications, it appears that the gi2 and extension of 
gi0 (gi0_1) models displays the highest estimates of RTS over the sample period. The 
median for the gi2 measure of returns to scale for all firms is 1.085 – the highest of 
the seven. The minimum median value was 0.986, with the other values lying between 
two values for different specifications.  
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In terms of a breakdown of RTS among all firms between the different significant 
time periods of the study (pre- reforms: 1986 – 1991, immediate period of post 
reforms: 1992-96, second phase of broader reforms and strengthening of regulatory 
authorities: 1997-11), it can be seen by looking at different specifications of the 
models that there are not uniformly higher returns to scale in the post reform periods 
as opposed to the earlier pre- reforms time period. This seems to indicate that the 
deregulation and reform that has taken place in the 1990s has had a mixed effect on 
returns to scale.  The greatest difference between the two median values is once again 
displayed by the two models gi2 and gi0_1, which not only estimates the highest 
levels of returns to scale among firms, but also indicates the greatest difference 
between returns in pre- and post deregulation periods. By concentrating only on RTS 
estimates calculated from my preferred gi1 model, there is evidence of increasing 
returns to scale for the industry (estimates are 0.955 for pre- reforms and 1.019 for the 
post reforms period).  
 
Public Firms 
RTS estimates for the public sector firms appear to be consistently higher than 
industry averages. This could indicate that these firms operated at sub-optimal scale 
compared to competitors. One reason could be the fact that these firms may have 
location disadvantages as well as using less efficient technology of production. 
Contrary to overall industry, public sector firms experienced decrease in returns to 
scale with downward trend since 1997 onward. The decrease in returns to scale is 
surprising given the fact that most of scale efficient firms probably may have been 
privatized in 1991. Although different models specifications show a significant 
variations in estimates but the trend is clear (five out of seven specifications 
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indicating decreasing returns to scale). In terms of a breakdown of RTS among all 
public sector firms between the different significant time periods of the study (1986 – 
1991 and 1992 – 2003,1992 - 96 and 1997 - 03), it can be seen that there are not 
generally increasing returns to scale in post deregulation time periods particularly 
since 1997 onward as opposed to the earlier time period.  This seems to indicate that 
the deregulation and reform that has taken place in the 1990s has had a positive 
overall effect on returns to scale and the firms started operating at comparatively 
optimal scale of production. This is probably due to the fact that these firms were 
placed in a better position to take advantage of returns to scale as a result of 
liberalisation taking place in the early 1990s.The gi1 model estimates indicate 
increasing returns to scale for the period 1997 to 2003.  
 
Private Firms 
These results are much the same as those obtained for overall industry in term of 
magnitude of the RTS estimates. However, the estimates display an upward trend over 
the years in investigation. This is reflected in the sample median values separated over 
time periods for different specifications. Almost all specifications models except st 
predicted an overall increase in RTS over time.  It seems that in common with overall 
industry, returns to scale for those firms operating under private ownership in pre and 
post privatization have increased over time particularly during 1997 to 2011. This is 
not surprising given the fact that these firms started their operation with better 
technology (dry process) or upgraded the old operation immediately after reforms so 
that these firms could compete with privatized firms.  
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Privatized Firms 
Similar to industry estimates, different models specifications show a mixed trend in 
returns to scale immediately after privatization –It would appear that the deregulation 
in the early 1990s had the mixed effect upon firms with privatized ownership. Hence, 
unlike the private ownership type, it appears that returns to scale have been rather 
erratic for firms with privatized ownership (this is in contrast to the gentle, upward 
trend observed for private firms).   
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Table 8.1: Returns to Scale (RTS) by Ownerships  
 tt gi0 gi1 gi2 st css gi0_1 
Industry        
Overall 1.069 1.052 0.986 1.085 1.005 1.034 1.085 
1987-91 1.074 1.059 0.955 1.080 1.106 1.002 1.113 
1992-11 1.054 1.043 0.994 1.090 0.993 1.046 1.079 
1992-96 1.080 1.039 0.962 1.063 1.010 1.027 1.073 
1997-11 1.043 1.047 1.019 1.101 0.989 1.055 1.085 
Public        
Overall 1.095 1.066 1.000 1.090 1.086 1.093 1.108 
1987-91 1.098 1.067 0.954 1.090 1.116 1.006 1.137 
1992-03 1.075 1.030 1.018 1.079 1.044 1.108 1.091 
1992-96 1.112 1.099 1.003 1.152 1.092 1.103 1.094 
1997-03 1.069 1.019 1.029 1.034 1.036 1.114 1.011 
Private        
Overall 1.038 1.041 0.996 1.102 0.968 1.042 1.050 
1986-91 1.018 1.026 0.978 1.081 1.112 0.998 1.013 
1992-11 1.043 1.045 0.998 1.104 0.960 1.046 1.059 
1992-96 0.973 0.980 0.995 1.063 0.898 1.041 1.010 
1997-11 1.051 1.051 1.007 1.114 0.980 1.046 1.103 
Privatized        
Overall 1.049 1.043 0.997 1.087 1.008 1.024 1.076 
1992-11 1.049 1.043 0.933 1.087 1.008 1.024 1.076 
1992-96 1.065 1.048 0.997 1.052 1.010 0.993 1.131 
1997-11 1.042 1.043 1.028 1.097 0.996 1.040 1.070 
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8.5.2. Technical Change (TC)  
 
Industry 
Table 8.2 displays results indicating the rate of technical change for different 
ownership firms. Technical change for all firms has been relatively stable and 
positive, in the immediate period of deregulation (1992-96) as well as more mature 
period such as 1997 to 2011. The GI specification models show a relatively sharp 
increase after the mid-1990s, with positive technical change experienced in most of 
the years in late 1990s and 2000-11.  This technological progress is more or less 
echoed in the all specification models, with overall positive technical change 
estimated in the early and later period of deregulation. The positive periods of 
technical change seem to be concentrated around 1997 to 2011 irrespective of the 
model choice, which is the periods of broader post reform in the manufacturing and 
financial sectors. In terms of the pre and post deregulation time periods analysed by 
the study, all seven of the models appear to indicate a greater positive technical 
change in the post deregulation.  Again, the majority of results seem to indicate that, 
overall, there has been a greater rate of technical change in the post deregulation 
period as opposed to the pre-deregulation period and the positive trend post-2000 
could serve to encouraging case for pro reform conclusions. 
 
Public 
The rate of technical change for public sector firms does not seem to follow similar 
magnitude but same pattern of overall industry. Almost all the models show a positive 
technical change for public sector firms over the most of the period of the study.  
Indeed, the median values of overall technical change according to different models 
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specifications are overall positive but with significant differences across different 
model specifications. The negative estimates of technical change put forward by the 
gio and gi2 models seem to be concentrated during 1986 -1991. In terms of 
comparison between the pre and post deregulation periods, five out of seven models 
specifications indicate a higher rate of technical change in the later period of the 
deregulation period (1997 and onward) as opposed to the early period (1992-96). 
Overall, in comparison to industry average, rate of TC is lower in at least five out of 
seven specifications. Again this overall result is not surprising for this group of firms 
due to the fact that these firms were operating with relatively less modern technology 
of production. The intention of the government was to sell these firms rather than 
injecting huge amount of money on modernization and upgrades.    
 
Private 
The positive technical change (around 4% to 5% per annum) for this group of firms is 
concentrated in both pre- and post deregulation period according to different 
specifications.  The median values show overall positive technical change for the 
period under analysis from almost all models.  In common with overall industry, it 
would appear that the rate of positive technical change has come immediately post 
deregulation and continued throughout the sample period, showing a significant 
improvement. It would appear that the deregulation and privatization measures 
introduced during the 1990s have had the effect of accelerating the rate of technical 
change amongst already privately owned firms too. 
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Privatized 
The results displayed here are more in keeping with results obtained from private 
ownership type.  There appears to be a relatively stable, rate of technical change 
which tends to be in the range of 3% to 5%.  This is estimated by all seven model 
specifications. There again is an observable improvement in median values estimated 
immediately after privatization (1992-96) compared to less than satisfactory 
performance of these firms under public ownership.  Similar to other firms, the period 
of 1997 to 2011 seem to be the one when more impressive positive technical change 
was achieved. 
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Table 8.2: Rate of Technical Change (TC) by 
Ownerships  
  
 tt gi0 gi1 gi2 st css gi0_1 
Industry        
Overall 0.029 0.039 0.000 0.044 0.031 0.038 0.029 
1987-91 0.006 -0.011 0.000 -0.024 0.004 0.024 0.000 
1992-11 0.037 0.045 0.030 0.057 0.041 0.039 0.045 
1992-96 0.019 0.028 0.000 0.057 0.017 0.024 0.022 
1997-11 0.043 0.046 0.055 0.056 0.045 0.040 0.059 
Public        
Overall 0.017 0.023 0.000 0.022 0.026 0.038 0.019 
1987-91 0.007 -0.010 0.000 -0.024 0.003 0.033 0.015 
1992-03 0.031 0.029 0.001 0.036 0.033 0.040 0.021 
1992-96 0.016 0.023 0.000 0.045 0.026 0.039 0.019 
1997-03 0.034 0.030 0.076 0.026 0.044 0.040 0.022 
Private        
Overall 0.028 0.041 0.000 0.044 0.030 0.035 0.038 
1986-91 0.005 -0.012 0.000 -0.026 0.007 0.013 -0.024 
1992-11 0.037 0.045 0.030 0.058 0.036 0.044 0.040 
1992-96 0.018 0.028 0.000 0.060 0.016 0.019 0.034 
1997-11 0.042 0.047 0.053 0.057 0.043 0.044 0.058 
Privatized        
Overall 0.038 0.046 0.030 0.060 0.044 0.038 0.026 
1992-11 0.038 0.046 0.000 0.060 0.044 0.038 0.026 
1992-96 0.022 0.029 0.030 0.060 0.017 0.034 -0.002 
1997-11 0.043 0.047 0.055 0.060 0.048 0.040 0.026 
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8.5.3. Total Factor Productivity Change (TFP)  
 
Overall 
Table 8.3 shows total factor productivity estimates using each of the model 
specifications discussed above. The contribution of scale component to TFP growth 
(explained later) can be derived by taking the difference between TFP growth and TC 
growth. Interestingly, there does appear to be some significant TFP growth for the 
overall industry. It would seem that industry had witnessed a significant productivity 
growth in post reforms period compared to pre- reforms period. Overall, for a 
majority of models (five out of seven), there does not appear to be a significant 
variations in the estimates of TFP growth between different models formulations. If 
broad conclusions are to be drawn, then gi2 model has the highest overall estimated 
median rate of TFP growth. There does appear to be consistent negative growth or 
zero change in productivity in pre- reform period, as is evident from the results of the 
different model specifications.   
 
Overall, the sample medians show that, for all model specifications, the rate of TFP 
growth is positive and higher in post deregulation than pre deregulation.  There does 
seem to be significant differences in the size of the change between different model 
specifications. This indicates that the deregulation taking in the early 1990s has 
prompted an increase in TFP growth (growth rates ranging from 3% to 5.7% p.a. 
during 1997 to 2011). One interesting finding derived from out gi1 model indicates 
immediate impact of reforms was negligible but more pronounced since 1997  
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Public 
In contrast to results above, there seems to be a less impressive picture for this group 
of firms. Overall, for a majority of time periods, there does appear to be a huge 
difference in the estimates of TFP growth between different model specifications, 
although if broad conclusions are to be drawn, then css model has the highest 
estimated median rate of TFP growth for all public sector firms. There does seem to 
be consistent „negative‟ or zero growth in pre reform period from the results of the 
different model specifications (based on five out of seven models estimates). Three 
out of seven model specifications indicate positive overall TFP change over the entire 
period, and once again, on average, a greater rate of TFP change post deregulation 
(1.5% to 2.5% growth p.a.). The extent of such a change differs remarkably according 
to the model specification used: the gi1 specification, for example, estimates only a 
modest increase in TFP growth between the two time periods, whereas the gi0 and css 
specifications estimate the largest change during 1997 to 2003 compared to 1987-91. 
 
Private 
Total factor productivity growth estimates for privately owned firms using each of the 
model specifications discussed above indicates an interesting trend probably similar to 
overall industry. The results here are strikingly different than for public sector firms.  
All model specifications show positive and significant TFP growth rates on average 
across the post deregulation period. The rate of change observed between time periods 
is almost similar across different specifications. All of the model specifications 
provide median rates of TFP growth in the post-deregulatory period which are higher 
than those of pre- reforms median values for public firms.  This indicates that 
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privately owned firms have benefited in terms of TFP growth in the post-deregulatory 
period, more so than firms who remained in public ownership until 2003. 
 
Privatized 
For this group of firms, broadly speaking, there appears to be similar trend in the 
productivity growth observed for privately owned firms.  Majority of change in 
productivity has come during 1997 to 2011. This is similar to the findings of Bonin et 
al. (2005) who concluded that privatized-owned firms operating within transition 
economies tend to display greater all round efficiency than other domestic firms. 
Interestingly, though, immediate effect of privatization (1992-96) is evident from the 
positive growth estimates compared to dismal performance by these firms operating 
under public ownership.  
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Table 8.3: Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFP) by Ownerships   
 tt gi0 gi1 gi2 st css gi0_1 
Industry        
Overall 0.030 0.038 0.003 0.041 0.033 0.031 0.017 
1987-91 0.008 -0.012 0.000 -0.024 0.001 0.025 0.005 
1992-11 0.034 0.041 0.029 0.059 0.037 0.036 0.025 
1992-96 0.018 0.031 -0.001 0.061 0.017 0.029 0.019 
1997-11 0.038 0.042 0.051 0.057 0.041 0.037 0.031 
Public        
Overall 0.012 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.014 0.033 -0.001 
1987-91 0.007 -0.013 0.001 -0.025 0.002 0.027 0.012 
1992-03 0.015 0.028 0.001 0.021 0.019 0.034 -0.032 
1992-96 0.015 0.031 -0.002 0.047 0.015 0.039 -0.001 
1997-03 0.014 0.025 0.001 0.004 0.025 0.029 -0.063 
Private        
Overall 0.030 0.037 0.011 0.038 0.036 0.033 0.028 
1986-91 0.007 -0.011 -0.001 -0.019 0.001 0.017 -0.025 
1992-11 0.033 0.046 0.029 0.051 0.039 0.035 0.031 
1992-96 0.017 0.031 -0.003 0.063 0.021 0.018 0.021 
1997-11 0.039 0.050 0.051 0.046 0.040 0.043 0.041 
Privatized        
Overall 0.033 0.041 0.026 0.063 0.035 0.033 0.011 
1992-11 0.033 0.041 -0.001 0.063 0.035 0.033 0.011 
1992-96 0.022 0.031 0.026 0.062 0.018 0.020 0.015 
1997-11 0.038 0.042 0.043 0.064 0.046 0.033 0.008 
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8.5.4. Scale Effects 
 
Overall 
Table 8.4, below, shows scale effects over time (calculated as the difference between 
TFP and TC), estimated once again with the different model specifications. All seven 
specifications results are not broadly consistent. Overall, the magnitude of scale 
component in the total factor productivity is extremely low compared to contribution 
of technical change. My more flexible gi1 model estimates indicate that, for a 
majority of the second phase of reforms time periods (1997 onward), the minimum 
efficient scale actually fell. It would also indicate the gaining of market share by 
larger firms and hence market becoming less competitive over time. It is interesting to 
note that these increases occur in periods surrounding manufacturing and financial 
reforms – the early 1990‟s (around 1991-92) and the late 1990s (around 1997).  
 
Public 
Table 8.4 shows scale effects for public sector firms. Overall, again, by looking at gi1 
specification and 1997 onward time period, the scale effect is positive for post reform 
period; indicating that the minimum efficient scale (MES) among public sector firms 
actually fell, again concentrated in the mid to late 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
Private 
Once again, the gi1 model specification displaying recurring positive values since 
1997 onward, implying decrease in the minimum efficient firm size over time.  This 
preferred specification reveal higher positive median scale effect values over the 
entirety of the post reforms period – supporting the observation that the MES for 
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private firms has been falling.  This effect seems magnified since 1997 onward, 
indicating a greater reduction in the MES as a result of the modernisation of the 
industry.  Interestingly, the gi1 model estimates a negative median value for the pre-
deregulatory period, indicating an increase in MES for private firms before 
deregulation and privatization.  
 
Privatized 
Table 8.4 shows scale effects for privatized firms. Two models specification namely 
gi1 and gi2 show positive values for the period 1997 onward, a decrease in minimum 
efficient size during this time period. The median values are significantly higher post-
deregulation, indicating that the reduction in MES in the latter period of the post 
reform was far higher and more pronounced than in the first major time period of the 
post reform (1992-96).  Again, the impact of reforms experienced by private and 
publicly owned firms, seem to have been shared to the same extent with privatized 
firms.     
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Table 8.4: Scale Effects by Ownerships 
 tt gi0 gi1 gi2 st css gi0_1 
Industry        
Overall 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.007 -0.013 
1987-91 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.005 
1992-11 -0.003 -0.004 0.029 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.020 
1992-96 -0.001 0.003 -0.056 0.004 0.000 0.005 -0.003 
1997-11 -0.005 -0.004 0.021 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.029 
Public        
Overall -0.005 -0.022 0.001 -0.025 -0.012 -0.004 -0.021 
1987-91 0.000 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 
1992-03 -0.016 -0.001 0.001 -0.015 -0.013 -0.006 -0.053 
1992-96 -0.001 0.008 -0.078 0.002 -0.011 0.000 -0.021 
1997-03 -0.019 -0.005 0.000 -0.022 -0.019 -0.011 -0.085 
Private        
Overall 0.002 -0.004 0.036 -0.006 0.006 -0.002 -0.010 
1986-91 0.002 0.001 -0.011 0.007 -0.006 0.004 -0.001 
1992-11 -0.004 0.001 0.046 -0.008 0.003 -0.008 -0.008 
1992-96 -0.001 0.003 -0.021 0.003 0.005 -0.001 -0.014 
1997-11 -0.003 0.003 0.020 -0.010 -0.003 -0.001 -0.017 
Privatized        
Overall -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 0.003 -0.009 -0.006 -0.016 
1992-11 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 -0.009 -0.006 -0.016 
1992-96 -0.001 0.001 -0.029 0.002 0.001 -0.013 0.018 
1997-11 -0.005 -0.005 0.013 0.004 -0.001 -0.006 -0.018 
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8.5.5. Elasticities and Factor Input Biases 
  
Elasticities 
Table 8.5 shows the input elasticities and technical input biases. Average elasticities 
of labour and capital are very low. This is not surprising given the fact that role of 
labour is not significant in the cement manufacturing due to automation of significant 
number of jobs. The low capital elasticity in particular is similar to studies relating to 
manufacturing industry (see for example, Oh et al. (2009)) but confusing due to 
significant investment made in the up-gradation of plants. I would have expected that 
the response of output to change in this factor would have been more profound 
compared to what is estimated here.  
 
In regard to low eslasticity of capital few authors such as Mairesse and Jaumandreu 
(2005) suggested that this is a universal issue in estimating production functions. This 
low elasticity could be due to variety of reason including inaccuracy in calculating 
capital variable and not taking into account the idle capacity. It also reflects the fact 
that the industry uses capital intensive technology and would not find it easier to 
replace this with labour or other factor of production. Fuel elasticity value of 0.65 is 
consistent with the cost share of this factor of input. It accounts for more than 50% of 
the total cost. My estimates are though lower than Kumbhakar et al. (1999) estimates 
(> 0.8) for the Swedish cement industry. High value of material input elasticity is also 
consistent with other studies of the manufacturing industry. Further, material input to 
some extent is truly the only variable input and is generally more closely associated 
with output compared to other inputs. 
 
                                                 Chapter 8 
                                                       Decomposing TFP & Input Bias 
 
217 
 
In term of patterns of these elasticities over time, fuel elasticity reduced from 0.66 in 
pre- reforms period to 0.567 during 1997-2011, primarily due to change of fuel mix 
from furnace oil to coal for the firms operating under private ownership. For labour 
elasticity, though I observe very erratic pattern and in some cases wrong sign 
(negative). Capital and material elasticities appear to be stable and no significant 
difference is found across different ownerships. 
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Table 8.5: Industry: Input Elasticities and Biases 
 Elasticities Input/Output Biases 
 Overall Public Privatised Private Overall Public Privatised Private 
Labour         
Overall 0.000 -0.003 0.041 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000 
1987-91 -0.009 -0.003  -0.007 0.000 0.000  0.000 
1992-96 -0.024 -0.012 -0.019 -0.045 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1997-11 0.106 0.020 0.105 0.121 0.027 0.024 0.027 0.027 
1992-11 0.037 -0.006 0.041 0.031 0.015 0.000 0.015 0.015 
Fuel         
Overall 0.658 0.668 0.641 0.668 0.000 0.000 -0.011 0.000 
1987-91 0.660 0.658  0.682 0.000 0.000  0.000 
1992-96 0.676 0.677 0.665 0.695 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1997-11 0.567 0.695 0.617 0.562 -0.019 -0.017 -0.019 -0.019 
1992-11 0.638 0.694 0.641 0.636 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 -0.011 
Capital         
Overall 0.080 0.085 0.083 0.077 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
1987-91 0.089 0.092  0.102 0.000 0.000  0.000 
1992-96 0.079 0.082 0.085 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1997-11 0.075 0.078 0.080 0.074 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
1992-11 0.077 0.080 0.083 0.074 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 
Material         
Overall 0.235 0.242 0.232 0.236 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
1987-91 0.233 0.233  0.226 0.000 0.000  0.000 
1992-96 0.232 0.255 0.208 0.241 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
1997-11 0.238 0.232 0.240 0.240 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
1992-11 0.235 0.254 0.232 0.240 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
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Input Biases 
 
Industry 
Table 8.5, also displays technological input bias calculated using the flexible gi1 
model, which accommodates time specific trends. TC, on the average is found to be 
labour and capital using and fuel and material saving. Capital using results are 
expected (see Kumbhakar et al., 1999) due to the nature of industry (capital 
intensive). For an energy intensive industry such as cement manufacturing, I would 
priori expect a strong energy saving bias (Førsund and Hjalmarsson, 1983), and this is 
confirmed by my estimates of the bias. Interestingly, though, immediately after 
reforms that include shedding of labour through golden handshake, firms did not 
experienced saving in labour as per this model. This is not surprising results given the 
fact that a significant number of workers were rehired on contract basis to avoid 
benefits and social security contributions. Contract workers provide more leverage to 
firms in firing these workers if the demand conditions change. Fuel saving is 
understandable given the fact that fuel cost contributes significantly in the overall cost 
of production (more than 50%) and industry has shown to be moving from furnace oil 
to coal. In years of negative output growth, firms would be expected to conserve fuel 
cost, as opposed to labour, hence, a fuel saving technical change. 
 
Public 
Table 8.5, below, also displays technological input bias for public sector firms, once 
again calculated using the more flexible models specification gi1. In common with the 
results for industry, TC is found to be fuel and material saving for those firms in the 
public sector.  The opposite is true for labour, and capital, where TC is labour, and 
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capital using. Again due to high proportion of fuel in overall cost of production, this 
result is not surprising. In comparing the pre to post deregulation periods, I can see 
that TC became less fuel and material using (converting from furnace oil and 
electricity to coal), whereas TC becomes more labour and capital using. This indicates 
that as a result of deregulation, public sector firms have started to use proportionally 
more labour and capital and less fuel to reduce fuel bill. 
 
Private 
TC is once again found to be fuel and material saving, and labour, and capital using 
for this group of firms. Private firms have become slightly fuel saving post 
deregulation period (particularly during 1997 onward), and slightly more labour 
using.  There is little to differentiate between publicly and privately owned firms in 
this respect.  
 
Privatized 
Results are similar to those determined above in terms of use and or saving of inputs. 
TC is found to be labour and capital using during 1997 to 2011 and is fuel and 
material saving. Absolute values are comparable to other types of ownerships. 
 
8.5.6. Firm Size and Performance 
 
I use flexible model (gi1) to observe the performance of the firms according to five 
different classes of sizes. As per expectation, very small size firms would benefit by 
increasing their scale of production evident from the results. Very large firms on the 
other hand, do not have this option available. Middle size firms on the other hand, are 
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operating at optimal scale of production. This group of firms also experienced 
significant technical change, the main contributor in the TFP growth. This group of 
firms also looks to be one performing significantly better in term of productivity 
growth.      
 
Table 8.6: Returns to Scale, TFP and Components by 
Firm Size 
 Very Small Small Medium Large Very Large 
Baltagi & Griffin (gi1) model    
RTS 1.033 1.005 0.993 1.033 0.931 
TC 0.013 0.019 0.037 0.017 0.000 
SE 0.010 0.010 0.002 0.009 -0.006 
TFP 0.003 0.010 0.035 0.009 0.006 
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8.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined technical change, total factor productivity growth and 
scale bias for the cement industry over the period 1986 – 2011 – a period 
characterised by substantial modernisation, liberalisation and privatization of the 
cement sector.  It was found that firms have largely benefited from the changes 
implemented during the deregulation of the early 1990s.  
 
Returns to scale for the industry and private firms have increased in the post reforms 
period, as has the rate of total factor productivity growth (particularly since 1997 
onward). In addition, it is found that the technical change experienced by the average 
firm is labour and capital using and fuel and material saving. These results indicate 
that the measure of deregulation introduced during the early 1990s have had the effect 
of making average firm more efficient in terms of TFP growth and fuel usage. 
 
When the results are disaggregated, further conclusions become apparent. Privatized, 
public and private owned firms seem to have benefited from the deregulation in the 
ways described above. It appears therefore that privatized firms have enjoyed the 
benefits experienced by other types of firms as a result of deregulation and indeed 
have been impacted positively in the form of positive rates of TFP growth and 
technological change.   
 
It therefore appears, that the measures introduced in the early 1990s have been 
modestly successful at least in term of productivity growth – firms in general have 
become relatively more productive. If these changes have been introduced in order to 
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achieve this outcome, then they have been to some extent partially successful.  
However, if the intention was to improve the efficiency and competitiveness of all 
firms operating in the industry, more needs to be done to ensure all types of firm 
ownership are able to benefit equally from reforms. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
Labour Use Efficiency Estimation  
 
A significant number of empirical case studies in 1970s and 1980s concluded that 
state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) were inherently inefficiency due to over employment 
in these firms. It was believed that politicians and governments use these firms to seek 
political rents by forcing them to employ inefficient, incompetent and less productive 
workforce. One of the objectives of deregulation and privatization policy was to let 
the management decide about the composition and size of workforce. Chapter 9 deals 
specifically with the modelling and estimation of labour use efficiency and wage 
elasticities. Labour demand function is estimated by introducing risks in production 
process. Labour use efficiency scores are calculated and interpreted in pre- and post 
privatization periods. Efficiency scores are modelled against a number of economic 
and firm specific factors to detect the sources of labour use efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                 Chapter 9 
                                                                                   Labour Use Efficiency  
 225 
9.1. Introduction 
 
Firms need to use their inputs at an efficient rate to maximise profitability and to 
survive in under competitive conditions.  Therefore, if a firm is using more labour in 
the production process than is technically required, it will be operating below the 
„frontier‟ of efficiency. Policy makers and academics alike take a keen interest when 
these relative levels of inefficiency are displayed consistently. Studies of labour use 
efficiency have focused upon manufacturing, agricultural and lately banking 
industries (see Haouras et al. (2003), Okten and Arin (2006) and Liefert et al. (2005), 
Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1995),  El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005), Jaffry et al. 
(2008) and Das et al. (2009),  for studies examining labour use efficiency in Tunisian 
manufacturing, Russian agriculture, Turkish manufacturing, Swedish social insurance 
offices, Turkish banking industry, and Indian manufacturing industry ).  
 
Of those studies that have looked into labour use, efficiency and layoff, many focus 
on calculating and interpreting ratios such as profit per employee, assets per employee 
and number of employees in pre and post privatization/deregulation sub-period and to 
some extent related to developed countries such as the Swedish banking sector, 
analysed by Battese et al. (2000), Heshmati (2001) and Gjirja (2004), mainly due to 
the ease of data availability). As a result, detailed econometric investigation into the 
labour use efficiency in pre and post privatization period for a developing country 
such as Pakistani manufacturing sectors has been relatively ignored. 
 
This study seeks to looks into labour use efficiency in both pre and post deregulation 
period in cement industry in response to privatization and other macro economic 
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reforms observed in over the course of the 1990s.  These policies were designed to 
give firms the ability to adjust their use of labour through layoffs and golden 
handshake schemes to become more efficient, they also aim to make the industry 
more competitive. If firms are able to adjust their labour use in accordance to 
competitive level then they would have been successful in moving closer to the 
efficiency frontier in order to be able to survive the increased competitive pressures 
which should result from increased levels of competition. I employ a panel data set, 
comprising of data from cement industry over the period between 1986 and 2011. 
This study period represents 4-5 business cycles and would provide a comprehensive 
picture of adjustments in labour use in post deregulation/privatization period. 
Specifically, a majority of similar types of studies mentioned above have not used a 
data set that encompasses the full range of significant periods of reform. 
 
9.2. Estimation of Labour Demand Function - Methodology 
 
The use of a flexible translog functional form to estimate the labour demand function 
has been fairly common after its use in Christiensen et al. (1971) (see Benjamin 
(1992), Heshmati (2001) and Bhandari and Heshmati (2005) for a selection of 
examples). The demand for labour is expressed in term of input requirement function 
of Diewert (1974) as: 
)exp(),,,,(  tzqwyfh    (1) 
   
Where h is units of labour measured in hours, f represents the production technology, 
y represents output produced using labour, w is hourly wage rate, q represents fixed 
input such as fixed assets (production capacity in my case), z represent firm‟s 
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heterogeneity in term of technology constraint, cost structure and labour requirements  
(in my case dry or wet process represented by (age) of the firm, as older firms used 
wet process), exporter firms (exporter) and public sector ownership firms (public)). I 
aim to capture this heterogeneity in input requirement by including three variables i.e. 
dummy variable for exporter, log of age of the firm and dummy variable=1 if firm 
belong to public sector. Age could also be a proxy of historical baggage of starting 
operation in relatively less competitive environment with excessive employment 
enforced upon government for political gains, and t represents the time effect in the 
form of time dummy variables. Overall, this function estimates the minimum amount 
of labour required to produce a given level of output.  The error term in this equation 
is decomposed into two distinct parts (μ and  ) as per the seminal paper by Aigner et 
al. (1977), representing technical efficiency and factors beyond the control of firm 
respectively.  In addition to these two, the firm‟s production technology will also have 
an effect upon their demand for labour. 
 
If the μ component of the error term for any observation is greater than zero, the firm 
displays a level of technical inefficiency, meaning that the specific firm has used more 
labour than was technically necessary in order to produce a given level of output.  A 
firm, which displays a μ value of zero, can claim to be fully efficient in the use of 
labour.  The   component of the error term can be both positive and negative.  Due to 
its presence, therefore, the labour demand frontier is stochastic even when μ is set to 
zero. 
If one includes risks in the requirement functions, then the model is redefined 
appropriately as per the work of Just and Pope (1978), where accounting for both the 
mean and variance of output will have an effect upon efficiency.   
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When doing so, the model then becomes: 
));(exp();(   xgxfh      (2) 
Where x = (y,w,q,z,t), with  f(x; ) representing the demand part and   representing the 
employment variance part of the demand function.  The model can also be re-
specified in log linear form as
37
: 
  );();(lnln xgxfh     (3) 
9.3. Data 
 
Historical data on output, inputs quantities, prices and firms characteristics were 
obtained through company annual reports, site visits, interaction with government 
ministries, personal contacts and telephone interviews with concerned regulatory 
authorities and associations.  
 
The final panel dataset used in this chapter comprises information from 1986 to 2011 
for public sector companies before their eventual privatization in 1991/92 and beyond 
and private sector companies. Hence, my data set covers 98% of the industry in pre as 
well as post privatization period. I dropped less than 1% of observations due to 
abnormal values (outlier) before the estimation stage.  The panel is unbalanced, as not 
all firms were in existence during all of the sample years encompassed by this study.  
As many private firms began their operations in post 1991 period.  Summary statistics 
of the data are presented in Table 9.1 below.  
 
                                                 
37
 For further detail on the estimation of efficiency and input-output variance see Heshmati (2001).   
                                                                                 Chapter 9 
                                                                                   Labour Use Efficiency  
 229 
Output and inputs are chosen as per existing literature. The specific variables used in 
the analysis include the total quantity of labour hours used (h), output measured by 
cement dispatches, hourly labour real wages rates (w), fixed assets (q), age of the firm 
is represented by variables old(years since operation), public sector firm dummy, 
exporter dummy  and a time trend representing exogenous rates of technical change 
(t). 
Table 9.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Scale N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
idnr  413 10.3 5.63 1 21 
period  413 1998.98 7.38 1986 2011 
lcost (million) 413 132.75 88.23 7.27 482.61 
hours  413 5127850 2963825 792000 18360000 
q (million) 413 0.73 0.86 0 6.55 
w (Rs.) 413 25.32 8.38 6.43 56.03 
w1  413 0.2 0.47 0 8.39 
k (million) 413 2528.22 2896.5 14.38 15140.4 
t  413 13.98 7.38 1 26 
size  413 3.5 1.09 1 5 
type  413 2.17 0.79 1 3 
old  413 24.9 12.63 3 57 
 
Nominal monetary values are converted into constant 2001 prices. The „wage‟ 
variable is defined as hourly wages - an aggregate measure of the cost associated with 
the hiring of labour, including payroll taxes. The quasi-fixed variable, q (total fixed 
assets), is representative of production capacity constraint. Efficiency scores are also 
looked by different sizes of firms and by ownership structure.  Size categories of the 
firm are determined based on the average number of full-time employees (see Table 
9.2): 
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Table 9.2: Construction of ‘Size’ Variable 
Number of Employees Resultant „Size‟ Classification 
Employees ≤ 300 1-very small size firm 
301 < Employees ≤ 500 2-small size firm 
501 < Employees ≤ 700 3-medium size firm   
701 < Employees ≤900 4-large size firm 
Employees  > 900 5-very large size firm 
 
The regression outlined below was subsequently run on the population of cement 
companies. The results displayed in the tables contained within the subsequent section 
therefore display results that assume a common labour use efficiency frontier for all 
ownerships over pre and post privatization and deregulation period. A flexible 
translog functional form is used to approximate f (.) and g (.).  The model can 
therefore be specified as follows: 
 
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                                                                                                                  (4) 
where h, y, w and q are variables which are defined as above, i is an index of firms 
(i=1,2, . . . , N),  t represents an index of time (t=1,2, . . . ,T).  Finally, a vector of time 
and firm dummies representing the exogenous rate of technical change λt, and 
heterogeneity across firms represented by λI am added in regression stages.  
 
In order to facilitate the potential for the most efficient firm to change in each time 
period, time variant technical efficiency scores are calculated as per Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984), where   
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And technical efficiency is
38
: 
)exp( itit TINEFFTEFF    (6) 
I expect  y and  q to be positive and  w negative, which can be interpreted as the 
elasticity of labour demand with respect to output, quasi-fixed input and wages 
respectively. These expectations are only valid at the average point, with the 
corresponding elasticities (which are both firm specific and time specific) outlined 
below: 
 
ityqwitywityyyitity qwyyhE lnlnln2ln/ln      (7)  
          
itwqitywitwwwwititw qywwhE lnlnln2ln/ln                  
(8) 
 
itwqityqitqqqititq wyyqqhE lnlnln2ln/ln     (9) 
Time specific elasticity of labour with respect to time (the exogenous rate of technical 
change) is derived as: 
)(/ln 1 ttitt thE       (10) 
and return to scale is calculated as 1/Ey: 
 
 
                                                 
38
 For further detail on the estimation of efficiency and input-output variance see Heshmati (2001).   
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9.4. Estimation and Explanation 
 
The model outlined in Equation (4) is firstly used to estimate labour demand function 
for cement firms. Table 9.3 shows estimates of the demand function, (f) and the 
variance function, (g). A majority of the firm specific variables are statistically 
significant and different from zero.  The variance function, (g), outlined above, was 
estimated using the weighted non-linear least square method. 
                                                                                 Chapter 9 
                                                                                   Labour Use Efficiency  
 233 
Table: 9.3: GLS Nonlinear Parameter Estimates of the Labour Demand 
Function and Estimates of the Variance Function  
 Parameter 
Estimate  
Approx 
Std Err  
t Value  Approx Pr > |t|  Parameter 
Estimate  
Approx 
Std Err  
t Value  Approx 
Pr > |t|  
a. labour demand function estimates       
a0 -1.163 0.434 -2.680 0.008 d2 0.715 0.223 3.210 0.001 
ay 0.869 0.059 14.850 <.0001 d3 -0.495 0.190 -2.600 0.010 
aw 0.583 0.098 5.960 <.0001 d4 -0.954 0.459 -2.080 0.038 
aq -0.336 0.050 -6.670 <.0001 d5 -0.450 0.142 -3.170 0.002 
ayy 0.292 0.037 7.860 <.0001 d6 -0.084 0.156 -0.540 0.592 
aww 0.262 0.104 2.520 0.012 d7 0.036 0.199 0.180 0.855 
aqq -0.071 0.023 -3.080 0.002 d8 -0.529 0.145 -3.650 0.000 
ayw -0.313 0.097 -3.220 0.001 d9 -0.267 0.147 -1.820 0.069 
ayk -0.152 0.041 -3.690 0.000 d10 0.071 0.212 0.340 0.736 
awq -0.069 0.072 -0.960 0.337 d11 -0.364 0.143 -2.540 0.012 
Pub 0.156 0.067 2.340 0.020 d12 0.041 0.193 0.210 0.832 
exp -0.414 0.055 -7.510 <.0001 d13 -0.111 0.210 -0.530 0.599 
ol 0.567 0.140 4.050 <.0001 d14 -0.303 0.205 -1.480 0.140 
c2 0.173 0.075 2.310 0.021 d15 -0.745 0.206 -3.620 0.000 
c3 -0.037 0.079 -0.460 0.644 d16 -0.118 0.243 -0.490 0.628 
c4 -0.076 0.080 -0.950 0.345 d17 0.406 0.409 0.990 0.321 
c5 -0.157 0.092 -1.700 0.089 d18 0.325 0.293 1.110 0.269 
c6 -0.271 0.112 -2.430 0.016 d19 -0.124 0.217 -0.570 0.569 
c7 -0.279 0.110 -2.540 0.011 d20 0.467 0.330 1.420 0.158 
c8 -0.349 0.119 -2.940 0.004 d21 0.419 0.242 1.730 0.085 
c9 -0.407 0.128 -3.190 0.002 b. variance function    
c10 -0.495 0.136 -3.640 0.000 by 0.073 0.013 5.720 .0001 
c11 -0.429 0.147 -2.920 0.004 Bw 0.020 0.032 0.610 0.542 
c12 -0.446 0.152 -2.940 0.004 bq 0.063 0.012 5.470 .0001 
c13 -0.397 0.162 -2.460 0.014 bt 0.101 0.032 3.190 0.002 
c14 -0.484 0.176 -2.760 0.006 bpub 0.178 0.037 4.880 .0001 
c15 -0.492 0.179 -2.750 0.006 bexp -0.013 0.040 -0.330 0.738 
c16 -0.602 0.186 -3.240 0.001 bol 0.054 0.011 4.790 .0001 
c17 -0.386 0.191 -2.020 0.044  8.1827    
c18 -0.440 0.195 -2.250 0.025      
c19 -0.621 0.212 -2.930 0.004      
c20 -0.684 0.214 -3.190 0.002      
c21 -0.532 0.222 -2.400 0.017      
c22 -0.382 0.223 -1.710 0.087      
c23 -0.575 0.231 -2.490 0.013      
c24 -0.550 0.241 -2.280 0.023      
c25 -0.616 0.239 -2.580 0.010      
c26 -0.735 0.263 -2.800 0.006      
v2
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9.4.1. Labour Demand Elasticities, Variances and Efficiencies  
  
Firm and time specific elasticities of labour demand with respect to outputs, wages 
and quasi fixed input (fixed assets) were calculated and are presented in Table 9.4. 
The median values are reported by years, firm size and ownerships. At the median 
data point, all elasticities with the exception of wage and time elasticities are positive, 
indicating that there is a degree of responsiveness of labour demand to changes in the 
levels of output, wages and fixed assets. Labour demand elasticity with respect to the 
output is positive for all five sizes firms – namely very small, small, medium, large 
and very large and all three ownerships (public, private and privatized) firms. This is 
consistent as per expectation. This output elasticity is steadily increasing over time 
with a median elasticity of 0.32, suggesting that firms have not become less labour 
intensive over time.   
 
One could conclude from this that this degree of elasticity is very unlikely to be 
significantly different across the number of firms included in the sample. This is a 
result that is to be expected, showing that a marginal change in the output will have 
the largest marginal effect on labour demand. 
 
The wage elasticity is –0.180 (the largest of the input elasticities) with a relatively 
small standard deviation of 0.06.  The elasticity of wages increased immediately after 
deregulation increasing from -0.068 in 1986 to –0.30 in 1995.  The sign of this 
variable is consistent with theory, and the temporal pattern of change indicates that 
labour demand is becoming cyclical and less responsive to changes in the wage rate in 
the final two years of the sample. Reduction in the size of the labour may prove little 
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difficult due to non availability of skilled labours in the years when demand for 
cement goes up with good economic progress or export potential. That has been the 
case in the last few years when companies exported a large quantity of cement to 
Afghanistan. 
Table 9. 4: Median Input and Output Elasticities by Year, Size and Type of 
Ownership     
 A: Labour demand elasticity B: Marginal employment variance (risk) effects 
 Output Labour Fixed 
assets 
Time Output Labour Fixed 
assets 
Time TME Efficiency 
1986 0.465 -0.068 -0.024 0.000 0.018 0.466 -0.013 -0.101 0.471 0.881 
1987 0.455 -0.079 -0.024 0.003 0.040 0.074 -0.033 -0.060 0.081 0.884 
1988 0.507 -0.035 -0.023 -0.099 0.050 0.169 -0.065 0.045 0.154 0.885 
1989 0.485 -0.080 -0.029 -0.050 0.049 0.193 -0.053 -0.007 0.189 0.880 
1990 0.489 -0.097 -0.022 -0.061 0.019 0.006 -0.034 -0.017 -0.009 0.876 
1991 0.497 -0.073 -0.027 -0.047 0.018 0.006 -0.067 -0.033 -0.043 0.878 
1992 0.493 -0.125 -0.029 0.041 0.019 0.004 -0.052 -0.071 -0.029 0.936 
1993 0.509 -0.142 -0.060 -0.065 0.053 -0.154 -0.068 -0.048 -0.169 0.937 
1994 0.509 -0.189 -0.074 -0.051 0.152 -0.318 -0.065 -0.061 -0.231 0.939 
1995 0.424 -0.306 -0.067 -0.079 0.050 -0.378 -0.055 -0.039 -0.383 0.932 
1996 0.530 -0.287 -0.073 -0.005 0.156 -0.610 -0.095 -0.079 -0.549 0.928 
1997 0.513 -0.121 -0.065 -0.155 0.054 0.294 -0.036 -0.015 0.312 0.933 
1998 0.444 -0.124 -0.049 0.029 0.029 0.464 -0.013 -0.034 0.480 0.870 
1999 0.442 -0.213 -0.040 0.022 0.019 0.066 -0.015 -0.037 0.070 0.861 
2000 0.472 -0.162 -0.042 -0.103 0.016 -0.057 -0.009 -0.024 -0.050 0.871 
2001 0.451 -0.140 -0.052 -0.074 0.002 0.029 -0.008 -0.024 0.023 0.837 
2002 0.481 -0.209 -0.047 0.097 0.039 -0.284 -0.014 -0.058 -0.259 0.844 
2003 0.522 -0.264 -0.075 -0.069 -0.001 -0.305 -0.009 -0.034 -0.315 0.834 
2004 0.556 -0.307 -0.094 -0.094 0.004 -0.534 -0.003 -0.024 -0.533 0.833 
2005 0.597 -0.213 -0.094 -0.071 0.050 -0.542 -0.006 -0.021 -0.498 0.838 
2006 0.618 -0.268 -0.127 0.138 0.000 -0.805 -0.004 -0.073 -0.809 0.820 
2007 0.656 -0.290 -0.141 0.035 -0.725 -1.309 -0.003 -0.042 -2.037 0.795 
2008 0.689 -0.227 -0.141 -0.121 -0.547 -0.978 -0.002 0.008 -1.527 0.791 
2009 0.620 -0.175 -0.133 0.041 -0.741 0.039 0.047 -0.010 -0.655 0.785 
2010 0.619 -0.105 -0.116 -0.059 -0.533 0.084 -0.001 -0.002 -0.450 0.775 
2011 0.656 -0.030 -0.115 0.027 -0.832 0.370 0.014 -0.007 -0.448 0.770 
V small 0.187 0.035 0.071 -0.051 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.890 
Small 0.512 -0.287 -0.064 -0.055 0.007 -0.090 -0.007 -0.011 -0.090 0.920 
Medium 0.478 -0.196 -0.057 -0.050 0.015 0.023 -0.023 -0.033 0.015 0.832 
Large 0.520 -0.201 -0.065 -0.051 0.044 -0.305 -0.036 -0.044 -0.297 0.916 
V large 0.573 -0.103 -0.085 -0.051 -0.006 -0.356 -0.013 -0.026 -0.375 0.890 
Public 0.491 -0.119 -0.036 -0.050 0.101 0.004 -0.072 -0.034 0.033 0.890 
Privatized 0.520 -0.173 -0.066 -0.055 -0.001 -0.025 -0.012 -0.030 -0.038 0.911 
private 0.504 -0.210 -0.070 -0.051 0.001 0.001 -0.006 -0.024 -0.004 0.831 
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The elasticity with respect to fixed assets has a median value of -0.06 with a relatively 
high standard deviation of 0.04. There is a trend in the elasticity starting at -0.024 in 
1986 and ending at -0.115 in 2010-11, which indicates decreasing demand for labour 
with the expansion of capital. Negative sign is an indication of capital being a 
substitute to labour. More capital is indicative of modernization of production process 
which in turn would require less labour. These results support those of Heshmati 
(2001) – hence this study can conclude that there must be significant differences in 
the degree to which the crowding out of labour as a result of expansion of capacity 
coupled with new technology.   
 
The sample median value of technical change (consisting only of a neutral 
component) changes only) over time is -0.05, indicating some positive technical 
progress (slight reduction in labour usage over time). Technical change fluctuates 
from positive to negative with negative trend established for many years at a time 
indicating consistent positive technical progress. 
 
The magnitude of the different output elasticities also appear to vary with the size of 
the individual firm in question. Labour demand elasticity with respect to wages seems 
to increase as firm size increases. This illustrates that increased wage levels do not 
serve as great a deterrent to the hire of additional labour for larger firms as opposed to 
their smaller counterparts.  The elasticity with respect to output does not decreases 
with size of firm, showing that larger firms are better able to expand their output 
without having the large effect on labour.  Labour demand elasticity with respect to 
fixed assets seems to fall with the size of the firms in question (showing that 
expansion in capacity coupled with new technology requires less additional labour for 
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larger firms). Finally, the time trend shows very consistent pattern of technical change 
for all sizes of firm, meaning that the some technical progress shown over the sample 
period has not been limited to firms of specific sizes.  
 
In terms of elasticity differentiated by firm ownership, all ownership firms have the 
same labour demand elasticity with respect to output but significantly less than one.  
All this is expected by the fact that the firms have already quite significant payroll 
bills in their overall cost structure and further increase is likely to be responded in 
some reduction in employment in these firms.   
 
The Employment Variance  
The figures representing the following can be found in Table 9.3 (part b).  The beta 
coefficient with respect to output is positive, and statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level. Of the input variables, the wage coefficient is positive but 
insignificant. The time trend is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient of 
fixed assets is positive and significant. The employment variance elasticity or 
marginal risk effects are calculated with respect to the dispersion factors of „output‟, 
„wages‟, „fixed assets‟ and „time trend‟, with median values being estimated 
separately for each year, firm size and ownership.  These results, together with the 
overall sample median, are reported in Table 9.4 part b. Marginal variance (risk) 
effects evaluated at the median of the data with respect to „output‟  is positive in both 
pre and post reforms period (except for last few years). Negative marginal effects are 
observed for wages for most of the years.  In most of the cases standard deviations are 
large and, for some variables, are in excess of the median value itself. Thus, for firms 
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with production levels close to the sample medians, the employment variance 
increases if the firm produces more output.   
 
The variable „Wages‟ is the most important factor contributing to the variance of 
employment in terms of marginal effects. The sign of marginal effect is as expected 
with lot of fluctuation.  Significantly more variation in the estimated marginal effects 
seems to take place as firm size increases. 
 
Technical Efficiency 
The efficiency measured here is a relative efficiency score, as it is calculated relative 
to the firm demonstrating the „best-practice‟ in each year where this individual firm is 
assumed to be 100% efficient. The median values of estimates of technical efficiency 
obtained from Equation (6) are reported in Table 9.4 part b by year, firm size and 
ownership. Technical efficiency is both firm and time-specific. The overall median 
technical efficiency is 87% with a standard deviation 5% meaning that, on average, 
firms could have reduced their labour usage by 13% without reduction in output.  This 
is indicative of a relatively high level of median labour use efficiency displayed by 
firms over the sample period and similar to observed by Heshmati (2001) in the 
analysis of Swedish savings banks and extremely high as that observed in the 
Tunisian banking sector firms by Chaffai (1997). 
 
However, what is apparent from investigating the changes in labour use efficiency 
over time is that the median technical efficiency over time is decreasing. In 1986, the 
average firm showed 88% labour use efficiency, compared with 77% in the final year 
of the sample period (10% reduction). The year on year change is largest between 
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1998 and 2011. Whether this was a phenomenon that was caused by the reforms is 
debatable, as efficiency levels seemed to decreasing continuously in the last decade of 
my sample period.  What is apparent is that the deregulation reforms have discernibly 
adverse effect on labour use efficiency over time and could have translated into higher 
prices of cement produced during this period and firms would have suffered losses. 
Hence, there exists an appreciable gap between the best performing firms in the 
sample and those firms playing „catch-up‟ (this is consistent with the results obtained 
by Bonaccorsi and Hardy (2005) with respect to the effect of regulatory reform upon 
the Pakistani banking sector). While this may be slightly disappointing, Ahluwalia 
(2002) suggests that a failure to live up to the full potential of reform might not be 
down to the changes in policies themselves, but a failure to implement these policy 
changes correctly. It may be that better implementation of the reforms policy will 
allow for the median firm in the sample to move closer to the efficiency frontier in the 
future. 
 
There appears to be not a noticeable variation in technical efficiency between firms of 
different sizes with the exception of medium size firms. The results indicate that the 
largest firms could reduce their labour demand on average by around 9%, with the 
smaller firms only requiring around a 8% reduction at the median.  Therefore, there is 
a very narrow gap between the optimal level of labour efficiency and that which is 
observed by the firms, which is in contrast to conclusion by Rao‟s (2005) study into 
efficiency of banking firms in the United Arab Emirates with different sizes.   
 
Among firms of different ownership types, it is found that private firms are the 
relatively least efficient in terms of labour usage, followed by public firms 
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respectively.  Private firms could have reduced their labour usage by 17%, privatized 
and public by 9% and 11%, indicating that private firms were employing far more 
labour than is technically necessary given output levels, and still have some way to go 
in improving technical efficiency levels in the future.   
 
The frequency distribution of technical efficiency is reported in Table 9.5 and Figures 
9.1-9.8. A significant number of firms are found in the intervals of between 80% and 
90% labour usage efficiency. 
 
Table 9.5: Frequency Distribution of Efficiency Scores 
eff Freq. Percent Cum. 
0.6 6 1.45 1.45 
0.7 26 6.3 7.75 
0.8 67 16.22 23.97 
0.9 161 38.98 62.95 
1 153 37.05 100 
Total 413 100  
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Figure 9.1 Industry Efficiency 
 
Figure 9.2: Public Firms Efficiency 
 
 
Figure 9.3: Privatized Firms Efficiency    
 
Figure 9.4: Private Firms Efficiency    
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Figure 9.5: 1986 Efficiency    
 
Figure 9.6: 1990 Efficiency 
 
 
Figure 9.7: 1999  Efficiency 
 
Figure 9.8: 2011 Efficiency 
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9.4.2. Elasticities and Efficiencies by Ownerships 
 
Firm and time specific elasticities of labour demand with respect to outputs, wages 
and fixed assets and time are calculated and are presented in Table 9.6 by years, and 
ownerships. Some interesting observations could be made by looking at these results 
over time. Public sector firms before their eventual privatization become less labour 
intensive after reforms were introduced. Elasticity of output for public sector firms 
reduced from 0.479 in 1986 to 0.36 in 2003. This may partly due to less variation in 
elasticities after firms eventually being privatized gradually over this period 
(Associate in 1996, Mustehkam in 2009 and Javeden in 2003). Contrary to public 
sector firm‟s output elasticities for privatized firms increased from 0.58 in 1992 to 
0.667 in 2011. Deregulations had not had any significant effect on employment 
response nonetheless. This partly is due to non-availability of skilled labour. Rather 
than shedding more employees, management opted to keep these employees on the 
payroll and use them when economic conditions improve and the demand for cement 
go up.  
 
When it comes to labour adjustment in response to wages, elasticities pattern over 
time reveals some interesting trends. Immediately after deregulations, firms 
responded in accordance to prediction and wages elasticity kept rising until 1997. But 
then, afterward came down for privatized as well as private sector firms. By 1998, 
firms would have made appropriate adjustment in their labour use and shedding 
further workers would have been damaging to long term competitiveness of the firm. 
When it comes to technological progress, firms experienced a modest progress during 
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the post reform period irrespective of ownerships. Similar to previous discussion, one 
could also conclude that labour use efficiency was on the downward slope in the last 
few years of the sample irrespective of the nature of ownerships. Decline in efficiency 
in later years is in the region of 4-5%. Again that might be explained by decrease in 
economic activity alongside some other factors.  
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Table 9.6: Median Input and Output Elasticities and Efficiency by Year, Size and Type of Ownerships       
 Output Labour Fixed Assets Time Efficiency 
 public privatized private public privatized private public privatized private public privatized private public privatized private 
1986 0.479  0.310 -0.058  -0.191 -0.024  0.022 0.000  0.000 0.881  0.893 
1987 0.486  0.424 -0.103  -0.055 -0.028  -0.020 0.003  0.003 0.889  0.868 
1988 0.513  0.501 -0.060  0.038 -0.025  -0.015 -0.099  -0.099 0.890  0.872 
1989 0.514  0.443 -0.138  0.014 -0.038  -0.017 -0.050  -0.050 0.887  0.875 
1990 0.499  0.399 -0.097  -0.096 -0.022  -0.024 -0.061  -0.061 0.885  0.861 
1991 0.512  0.382 -0.149  0.012 -0.042  -0.017 -0.047  -0.047 0.887  0.861 
1992 0.449 0.584 0.366 -0.115 -0.125 0.074 -0.036 -0.077 -0.001 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.913 0.950 0.926 
1993 0.505 0.573 0.415 -0.138 -0.272 -0.033 -0.049 -0.090 -0.031 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 0.910 0.960 0.925 
1994 0.525 0.564 0.410 -0.274 -0.146 -0.129 -0.059 -0.085 -0.026 -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 0.909 0.960 0.930 
1995 0.417 0.549 0.351 -0.342 -0.203 -0.294 -0.084 -0.068 -0.041 -0.079 -0.079 -0.079 0.927 0.945 0.911 
1996 0.546 0.566 0.503 -0.413 -0.256 -0.102 -0.062 -0.079 -0.077 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 0.925 0.956 0.886 
1997 0.573 0.438 0.468 -0.331 -0.103 -0.095 -0.080 -0.023 -0.074 -0.155 -0.155 -0.155 0.933 0.963 0.890 
1998 0.505 0.444 0.432 -0.216 -0.147 -0.107 -0.037 -0.028 -0.052 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.875 0.910 0.839 
1999 0.440 0.443 0.420 -0.181 -0.333 -0.105 -0.009 -0.031 -0.049 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.862 0.898 0.829 
2000 0.462 0.472 0.456 -0.050 -0.186 -0.134 0.001 -0.034 -0.051 -0.103 -0.103 -0.103 0.864 0.920 0.832 
2001 0.409 0.512 0.470 -0.067 -0.280 -0.108 0.022 -0.082 -0.060 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 0.866 0.896 0.826 
2002 0.420 0.485 0.485 -0.046 -0.189 -0.303 0.021 -0.035 -0.067 0.097 0.097 0.097 0.866 0.902 0.831 
2003 0.361 0.533 0.569 -0.120 -0.203 -0.280 0.038 -0.055 -0.096 -0.069 -0.069 -0.069 0.864 0.896 0.819 
2004  0.597 0.534  -0.211 -0.374  -0.074 -0.103  -0.094 -0.094  0.897 0.813 
2005  0.604 0.579  -0.152 -0.232  -0.068 -0.104  -0.071 -0.071  0.895 0.807 
2006  0.607 0.618  -0.100 -0.358  -0.053 -0.148  0.138 0.138  0.871 0.789 
2007  0.534 0.688  -0.274 -0.366  -0.062 -0.143  0.035 0.035  0.856 0.741 
2008  0.521 0.695  -0.043 -0.301  -0.033 -0.157  -0.121 -0.121  0.819 0.745 
2009  0.485 0.637  -0.076 -0.267  -0.057 -0.144  0.041 0.041  0.848 0.727 
2010  0.468 0.636  -0.001 -0.141  -0.064 -0.132  -0.059 -0.059  0.838 0.720 
2011  0.667 0.656  0.044 -0.081  -0.121 -0.115  0.027 0.027  0.884 0.716 
                
1986-91 0.506  0.412 -0.100  -0.022 -0.027  -0.017 -0.049  -0.049 0.887  0.870 
1992-11 0.456 0.534 0.494 -0.160 -0.169 -0.138 -0.037 -0.063 -0.076 -0.058 -0.055 -0.055 0.892 0.898 0.828 
1992-96 0.505 0.566 0.410 -0.274 -0.203 -0.102 -0.059 -0.079 -0.031 -0.051 -0.051 -0.051 0.913 0.956 0.925 
1997-2007 0.440 0.512 0.485 -0.120 -0.189 -0.232 0.001 -0.053 -0.074 -0.069 -0.069 -0.069 0.866 0.897 0.826 
2007-2011  0.521 0.656  -0.043 -0.267  -0.062 -0.143  0.027 0.027  0.848 0.727 
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9.4.3. Determinants of Labour Use Efficiency    
 
In order to complete a more detailed analysis of the results, a second stage panel data 
random effect regression was run in order to model a variety of other factors against 
the firm specific efficiency scores obtained in the previous sections. Five different 
model specifications (which I name model1-model5) are estimated in order to check 
for robustness in the results with each involving the inclusion and exclusion of certain 
model variables. Time dummies are added to see the effect of deregulation and 
privatization on labour use efficiency in pre and post deregulation/privatization 
periods. The output from these regressions can be seen in Table 9.7.  The sign and 
significance of the model variables do not seem to change dramatically between the 5 
models specifications, indicating that the model parameters are consistent and robust.   
  
In this exercise I proxies my firm size with log of total assets that could accommodate 
capacity addition in post deregulation period as well as addresses smart dry 
production technology which could potentially reduce labour requirements. Assets is 
a variable that has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (generally), 
indicating that firms with larger assets (hence production capacity) tend to be more 
efficient in their use of labour. This result is an indication of potential scale 
economies and needed to be explored further. The variable reflecting ownership 
change from public to privatized is to be consistent with the other studies conclusions 
indicating an improvement after change of ownership (contrary to public sector firms 
who experienced a decline in their labour use efficiency compare to firm operating in 
private sector) 
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Firms spending more money on admin and marketing campaign tend to be less 
efficient in labour use. Having access to higher working capital does not appear to 
have any notable effect on labour use efficiency. Financially profitable as well as 
productive firms (indicated by return on assets (roa) and total factor productivity 
variables) were on the average using labour more efficiently. 
 
Operating in north region and using dry process technology appears to have negative 
effect on labour use efficiency.  Time dummies show decreased levels of labour use 
efficiency in post deregulation period for the 2002 onward, which supports the 
contention that the reforms enacted in the 1990s had some positive effect initially, but 
for the last few years, trend has reversed and reforms had not encouraged firms to use 
labour more efficiently lately.   
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Table 9.7: Random Effect Regression Results: Dep. Variable: Efficiency Scores  
Variable model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 
lassets 0.01787***  0.02010*** 0.01613*** 0.01098** 
oexptc -0.40008***  -0.41701*** -0.40884*** -0.53108*** 
roa 0.08841* 0.13890*** 0.12085*** 0.08208* 0.07719* 
tfp 0.01902* 0.02810**  0.01346 0.01187 
wcr 0.0063 0.00428  0.00618 0.00274 
dry  -0.05904*** -0.07343*** -0.05672***  -0.07380*** 
north -0.06095***  -0.05867*** -0.06837***  
exporter -0.0141  -0.01437  -0.00279 
public 0.00245 -0.02546 0.00146 -0.05353*** -0.03273* 
privatized 0.05979*** 0.04462*** 0.05872*** 0.09741*** 0.03168** 
Yearly dummies  
1987 0.03663 0.02167 0.04636 0.03971 0.04331 
1988 0.04093 0.02978 0.04843* 0.043 0.04663 
1989 0.04487 0.03685 0.05385* 0.04651 0.0502 
1990 0.04388 0.03923 0.05179* 0.04346 0.05061* 
1991 0.04302 0.04518 0.05166* 0.04299 0.05024* 
1992 0.06589** 0.06233* 0.07552** 0.07427** 0.07345** 
1993 0.05340* 0.04671 0.06486** 0.06394** 0.06580** 
1994 0.05678* 0.04891 0.06710** 0.06620** 0.06985** 
1995 0.04841* 0.03532 0.06137** 0.05885* 0.06162* 
1996 0.05984* 0.06873** 0.07350*** 0.06922** 0.07373** 
1997 0.06770** 0.08210** 0.08074*** 0.07734** 0.07696** 
1998 0.00845 0.02481 0.01797 0.02114 0.01498 
1999 0.00325 0.01976 0.01335 0.01422 0.00947 
2000 0.0125 0.02721 0.01877 0.01949 0.01758 
2001 0.00551 0.02644 0.01093 0.0133 0.0123 
2002 -0.00171 0.00939 0.00815 0.00379 0.00632 
2003 -0.0064 0.00363 0.00166 -0.00157 -0.00055 
2004 -0.01588 -0.00516 -0.00796 -0.01284 -0.00887 
2005 -0.03196 -0.01358 -0.02598 -0.02722 -0.0195 
2006 -0.05891** -0.03911 -0.05184* -0.05467* -0.04561 
2007 -0.06488** -0.04065 -0.06643** -0.06425** -0.05797* 
2008 -0.0443 -0.02967 -0.05021* -0.04868* -0.03767 
2009 -0.05638* -0.04534 -0.05897** -0.05646* -0.04754* 
2010 -0.04411 -0.03316 -0.05200* -0.0461 -0.03626 
constant 0.76166*** 0.82020*** 0.77447*** 0.72210*** 0.80910*** 
Notes: 
lassets= log(assets);  oexptc= general and  administrated expenses/total expenses; roa= return on assets; tfp= total factor 
productivity;  wcr= working capital ratio; dry = production process dry;  north=region north ; exporter= firm is exporter ; public= 
ownership is public; privatized= ownership status privatized. 
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9.5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to examine the efficiency of labour use in the cement industry 
during a period of significant reform using data from 21 cement firms analysed over 
the period between 1986 and 2011.  A flexible translog functional form is used where 
demand for labour is a function of wages, a quasi-fixed input (in the form of capacity) 
and a time trend.  Of those inputs, labour demand elasticities are as expected, with the 
largest elasticity being observed with respect to wages.  Of output, positive labour 
demand is observed.    
 
The most interesting conclusions from this study are those that illustrate technical 
efficiency levels, and the way in which these efficiency levels have changed over 
time.  It was found that, on average, firms could have reduced their labour usage by 
13% with output remaining constant.  However, industry was generally experiencing 
decrease in labour use efficiency across the deregulation years of the study and in 
particular during 1999 to 2011, indicating that policies enacted in the 1990s to assist 
firms in the reduction of their labour use at least had a neutral effect or at best were 
reasonably not successful. This level of efficiency does not vary with firm size too.   
Among firms of different ownership types, it was found that private firms were the 
least efficient in terms of labour usage, followed by public and privatized firms 
respectively.  
 
It would appear that the significant deregulation reforms of the last 2 decade in 
economy helped some industries such as banking firms to some extent to reduce the 
degree of over-usage of labour but I am unable to say the same in case of cement 
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industry.  There exists, however, a fairly small degree of inefficiency in terms of 
labour usage, particularly among the very those firms who were privatized in 1991/92.   
It may be deemed that additional effort needs to be made to streamline these firms if 
the desired labour use efficiency gains are to be made. 
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 Reforms and Competition in the Cement Industry  
 
 
This chapter builds on existing literature by looking into level of competition in the 
cement industry during pre- and post privatization period by using a longer sample 
period (26 years). In my effort to test the allegations that producers association has 
formed a cartel, I use some widely used traditional competition indices alongside new 
indices of competition. These methods include simple indices such herfindhal index 
(H), top 3 firms market share measured by concentration index (C3), and firms mark-
up over marginal cost measured by price-cost margin (PCM). Regression based 
methods include estimation of competition index (), lerner index (LI) and Boone β. 
Subsequently, I link firms pricing decisions to their marginal and average costs (MC, 
AC) and net returns on assets/ investment (ROA).  
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10.1. Introduction 
 
Microeconomic theory postulate two extremes of environment in which firms operate 
namely perfect competition and monopoly. Perfect competition is normally 
considered the case for most of the empirical case studies unless there is strong case 
of otherwise. Under this environment, firms are price takers as an infinite number of 
firms operate without colluding in setting prices or output quantities. Hence, an 
infinitely large number of firms set price equal to marginal cost at the lowest level of 
long-run average cost.  By doing so, they could make some profit in the short term, 
but unable to do so in the long run. Hence, survival of the firms is dependent on 
operating at least at the minimum efficient scale. All those firms not able to do so 
would leave the industry in the long run. Hence, it becomes the case of survival of the 
fittest.  
 
Pure monopoly condition is opposite whereby firm is no more price taker and could 
make long term sustainable profit by setting price above of its marginal cost. Hence, if 
number of firms is not large enough, firms would have incentive to collude and keep 
earning economic profit, unless conditions change such as new firms entry or change 
in status quo through government policy such as deregulation and privatisation.    
 
There had been a significant effort in empirical industrial economics area to test these 
two extremes of the competitions using different industries data in developing as well 
as developed countries in response to change in regulatory policy and/or transfer of 
ownership as well as to investigate the claim of monopoly formation in different 
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countries. One of the early studies is by Douglas and Miller for the US airlines 
industry as early as 1974.  Lately, some authors tested the competition such as those 
by Cowan (1997), Oral and Mistikoglu (2005) and Ferarri and Guilietti (2005) for 
different industries including utilities (UK water industry), the Turkish brick industry 
and the Italian electricity industry respectively.  
 
The potential of forming a cartel in the cement manufacturing is high due to implicit 
entry barrier (partly due to high level of sunk cost i.e. in the form of initial investment 
of setting up plants and proximity to raw material such as limestone, clay and gypsum 
etc.), and thus cement industries across the world have found themselves subjected to 
a particularly high level of research interest [some of such studies carried out to find 
market power in this case include: Zeidan and Resende (2009) and Salvo (2010) for 
Brazil; Hu schelrath and Veith for Germany; Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001) 
for USA; Çelen and Gunalp (2010) for Turkey; Bejger (2012) for India; Steen and 
Sørgard (1999) for Norway; and Bejger (2011) for Poland]. 
 
In term of choice of methods to assess competition levels, there appears to be 
significant variations. Some studies in this regards have used Rosse-Panzar „H‟ 
statistic as the preferred methodology (examples of such studies include study by 
Molyneux et al. (1996) who assess levels of competition within the Japanese banking 
sector, cross country comparison by Bikker and Haaf (2002), and an examination of 
the Italian banking industry by Coccorese (2004)). Rosse-Panzar „H‟ statistic has been 
preferred methodology in examining competitive conditions of the banking industries 
due to relatively ease of estimation and comparatively less data requirements.   
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Some authors used more advance methods such as the structural model of competition 
and conjectural variations. Shaffer (1993), for example, looked to assess the levels of 
competition in the Canadian banking industry by measuring the relationship between 
marginal revenues and cost subject to a given level of output of the banks. Since then, 
lot of studies used this methodology to estimate the levels of competition in banking 
as well as non banking industries Shaffer alongside other authors estimated cost 
estimation to detect some interesting situations such as the presence of „super-
competition‟, referring to a situation in which firms produce more compare to 
competitive level and where marginal cost exceeds marginal revenue presumably to 
capture some market power in the future or to fully utilize excess capacity. 
Empirically, Gruben and McComb (2003) observed this situation in the Mexican 
banking industry after the privatization and other regulatory reforms were introduced.  
 
The underlying benefit of reforms alongside other advantages is the belief that these 
would supposedly lead to lower prices for consumers and greater levels of efficiency 
for the firms and thus make market structures more competitive. This chapter aims to 
establish whether or not the privatization and deregulation policy adopted by the 
government has made industry more competitive, through the estimation of 
competition indices by parametric as well as non-parametric methods.  
 
In the next sections, the study will review state of play in the Pakistani cement 
industry and then discuss the relevant work in the area of privatization/deregulation 
and its effect on competition. Subsequent sections then present the theoretical 
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underpinnings and methodology. Data sources and relevant variables are explained 
and empirical analysis part deals with estimation of different models. Finally, last 
section concludes the discussion. 
 
10.2. Competition in the Pakistani Cement Industry 
 
In common with many other industries, the cement industry in Pakistan has 
traditionally been subjected to heavy government intervention through nationalisation 
in 1970s and price setting by the state regulatory authority [State Cement Corporation 
of Pakistan (SCCP)], with a majority of firms operating under public ownership (only 
2 out of 14 during 1986-90 were privately owned). From the early 1990s, this 
composition began to reverse, with a series of reforms including privatization, 
deregulation coupled with incentives to private sector to set up cement manufacturing 
facilities. As a result of these reforms, there was a significant transfer of ownership 
from the public to the private sector in early 1990s, with individual firms being able to 
greater levels of control over the way in which they operate (for example, after the 
reforms, firms have had significantly greater control over setting capacity 
requirements and price). Alongside introducing aggressive marketing campaign and a 
streamlining of manpower, it is hoped that the long-term effects of these changes 
would be to increase the level of competition in the cement sector. 
 
After the reforms of early 1990s, there had been significant shift in the way now firms 
operate and set prices as per market conditions. Industry has added a significant 
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capacity in post reforms period. North region has seen a significant number of new 
firms entering the industry. Industry has also witnessed some mergers and 
acquisitions. Small size less profitable companies are being bought by larger players. 
Since 2003, the industry has also started exporting cement to neighbouring countries 
such as India, Afghanistan, Iran and UAE. Proponents of reforms and free market feel 
that industry has become very competitive over time and consumer are getting benefit 
through enhanced consumer surplus and availability of product round the year 
compare to those days when industry was predominantly operating under government 
ownership.  
 
However, there had been serious allegations of collusions and monopoly forming 
tactics as a result of establishment of a producer association called „All Pakistan 
Cement Manufacturing Association‟ (APCMA).  APCMA offices had been raided 
twice by the federal Investigative Agency (FIA) in the last few years to collect 
documentary evidence of any written agreements between producers in regard to 
prices or production quota. Monopoly Control Authority (now Competition 
Commission of Pakistan) carried out a detailed assessment of the industry to 
investigate collusion practices and concluded that commission was unable to prove 
that industry was operating under any sort of cartel or producers were colluding in 
setting prices or productions quotas. One such report in 2008 concluded: 
 
Cartel or Not? 
“At this point-in-time the Commission has not noted sufficient evidence to suggest 
there being one. The cartel question hence, remains an open one. After analysing 
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industry fundamentals the opinion of the commission is that the current price hike in 
cement could be the result of change in sector fundamentals affecting the demand and 
supply dynamics and due to commercial reasons. Nevertheless, the Commission 
cannot completely rule out the possibility that this across the board simultaneous price 
increase may have arisen from collusive behaviour of the incumbent cement 
producers”      
 
Although no documentary proof has been found by regulatory authorities but by 
looking at the concentrations ratios (see Table 10.1) one could feel that 40% of 
capacity is owned only by top 3 firms and remaining 60% is shared among other 
firms. However, even worse, this ratio is almost 50:50 for total assets. 
 
Table 10.1: Concentration Ratios for the Top 3 Firms  
(based on total assets and rated production capacity)  
 Assets Capacity 
Years CR3   CR3 
1987 0.33   0.38 
1990 0.36   0.36 
1997 0.42   0.34 
2003 0.42   0.33 
2008 0.47   0.44 
2011 0.48   0.41 
Source: own calculation 
 
10.3. Deregulation and Competition- Review of Literature  
 
A number of studies have found that changes in the way which certain industries are 
operated can have a positive effect upon financial and operational performance. Some 
early studies supported the positive impact of reforms i.e. Thompson, 1987, Vickers 
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and Yarrow, 1988, Bishop and Kay, 1989, Boardman and Vining, 1989,  Megginson, 
Nash and van Randenburgh, 1994, Galal et al., 1994, Boycko et al., 1995, Martin and 
Parker, 1995, Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, Shliefer, 1998, Boubakri and Cosset, 1998, 
and D‟Souza and Megginson, 1999. Since 2000, authors such as Shirley and Walsh 
(2000), Saal  and Parker (2000), Megginson and Netter (2001), Rossi (2001), Chirwa 
(2001), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), D‟Souza et al. (2002), Jones and Mygind 
(2002), Estache et al. (2002), Djankov and Murrell (2002), Wei and Varela (2003), 
Sun and Tong (2003), Cullinane and Song (2003), Li and Xu (2004), Chirwa (2004), 
Brown et al. (2006), Okten (2006), and Amess and Roberts (2007) also concluded that 
firms under private management performed better. The literature however, does not 
provide a clear indication of the extent to which reforms will enhance competition. 
Some of the studies relevant to the financial sector including the banking industry are 
summarised below.    
 
Yildirim and Mohanty (2010) investigated the effect of deregulation on the state-level 
competition in U.S. banking markets over the period 1976-2005. The study results 
confirm that the U.S. banks in general operated under monopolistic competition 
during the period examined. The study concluded that the U.S. banking industry have 
become less competitive due to rising market power of large size banks as a result of 
geographic deregulation. 
 
Ho (2010) looked at the ease of regulation effect on the banking industry in Hong 
Kong. Overall, the author found the positive role of deregulation whereby the industry 
has become more competitive and the consumers are better-off after the deregulation. 
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Empirical results also confirm the fact that the banking sector is operating under non-
cooperative competitive behaviour.  
 
Maudos and Solís (2011) looked at the role of deregulation in determining 
competition in the Mexican banking industry in the period 1993–2005. The empirical 
evidence pointed towards existence of monopolistic competition. The lerner index 
showed an increase in competition in loan market but decrease in the deposit market 
in post reforms period. Thus the study questioned the effectiveness of new regulatory 
regime when it comes to competition in the industry.  
 
Cetin and Benk (2011) evaluated the post deregulation effect on the competition in the 
Turkish airline industry. The study documented positive effect of policy on the 
competition that has started benefiting customers. 
 
Okoeguale (2012) studied 1996 deregulation policy on the US telecommunication 
industry. The author was able to find that deregulation increased merger activity by 
increasing competition. The authors concluded that “Deregulation opened both the 
local and long-distance telecom markets to competition from new communication 
technologies, resulting in a significant increase in IPO and merger activity”. 
 
Studies examining the level of competition in Pakistan have not been forthcoming. 
Most of the studies conducted so far are limited to financial sector such as banking 
industry. One of such study is by Khan (1998) which concluded an increase in the 
competition levels as a result of reforms introduced in early 1990s. The study also 
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noted that competition is on the rise, but still limited. In a study of cross country 
within the sub-continent, Perera et al. (2006) show that banking profits are earned 
under conditions of monopolistic competition. This study also looked into nature of 
banking business and concluded that in the case of Pakistani banking industry, fee 
earning business is more competitive, while for Indian banking interest earned on the 
traditional banking such as deposit taking and loan making is more competitive.  
 
This chapter builds on this existing literature by looking into level of competition in 
the cement industry during pre- and post privatization period by using a much longer 
sample period (26 years) than a majority of past studies. In my effort to evaluate the 
development of competition and test the allegations that producers association has 
formed a cartel, I use some widely used traditional competition indices alongside new 
indices of competition. These include traditional non-parametric methods such as 
herfindhal index (H), top 3 firms market share measured by concentration index (C3), 
and firms mark-up over marginal cost measured by price-cost margin (PCM). 
Parametric measures include estimation of competition index (), lerner index (LI) 
and Boone β. Subsequently, I relate firms pricing decisions to marginal and average 
costs (MC, AC) and net returns on assets/ investment (ROA).  
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10.3. Methodology 
 
There are a number of competing approaches to the assessment of competitive 
conditions. I use a series of different methodologies including simple ratios (non-
parametric) and more advanced regression to observe the level of competition in the 
industry. The calculation of non-parametric indices is simple and is well documented 
and therefore do not needed to be explained in greater detail here but in the following, 
I discuss parametric methods and subsequently use these methods on the cement 
industry.     
 
10.3.1 Estimation of Competition Index () by Demand and Supply  
 
I follow the methodology of Shaffer (1993), which will briefly be outlined below. 
Assuming that the goal of a firm is to maximise profit, I will also assume that firms 
objective is to meet the profit maximising condition, where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. Under conditions of perfect competition, the firm‟s marginal revenue 
would be equal to its average revenue, or price.  Hence, the firm would continue to 
increase production until their marginal cost was equal to the output price.  Under 
conditions of relative imperfection, where the firm‟s own actions have some effect 
upon the market price, marginal revenue is divergent from price. In accordance with 
Bresnahan (1982), the firm‟s demand function can be written as Q = D (P,Y,  ) +    
and true marginal revenue function with semi elasticity of demand is MR= P+ 
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h(Q,Y, ) = P+Q/( ΔQ/ΔP), where P is the product price, Q is the aggregate output, Y 
is a vector of exogenous variables and   is a vector of estimated demand parameters.   
 
However, the firm‟s perceived marginal revenue function is MRp= P+λh(Q,Y, ), 
where 0    1 is new parameter that could be estimated and represents distinction 
between demand and marginal revenue.  The  term is included to represent the 
degree to which individual firms are aware of the divergence of average revenue (or 
price) from marginal revenue. If I assume c(Q, W, β) firms‟ marginal cost function 
then profit maximising firm is likely to set perceived marginal revenue equal to 
marginal cost such as: P = c(Q,W,β) -λh(Q,Y,  ) + η. When  is zero, firms behaves 
as if the two are identical (hence indicating that the firm at least believes that it is 
perfectly competitive, and therefore sets price equal to marginal cost).  When  is 
equal to one, it indicates a perfect understanding of the separation of price from 
marginal revenue, and is indicative of monopolist behaviour, or a collusive 
oligopolies.  The closeness of the actual value of  to either of these two competitive 
extremes indicates the relative extent to which firms believe themselves to be 
operating in different competitive conditions.  In that way  can be seen as an index of 
market power.   
 
Elementary economic theory also suggests that industry output will be lower and price 
higher under conditions of monopoly, as compared to the perfectly competitive 
alternative.  The extent to which, industry price and output deviates from conditions 
of perfect competition can be approximated by the inverse of the λ value.  Market 
                                                          Chapter 10 
                                                                    Reforms and Competition  
  263 
 
price deviates from competitive price by –λQ/(ΔQ/ΔP), while the deviation in 
quantity is determined by dividing the competitive output by ΔQ/ΔP, multiplied by 
the deviation in price.   
 
The key to the methodology, therefore, is the accurate calculation of .  The first step 
in the calculation of this term is a demand function representative of the true demand 
curve.  I approximate my demand function as: 
 
Q =  0 +  1P +  2Y +  3PZ +  4Z +  5PY +  6 YZ + e   (1) 
 
Where Q is the quantity of outputs (quantity of cement produced and sold), P is the 
respective price of cement sold per ton (total sales divided by total quantity sold), Y is 
approximated by demand enhancing economic activity (development expenditure as a 
% of GDP), Z is proxy for substitute of cement (due to the fact that there is no perfect 
substitute of cement, I use construction activity) and e is the residual or error term.  I 
had a choice of using either GDP growth rate or the development expenditure 
indicators. But based on the fact that a significant portion of demand for cement is 
determined by the government spending on the roads, buildings and defence housing 
and infrastructure, I use this proxy. Based on different government priorities in the 
past, higher level of GDP growth could not lead to higher demand for cement. But 
higher level of development would almost lead to higher demand for cement. The 
multiplicative terms PZ, PY and YZ are included to estimate  through the rotation of 
the demand curve.   
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The second stage in the estimation of  is a marginal cost function obtained through a 
translog cost function as follows: 
 
LnC = β0 + β1 lnQ + β2 (lnQ)
2
 + β3 lnW1 + β4 lnW2 + β5 lnW3+ + β6 lnW4  +0.5*β7ln 
(W1)
2
 + 0.5*β8 ln(W2)
2 
 +0.5*β9ln(W3)
2
 + 0.5*β10ln(W4)
2
 +β11lnW1 lnW2 +β12 
lnW1 lnW3 +β13 lnW1 lnW4 +β14 lnW2 lnW3 +β15 lnW2 lnW4+β16 lnW3 lnW4 + β17 
lnQ lnW1 + β18 lnQ lnW2+ β19 lnQ lnW3 + β20 lnQ lnW4+e                                                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                               (2) 
 
LnC in the above represents log of total cost (including production, distribution and 
admin etc.), while lnW1, lnW2, lnW3, lnW4 are exogenous input prices (log of yearly 
employees wage rates, price of furnace oil, price of electricity, bag and price of 
limestone per ton).  Fifth input price (price of bag) is used to impose homogeneity in 
input prices. The implied marginal cost function is therefore as follows: 
 
MC = [C/Q] [b1 + b2 lnQ +b3 lnW1 + b4 lnW2+ b5 lnW3+ b6 lnW4]   (3) 
 
With these two equations in place (1 & 3), the calculation of  can be attempted. The 
supply relation is estimated from above equation, assuming a degree of market power 
(and hence influence over price) as well as profit maximisation on the part of the 
firms concerned.   
 
P = -λQ / [a1 + a3Z + a5Y] + [C/Q] [b1 + b2 lnQ +b3 lnW1 + b4 lnW2+ b5 lnW3+ b6     
lnW4] – b7 DQ / [a1 + a3 Z + a5 Y] + μ      (4) 
                                                          Chapter 10 
                                                                    Reforms and Competition  
  265 
 
 
Where μ represents the error or residual term, while D a dummy variable to represent 
post reforms period (dummy variable =1 for the post deregulation period 1990 
onward).  is calculated from the above equation, representing a measure of market 
power, where the value for firms operating under conditions of monopoly or collusive 
oligopoly should be higher than that of more competitive market conditions.   
 
 
 
10.3.2 Estimation of Lerner Index: Conjectural Variation (CV)  
 
In this regard, I follow the methodology developed by Iwata (1974) in which the 
parameters from a firm‟s behavioural equation are estimated. The methodology 
assumes that all firms seek to maximise profits and determine market prices and the 
levels of output based on the costs and the degree of competition. Let say qj represents 
the output of firm j,  j = 1, 2, … m and  ∑j qj = Q (the output for the entire industry). 
The inverse demand function is specified as p =  (   ), where   is a vector of 
exogenous variables that have some effect upon demand. In addition, let Cj = C(qj, ωj) 
be the cost function for firm j, where ωj is the vector of the prices of inputs employed 
by firm j. Firms therefore try to maximise profit levels by solving the following 
equation:  
    
                                         (5) 
 
Where, the first order condition which corresponds to the above is given as: 
    
         
  
 
                                    (6) 
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This first order condition can be decomposed into two separate parts.  The first 
corresponds to the cost element of equation (5) and the second is intended to measure 
the degree to which the market deviates from perfect competition. Conjectural 
elasticity (θj) of total industry output with respect to the output of the j
th 
firm is 
defined as: 
 
    
      
    
 ,                                                  (7) 
where    is the market demand semi-elasticity such as:   
 
    
     
 
                                                 (8) 
 
As the objective is to estimate the overall degree of market power within the industry, 
the estimation of the ratio λ ≡ -θj /  is sufficient in order to calculate the learner index.   
 
Dividing lambda by the average price in the industry, I get lerner index (LI) ≡ λ/p, LI 
 [0, 1] measuring the relative mark-up of price over marginal cost (Appelbaum, 
1982).  Equation (6) is estimated simultaneously alongside a total cost function where 
as mentioned above, the production technology is assumed to be based on five inputs 
and their prices (labour, furnace oil, electricity, limestone and paper bag). I also 
include time dummies in the cost function to capture the economic cycles and time 
effects. To preserve the degrees of freedom, I use twelve time dummies, each one 
covering two years while, treating the years 1986 and 1987, base category. The 
translog specification for such a cost function, would take the form:  
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                                                                                                                    (9)  
 
Equations (6) and (9) are then estimated, with the latter re-written as:  
 
   
   
  
                             
 
   
                 
 
 
                                                                                                        (10) 
 
Where, on the right hand side of the equation (10), the first term reflects marginal cost 
(MC), and the parameters λg attached to time dummies variables appearing in the last 
summation operator captures the potential sources of market power or premium over 
marginal cost. Similar to previous exercise, I impose the homogeneity of input prices 
by dividing the input prices and total cost by my fifth input price (price of bag). 
Subsequently, regression coefficients are used to estimate marginal cost and lerner 
index.  
 
 
10.3.3 Estimation of Lerner Index: Stochastic Frontier (SF)  
 
Cost function estimation above assumes that firms try to minimise cost with respect to 
output and input prices. But not all firms are likely to achieve this and that this could 
introduce optimisation error and should be taken into account when estimating 
                                                          Chapter 10 
                                                                    Reforms and Competition  
  268 
 
marginal cost and mark-ups. Recently, some authors such as Kumbhakar (2012) and 
Coccorse (2012) addressed the optimisation error issue by introducing an error term in 
the regression model and use the well established stochastic frontier to estimate mark-
ups. I follow their approach and recalculate the lerner index. Depending upon market 
conditions, profit maximising firm generally setup price (P) either equal or greater 
than marginal cost (MC): 
P   MC                                                           (11) 
 
The distance between P and MC determine the market power and level of competition 
in the industry. Higher and rising distance between price and marginal cost would 
indicate gaining of market by the firms. Lerner index (LI) measured by the divergence 
of price and marginal cost could be expressed by a ratio such as:   
   
    
 
                                                         (12) 
 
By multiplying (11) with the ratio of output (q) to total cost (TC), I get 
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
                                                    (13) 
 
Price multiplied by quantity yield total revenues (TR) and the ratio Pq/TC could be 
interpreted as revenue to cost share (Rit). Similarly, right hand side could be 
interpreted as cost elasticity of output by taking derivative of total cost with respect to 
output (in log form). Hence equation (13) above could be replaced with the following:   
     
     
    
                                                       (14) 
 
Equation (14) is converted into equality by adding a non-negative (one sided) error 
term uit and a symmetric two side error term (vit) to account for unobserved factors, 
                                                          Chapter 10 
                                                                    Reforms and Competition  
  269 
 
(Kumbhakar et al. 2012, p.114). By adding these two error terms, above equation can 
be reformulated to: 
     
     
    
                                            (15) 
 
Equation (15) could be considered classical example of stochastic frontier where firm 
unobserved effects are accommodated by vit and market power (mark-ups) by one 
sided error term uit. By using the cost function of equation (9) and differentiating with 
respect to q and substituting into equation (15), I get the following estimable 
equations: 
   
     
    
                        
 
   
           
                                                                    (16),  
and 
   
                             
 
   
          
                                                              (17)      
 
By using the appropriate distributional form of uit, I could obtain an index of market 
power such as: 
    
  
 = 
   
     
    
 =                                                         (18) 
 
From above, traditional lerner index (LI) is estimated by the following
39
: 
     
   
       
                                                           (19) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39
 For algebraic manipulation and detail of estimation strategy, see Kumbhakar et al. (2012). 
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10.3.4 Relative Profit: Estimation of Boone β 
  
Another indicator of competition proposed by Griffith et al. (2005) and developed 
further by Boone (2008) is relative profit or more commonly known Boone β. This 
measure is based on the relative efficiency hypothesis where some firms earn higher 
profit because they are more efficient. Hence some firms earn more profit because of 
lower marginal cost at the expense of firms with high marginal cost. This measure is 
based on the idea that higher competition helps in transferring assets and power from 
the least efficient to efficient firms. An increase in competition could force some 
firms to leave the industry, and thus, increase either in concentration index; herfindhal 
index or price-cost margin could be a result of re-allocation of resources. Hence, rise 
in above indices could give wrong signal of decrease in competition. Boone indicator 
is considered more robust and overcomes many of the issues of traditional indicators 
and focuses on the conduct of the firms rather than outcome of the competitive 
conduct. Following Boone (2008), I could characterise Boone model for firm i at time 
t as: 
it= α + β (cit) + uit   ,                                       (20) 
 
Where it is variable profit (calculated as revenues – variable cost) for firm i at time t, 
β is referred to as Boone indicator and cit is marginal cost. By following Boone 
(2008), average variable cost could be approximated by cost of goods sold divided by 
net sale (sales net of indirect taxes) in place of marginal cost due to the fact that 
marginal cost is not directly available and have to be estimated. An increase in cost 
reduces profit generally, but in more competitive environment, inefficient firms are 
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punished more heavily and their profit should get reduced more. Following Schaeck 
and Cihák (forthcoming), β indicator could be estimated by the following: 
                                
   
    
    
 
    
 
                                                                      (21) 
 
I use profit and cost in log form. To normalise with respect to the size of the firm, 
variable profit (it) could be expressed as a proportion of assets. T is total number of 
periods (years); and d is time dummies. Time dummies are interacted with cost to get 
year specific estimates. A higher value of β compared to a base period would indicate 
an increase in competition and vice versa. 
 
10.4. Data 
 
Panel data reflecting a variety of variables is taken from a variety of sources, covering 
the period 1986 – 2011.  The data set used by this study encompasses a much wider 
time period of post reform than most other such studies on the development in 
competition during post reforms regimes. To my knowledge no similar study focusing 
on developing countries have been able to obtain comprehensive data on a time period 
of this length. The significant periods of time I have highlighted both pre- and post 
reform can be found in Table 10.2 below. 
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Table 10.2: Policy Reforms in Industrial Sector  
Period                    Classification 
1986 – 1989 Pre-reform Period 
1990  Very early reform period, creating the framework for later developments 
1991 – 1996 1st phase of reform – includes privatization in cement industry and entry of new firms 
operating under private sector 
1997 - 2003 2nd phase of reforms and privatization including establishing regulatory framework  
 
Data on cement industry firms were obtained from the company annual reports, 
Karachi stock exchange, APCMA, Competition Commission of Pakistan, Expert 
Advisory Cell (Ministry of Production and Industries, Government of Pakistan), 
brokerage houses in Karachi, company websites, through the exploitation of personal 
contacts with authors in the field who have obtained such data for use in previous 
studies and many others.  
 
The final panel dataset used in this study comprises information of 21 firms and 26 
years. The variables used, as well as their descriptive statistics, can be found in Table 
10.3 below. 
Table 10.3: Variables Description and Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Q: Quantity (mill tons) 730 860 2 6552 
TC: Total Cost (mill Rs.) 1660 1144 64 7858 
Y: Development Expenditure (%)
40
 4.46 1.58 2.13 7.73 
Z: Construction Growth (%) 3.74 8.29 -11.17 24.35 
P: Selling Price (Rs. Per ton) 4076 1165 2389 13642 
W1: Wages (Rs. Per annum) 182321 60352 46321 403397 
W2: Furn. Oil Price (Rs. Per ton) 9373 2202 6247 14079 
W3: electricity Price (Rs.  per KW)               3.82               1.26           2.04              5.64 
W4: Limestone Price (Rs. Per ton) 81 21 40 117 
 
                                                 
40
 Given the importance of this variable I scaled up Y by 1000 at the estimation stage (equation (1) to 
get precise estimates of this important determinant of demand.   
                                                          Chapter 10 
                                                                    Reforms and Competition  
  273 
 
As a preliminary analysis I constructed a herfindahl index of competition by time 
period, the results of which can be seen below in Table 10.4.  I constructed this index 
by using three different measures i.e. total assets, rated capacity and sales volume 
.The index does not suggests that there is an increase or decrease in competition 
during the years following the initiation of reforms in 1992. It would appear that the 
index value is not high and hence could indicate that there is less presence of 
concentration. The stability in the index though indicating no change in the status quo 
but contrarily, could also be suggestion of cartel members agreeing on the market 
share and maintaining throughout the sample period. These initial observations based 
on just descriptive statistics are useful but more detailed assessment is carried out by 
estimating competition index (λ), lerner index and some other popular indicators of 
competition. 
 
Table 10.4: Herfindahl Indices 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Assets 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 
Capacity 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
Sales 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 
        
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Assets 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 
Capacity 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 
Sales 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 
        
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Assets 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.12 
Capacity 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11 
Sales 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
        
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011   
Assets 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12   
Capacity 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.11   
Sales 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12   
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10.5. Estimation and Explanation 
 
Equation (1) and the (4) are jointly estimated using 2SLS non-linear full information 
maximum likelihood method. The results of which can be found below in Table 10.5. 
I estimated different specification models by selecting different time periods for 
reforms to take effect such as 1990 (very early period before initiation of 
privatization), 1993: immediate year of first phase of post privatization, 1995: after 
three years of privatization and 1998: start of second phase of privatization. In the last 
attempt, I portioned the reforms periods into two sub-periods (first: 1990 to 2003 and 
second, 2004 to 2011) to observe any divergence between these two post reforms 
periods in term of prices and output. 
       
Similar to other empirical studies in estimating the cost function, I imposed 
homogeneity in input prices. My theoretical expectations are generally confirmed with 
price coefficient negative (a1 < 0 and statistically significant), income coefficient 
(development expenditure) positive a2 > 0, substitute coefficient negative a4 < 0 (for 
most of the models estimated) and downward slope demand curve = a1 + a3z + a5Y < 
0. Further, for the identification of λ, either a3 or a5 should be significant. In my case, 
a3 coefficient is statistically significant as well a5 in some models. 
 
Starting with my base model (column 2 & 3), overall, models fits the data well given 
the fact that I am using disaggregated individual firms level data; twelve of the fifteen 
coefficients are statistically significant and the λ is estimated 0.02, with a standard 
error of 0.01.  This indicates a statistically significant index of competition and an 
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overall some market power. As the coefficient is statistically different from zero, I do 
reject the null hypothesis that the cement industry operates under conditions of perfect 
competition. Interestingly though, as the λ value is relatively much closer to zero than 
to one, I can be certain that the coefficient is not equivalent to one, which would have 
indicated the firms operating under the conditions of pure monopoly. Due to very low 
value of index, I can therefore conclude that the competitive conditions are not 
completely imperfect and industry does operated relatively, competitively over the 
whole sample period. This result is consistent with APCMA version and Competition 
Commission of Pakistan.  
 
Next, I re-estimated the above model by introducing a shift dummy, similar to Gruben 
(2003), to note any divergence from competitive conditions in post deregulation and 
privatization period. An indication of statistically significant positive λ in post 
deregulation period would indicate the divergence from competitive conditions. I 
included a dummy variable =1 for period 1993 onward and 0 otherwise. Results of 
this exercise are reported in Table 10.5 (column 6 & 7). 
 
Similar to above, the model fits the data well with only three coefficients 
insignificant. Substitute variable coefficient, though have wrong sign and significant. 
My point of interest variable λ and λdereg are both significant. Positive λ indicate 
industry operating under competitive structure with some market power before 
privatization. Negative  λ in post 1993 is an indication of excess capacity and excess 
supply as compared to what is determined by marginal revenues and marginal cost 
(marginal cost exceeding marginal revenue). This is not surprising results given the 
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fact that financial performance of these privatized companies generally and industry 
particularly was not encouraging in post privatization period (see chapter on financial 
performance).  
 
Combing λ and λdereg together, I get the structure where some market power is being 
exercised by these firms (similar to base model). The value of -λdereg > 0 is also an 
indication that due to some reason producers are producing and supplying output 
more than competitive level. Added capacities has put extra pressure on the supplier 
to produce more to meet interest payments on funds borrowed from banks and other 
financial institution. 
 
To further explore this, I re-estimated the model whereby, I introduced two shift 
dummy variables for two post reforms period. Dummy variable =1 for the period 
1990 - 2003, and 0 otherwise. Another dummy variable =1 for the period 2004 to 
2011 and 0 otherwise. This exercised is carried out to see any changes in competitive 
conditions in two separate periods i.e. immediately after reforms (first 10 years of 
reforms period) and then in subsequent years. λ value in this formulation is positive 
and statistically significant (column 12 & 13). This again is evidence that industry is 
operating under competitive condition. The first shift dummy in this case (λdereg) 
captures period 1990 – 2003, and indicates a decrease in competition, and the 
coefficient is statistically different from zero. The second shift interactive term 
(λdereg1) suggests a degree of excess capacity over the period 2004 onward and is 
statistically significant.  This seems to indicate that, in the latter part of reforms period 
there was a significant capacity addition that forced firms to operate at more output 
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compare to competitive level. Interestingly, a significant part of this output was 
exported to neighbouring countries. The sum of λ and the interactive shift coefficient 
(λdereg and λdereg1) provides a degree of post-1990 percentage deviation of 
aggregate output from the competitive equilibrium level regardless of functional form 
of demand and supply (Shaffar (1993); page 58, footnote 9). This figure is 31% less 
than competitive level. 
 
 
Overall, my final model indicates a decrease in competitive conditions and thus 
industry has started moving away from perfect condition but for way from monopoly. 
Consistent with profit maximising firm behaviour, firms could move to long term 
equilibrium condition. This adjustment period for Canadian banks had been suggested 
10 years (Shaffar (1993) and Raj et al. (1979)). 
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      Table 10.5: Full Estimation Maximum Likelihood 2SLS Estimates of Competition Index () 
 Base Model Reforms Effect: 1990 Reforms Effect: 1993 Reforms Effect: 1995 Reforms Effect: 1998 Reforms Effect: 1990-
2003, 2004-11 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Parameter Estimate Approx Std 
Err 
Estimate Approx 
Std Err 
Estimate Approx Std 
Err 
Estimate Approx Std 
Err 
Estimate Approx Std 
Err 
Estimate Approx 
Std Err 
Demand Equation 
a0 1.749435** 0.5805 1.442654** 0.5468 1.403855** 0.6343 1.172164** 0.5797 1.120868* 0.6153 2.671119*** 0.706 
a1 -0.000720*** 0.000117 -0.00052*** 0.000113 -0.00064*** 0.000123 -0.00051*** 0.00011 -0.00063*** 0.000115 -0.00096** 0.000123 
a2 0.000028** 9.07E-06 2.54E-06 0.000011 0.000034*** 9.97E-06 4.88E-06 0.000012 0.000039*** 9.95E-06 0.000018* 0.000011 
a3 0.000051*** 3.47E-06 -0.00005*** 4.7E-06 0.000049*** 3.58E-06 -0.00005*** 4.57E-06 0.000049*** 3.47E-06 0.00006*** 3.71E-06 
a4 -0.21911*** 0.0274 0.19658*** 0.0282 -0.20928*** 0.0284 0.189412*** 0.0274 -0.18853*** 0.0279 -0.26178*** 0.0297 
a5 -5.87E-09*** 1.74E-09 -1.7E-11 2.64E-09 -7.1E-09*** 1.82E-09 -1.6E-10 2.56E-09 -7.2E-09*** 1.64E-09 -3.4E-09** 1.76E-09 
a6 3.70E-07 5.94E-07 -3.6E-07 5.58E-07 3.07E-07 6.05E-07 -2.6E-07 5.55E-07 -1.9E-07 6.09E-07 5.2E-07 6.53E-07 
a7 0.329778 0.2306 -0.14629 0.1965 0.348286 0.2313 0.016368 0.1877 0.473605** 0.1566 0.428773 0.2602 
Supply Equation 
 0.020397** 0.0107 0.056571 0.0679 0.145747** 0.0576 0.015994 0.072 0.149719* 0.086 0.263543*** 0.0774 
b1 3.550252*** 0.2784 3.201444*** 0.337 3.825612*** 0.355 3.079766*** 0.333 3.752331*** 0.3425 4.52352*** 0.4525 
b2 0.226618*** 0.00904 0.211572*** 0.0098 0.230195*** 0.0101 0.209055*** 0.00945 0.225583*** 0.00933 0.229457*** 0.011 
b3 -0.11298*** 0.0267 -0.10859*** 0.0273 -0.14641*** 0.0305 -0.11026** 0.0422 -0.14808*** 0.0438 -0.22108*** 0.0386 
b4 -0.12159* 0.0652 -0.13195** 0.0603 -0.20377** 0.0805 -0.12691* 0.0731 -0.1696** 0.076 -0.14194** 0.0706 
b5 0.075506 0.0764 0.011336 0.0831 0.11866 0.0813 0.01336 0.086 0.129461 0.0987 0.046675 0.0888 
b6 -0.14301*** 0.0333 -0.09977** 0.0384 -0.16479*** 0.0409 -0.08633** 0.0344 -0.15387*** 0.0363 -0.15248** 0.0497 
dereg   -0.03858 0.0668 -0.12839** 0.0577 0.001358 0.0736 -0.13308 0.0874 0.27979*** 0.0571 
dereg1           -0.23307** 0.0768 
Models Statistics  
Adj. R2             
Q 0.3423  0.3366  0.3456  0.3395  0.3627  0.2931  
P 0.4493  0.4514  0.4323  0.4570  0.4229  0.3287  
Notes: *** significant at =<1% significance level 
            **    significant at =<5% significance level 
            *      significant at >5% significance level 
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Table 10.6 shows the estimates of six different competition measures (three each for 
non-parametric and parametric methods). I start with widely used traditional non-
parametric measure of competition herfindhal index (H). This measure indicates no 
change in the competition in post reforms period. A marginal increase in competition 
immediately after reforms was offset by a decrease during 2007 to 2011. 
Concentration index (C3) approximated by top three firms‟ market share also depicts 
the similar trend. Third measure I use is price cost margin (weighted as well as un-
weighted) indicate decrease in competition during post de-regulation period.  
 
Table 10.6 displays average prices and cost alongside marginal cost using regression 
coefficient of CV model. Some interesting trends could be spotted. Firstly, average 
prices during the sample period remained roughly same with the exception of the 
period 1994 to 1999, when prices declined from Rs. 4500 to Rs. 3900 per tonne. By 
looking at the average and marginal cost though, one could easily observe that cost of 
producing cement has been declining continuously since the mid 1990s. This could be 
better explained by firms using more advanced technology (dry process) as well as 
developments in competitive conditions. 
 
It seems that by ignoring the magnitude, the lerner indices have been rising since the 
time deregulation and privatisation was implemented irrespective of index measured 
by CV or stochastic frontier.  Hence, firms as a whole charged for more than marginal 
cost since privatisation and deregulation. Particularly, since 1999, increase in lerner 
index (decrease in competition) has been steep. This is interesting given the fact that 
decrease in the marginal costs had not been passed on to the consumers. Boone beta 
index that is considered more robust compared to lerner index also confirms the 
similar findings. One criticism of Boone beta is the assumption of constant marginal 
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(average variable cost) with respect to change in output. As a robustness check, I use 
marginal cost derived from CV model and recalculated beta for pre and post 
deregulation/privatisation period. My beta coefficients values were 0.974 for 1986-91, 
0.703 for 1992-99, 0.655 for 1999-11, 0.492 for 1999-06 and 0.686 for 1992-11. 
Hence, ignoring the magnitude of coefficients, conclusions seem to be the same that 
competition levels have decreased over time. 
 
Table 10.6 also depicts industry profitability measured through return on assets 
(ROA). Since 1995, with the exception of 2004 to 2006, profitability has been 
declining and firms had earned smaller margins on investments. This could be due to 
two reasons. Firstly, a significant investment has been made to upgrade the old 
equipments and machinery and, to add capacities to meet local and export demand.  
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Table 10.6: Estimation of Competitive Conditions (Other Indices) 
 
H C3 PCM WPCM 
LI 
(CV) 
LI 
(SF ) 
Boone 
β 
(2005) 
MC AC ROA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1986-87 0.097 0.392 0.556 0.574       
1988-89 0.087 0.350 0.569 0.567 0.347 0.135 3.327 3339 3623 8.813 
1990-91 0.085 0.352 0.540 0.553 0.297 0.139 2.384 3470 3685 3.833 
1992-93 0.081 0.319 0.587 0.614 0.356 0.138 1.810 3151 3334 9.448 
1994-95 0.083 0.328 0.613 0.646 0.343 0.132 1.123 3348 3793 10.604 
1996-97 0.072 0.291 0.607 0.629 0.418 0.149 2.724 2253 2611 -1.073 
1998-99 0.076 0.324 0.581 0.616 0.367 0.166 2.437 2273 2704 -5.122 
2000-01 0.078 0.352 0.545 0.579 0.427 0.176 2.315 2326 2677 -1.851 
2002-03 0.074 0.339 0.572 0.605 0.452 0.185 2.233 2198 2497 0.149 
2004-05 0.078 0.352 0.582 0.612 0.518 0.188 1.545 1891 2162 8.965 
2006-07 0.096 0.424 0.522 0.575 0.443 0.184 1.316 2049 2252 5.367 
2009-09 0.104 0.451 0.435 0.492 0.447 0.193 2.003 2330 2550 -0.859 
2010-11 0.114 0.491 0.381 0.451 0.532 0.210 1.656 1794 2005 -1.796 
1986-91 0.090 0.365 0.555 0.564 0.322 0.137 2.856 3405 3654 6.323 
1992-98 0.077 0.308 0.599 0.626 0.371 0.146 2.023 2756 3110 3.464 
1999-06 0.079 0.356 0.571 0.605 0.441 0.180 1.969 2147 2458 1.502 
2007-11 0.109 0.467 0.418 0.482 0.474 0.196 1.658 2058 2269 0.904 
1992-11 0.086 0.367 0.542 0.582 0.430 0.172 1.916 2361 2658 2.383 
Notes:  
1) H: Herfindhal index (total assets) defined as  
    
 
   
 
.  
2) C3= Market share of top 3 firms. 
3) PCM= 
 
                   
     
 
   
 
  
4) WPCM is weighted PCM (weights are determined by market shares of total assets).  
5) LI (CV) = 
 
 
 . λ is estimated by using system of two simultaneous equations using the three stage least 
square (3SLS). The instruments used are gdp growth rates, government development expenditures, 
central bank discount rates, total population, construction sector growth rates, quantity of cement sold 
by each firm, square of quantity of cement sold, input prices (furnace oil prices, coal prices, limestone 
prices, labour wages), interaction of quantity of cement sold and input prices, public, age of the firm, 
value of cement export of each firm, 12 time dummies (t88-89 to t10-11).  
6) LI (SF) = Lerner index calculated using the formula LI = θ/(1+ θ). See text for detail and Kumbhakar 
et al. (2012). Equation (18) is estimated using panel data time-invariant fixed-effects model (least square 
dummy variable approach). 
7) Boone β (2005) is calculated by regressing the cost ratio (cost of goods sold (cogs) to net sales) on 
profit (net sales – cogs). Both variables are in logs. Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation 
method used by interacting yearly time dummies with cost ratio. Time dummies also included as 
independent variables. One lag of profit included as a regressor to account for dynamic effect. This is 
similar to Schaeck and Cihák (forthcoming). 
8) MC = Marginal cost (Pak. Rs. per tonne) derived from CV model. 
9) AC = Average total cost (Pak. Rs. per tonne) calculated by dividing total cost by total cement 
dispatched (sold in tonnes) 
10) ROA = Return on assets (%) by dividing net profit after tax by total assets.    
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This has certainly increased the value of fixed assets and consequently total assets 
significantly. Secondly, due to the way, I have calculated the Lerner index; some costs 
are not accounted for, such as cost of capital (interest paid on bank loans) and 
depreciations etc.  
 
Furthermore, ROA is net return on assets after deducting all government levies and 
taxes (directly and indirectly). An increase in the government share from the total pie 
could leave less residual left to be distributed/kept to the shareholders. Figure 10.1 
shows tax payments of the industry during the sample period. It is apparent from the 
figure, that government had been the main beneficiary. Tax receipts of the 
governments have been rising since 1996.          
 
Figure 10.1: Total Taxes (Pak. Rs. billions) Paid by the Cement Industry   
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10.6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to test for the presence of competition in the cement industry 
over the period between 1986 and 2011.  The competition index (λ) alongside lerner 
index and other non-parametric indices are estimated to test for the market power of 
the average firm when the market is in Cournot equilibrium. The interactive shift 
dummies terms were included to test for changes in the level of competition over 
time.  The estimates of λ from varying model specifications indicate that to a greater 
or lesser extent, the cement sector is operating under conditions of near monopolistic 
competition in post reform. It should, however, be noted that the precise estimate of λ 
places the level of competition slightly nearer to the perfectly competitive structure 
during 1990 to 2003 and then had moved away to long term equilibrium.  Indeed, for 
one of the model specifications used (that did not feature any time shift dummies) it 
was not possible to reject the hypothesis that the cement sector was almost perfectly 
competitive. Based on other indicators, though one gets the message that the 
deregulation and privatization measures introduced by the government in the early 
1990s have at least partly made industry relatively less competitive over time and 
there are signals of firms gaining market power. 
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CHAPTER 11 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents the main findings, highlights the issues not addressed in this 
study and provides future directions of research 
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11.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this study changes in the operation and behaviour of firms as a result of 
deregulation and privatization introduced since early 1990s. This exercise was aimed 
to provide useful information and provide a direction for policy makers, government, 
investors, competitors and general public in the area of industrial 
economics/management and evaluation of policy reforms and its effect on the 
individual firms and industry.  
   
In order to achieve these objectives the study carried a detailed and careful analysis of 
the operational performance of the industry generally and privatized firms 
particularly. Sample is divided into two sub-periods covering the period of 1986-91, a 
public ownership or pre- reforms period, and 1992-2011, a private ownership period 
or post reforms period. The main consideration in this analysis was to observe 
significant changes in the management of resources as a result of change of ownership 
from public to private sector. A significant effort was made to distinguish the 
industry/macroeconomic effects from ownership effects.  
 
A lot of studies in this area, authors looked at either firms‟ efficiency/productivity 
analysis, or financial performance or cost benefit analysis through social accounting 
framework in some earlier studies. This study aim was to narrate a complete story 
rather than bits and pieces. The study carried out the analysis for overall industry, 
privatized firms, private firm and public sector firms. The robustness of the ownership 
effects is checked by comparing the trend in performance of privatized firms 
(predominantly those firms privatized in early 1990s) with those firms, which 
remained under public ownership till the time they privatized (by 2003, all public 
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sector firms were privatized) and the firms starting operation under private ownership 
and remained in private sector throughout the sample period. A non-parametric test is 
used to test the statistical differences in performance of pre- and post reforms periods 
(in evaluation of financial performance).  
 
The study is able to provide information on the following broad issues in pre- and 
post change of ownership time periods including: 
 
 Financial performance 
 Social costs and benefits 
 Resource management in term of efficient use of inputs and changes in total 
factor productivity 
 Adjustments in labour uses 
 Competition conditions and gaining of market power in post reforms period 
 
In the remaining part of this chapter, the main results from the empirical investigation 
will be summarised and areas for future research in the field will be highlighted. 
 
11.2. Summarising the Discussion 
 
The first step in the performance evaluation process was to define a suitable criterion 
of performance measurement. The debate and controversy regarding performance 
evaluation of public and private ownership is still alive in the empirical economics 
literature due to differences in objectives of two ownership structures and lack of 
consensus on performance measurement criteria. This study appreciated the utility of 
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different methods to assess the performance of firms and used them in at appropriate 
places.  
 
The study starting point was assessment of qualitative changes and evaluation of 
commercial profitability and operating efficiency. Different financial ratios deduced 
from the empirical literature predominantly from Megginson et al. (1994) work were 
used in this regard. Hypothesis regarding profitability, efficiency, capital investment 
and outputs were tested. In the second stage, accounting information is rearranged 
into economic relevant numbers. This resulted in calculation of public profit and 
profitability. An adjustment was made to non-efficiency factors such as prices and 
endowments of fixed factor of production. In subsequent analysis, I estimated 
technical and cost efficiencies, total factor productivity indices, labour use efficiencies 
and competitive conditions in pre- and post reforms period.   
 
The financial and economic performance carried in this way reveals the following 
information/trends: 
 
 I started my evaluation of firms‟ behaviour by looking at the qualitative 
changes that were introduced immediately after the change of ownership from 
public to private sector. I linked these changes to prevailing economic and 
competitions conditions and conclude that deterioration in the economic 
activity for the last few years might have depressed the demand for cement. As 
a consequence firms have to either export in highly competitive market or 
operate at sub-optimal scale of operation. By looking at capacity utilization 
figures, I noticed a significant decline in capacity utilizations in post reforms 
period.   
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 The performance of firms in term of trends of margin on sales could be 
explained by four sub-periods. The margin improved immediately after 
privatization during 1992-95 followed by continuous decline during 1994-99. 
But soon after, the margin significantly increased during 2001 to 2005. The 
trend however reverted to decline since 2006 with little improvement in 
between. The results are robust irrespective of alternative ratios of profitability 
(like using return on equity or assets as well as gross profit margin). 
Significant improvement during immediate period of reforms is not surprising 
due to depressed margins under public ownerships and firms gaining power to 
set prices and outputs as per market demand and supply. Similarly better 
performance during 2001 to 2005 is also expected due to high economic 
growth and effective economic management by the professional managers.     
 
 Financial efficiency results in term of labour productivity, capacity utilization, 
average collection period and inventory turnover also show some interesting 
and significant patterns. Capacity utilization kept falling continuously and this 
has resulted in sub-optimal production levels for same years. Labour 
productivity measured as a simple ratio of output to number of workers 
improved in the immediate period of privatization. The average collection 
period showed a significant increase for private and privatized firms indicating 
a more lenient policy of credit sales in the post privatization regime. This 
result is expected because as the competition gets tense, the amount of credit 
sale would increase to keep the loyal customers happy.  
 
 The study revealed a significant change and upward trend in output (measured 
by real sales) and capital investment on fixed endowments. These results are 
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similar to Megginson et al. (1994). The increase in investment was partly due 
to aggressive policy of optimization and expansion by the new private 
management immediately after the transfer of ownership. This is encouraging 
and expected. Years of negligence and under investment under public 
ownership made these firms unable to meet the demands due to breakdown in 
technology. Further, lot of firms operating in 1980s using wet process of 
production were unable to compete with new private firms using smart and 
cost efficient dry process technology. Hence, these firms made a lot of 
investment in gradually moving to this new dry process technology. Further, 
as a result of rising energy prices, firms cost of production increased 
significantly since 2000. To cope with this, lot of firms converted furnace oil 
based energy generation units to coal fired one. All this needed a significant 
investment too.   
 
 Dividend record of the privatized firms, however, has not been promising. 
Both ratios of dividend to sales and income did not show any significant 
upward movement in post reforms period. A significant increase in dividend 
was followed by years of no dividend payouts. Privatized firms followed a 
general industry trend. This typical attitude is however similar to overall trend 
in terms of dividend payments of manufacturing sector. The research in this 
area showed that dividend payouts are cyclical in Pakistan. Hence, one could 
conclude that change of ownership has not changed this trend.     
 
 Adjusted social accounting based profitability measures showed some 
interesting trends in post reforms period. Despite the fact that new 
management expanded their scale of operation by investing heavily into 
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capacity additions, the study observed a significant improvement in the public 
profitability. Public profit and profitability followed the same pattern 
evaluated at nominal as well as real prices. These results are similar to Jones et 
al. (1994) who concluded the superior performance in private ownership 
period by using the same social cost benefit ratios. Non-parametric total factor 
productivity approach is similar to public profitability concept and is widely 
used in performance evaluation studies. This ratio at nominal and real prices 
also improved in private ownership period, however, the variations in the ratio 
were lees compared to public profitability. Overall, non-parametric method of 
productivity indicates that change of ownership has made the firms more 
productive. 
 
 The study focus then moved from non-parametric (financial and social ratios) 
based measures of performance evaluations to econometric estimation of 
frontier translog production and cost function estimation to estimate firm level 
technical as well as cost efficiency estimates. By following literature in this 
area, this study used main inputs and outputs to estimate the parameters of 
production technology. Estimation of parametric stochastic production/cost 
function is very popular and widely used by empirical researchers. But due to 
strong assumptions and a priori functional form, this method has been 
criticised recently. Researchers have started using more of alternative 
measures to estimate technical and cost efficiencies including non-parametric 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This method has seen lot of use and 
improvement in the last 10 years. This study also used this method to contrast 
efficiency results derived from parametric stochastic frontier. The results 
revealed that technical efficiency of the privatized firms did not improve 
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during 1993-2011. The firms however, became more cost efficient, which led 
to an overall increase in total factor productivity. DEA based efficiency 
estimates confirmed the stochastic frontier findings.  
 
 A decomposition of total factor productivity into scale and technical change 
effect reveals a significant productivity growth and that improvement in TFP 
is predominantly determined by technical change effect in post reforms period. 
Based on different specifications of production function, the study concludes 
that contrary to disappointing technical efficiency results, the industry 
witnessed a reasonable total factor productivity growth in post reforms period 
generally and during 1997 to 2011 particularly. Gains in productivity in post 
privatisation are similar to Estache et al. (2002), Cullinane and Song (2003), 
Amess and Roberts (2007) but contrary to Saal and Parker (2001). These 
results are also consistent to international experience. Megginson and Netter 
(2001) who reviewed the empirical literature on the issue concluded that 
available literature is generally supportive of the notion that firms improve 
their performance in post privatisation period. Investment in new technology 
appears to be having an effect on the production process in the post reforms 
period. As a result of significant capital investment, firms have experienced 
significant technological change during 1997 to 2011. Improvement in 
technology is similar to Saal et al. (2007) who estimated technological 
improvement. My technical change improvement is higher than Saal 2007) 
improvement of 2.19% for UK W&S companies. Further, firms appear to be 
using labour and capital more and saving fuel and material. Saving in fuel is 
similar to other studies using cement industry data (i.e. studies using Swedish 
cement industry data by Kumbhakar et al. (1992) and Kumbhakar (2002) for 
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US airlines). The substitution of fuel is also expected as the energy prices in 
the last 10 years had been continuously going up and firms had been 
substituting furnace oil technology with coal fired technology to generate 
energy. 
 
 One of the objectives of privatizing public enterprises was to make these firms 
viable by reducing their wage bills. It was believed that overstaffing in the 
public sector firms had made them less competitive compared to firms 
operating under private ownership. As a result of privatization, a significant 
number of workers were encouraged to leave the job by taking golden 
handshake. One of the aims of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
this policy in the post reforms and golden handshake period by estimating 
efficiency scores of labour use and compare it with pre- reforms period. 
Labour demand function was estimated to see the impact of reforms on labour 
use efficiency and the substitutability of capital and labour. Contrary to an 
expectation of improvement in labour use efficiency, labour efficiency levels 
had actually gone down in post reforms period. This is surprising but then 
expected because, majority of those workers who opted for golden handshake 
were rehired on contract basis later on. Further, due to depressed demand and 
low capacity utilization, firms were unable to use their workforce intelligently 
and efficiently in some years of post reforms period.  
 
 Since the change of ownership and reforms in early 1990s, lot of people have 
been protesting that cement industry producers are colluding and charging 
higher prices. Collusion by the cement producer is not a new thing as lot of 
other countries in developing, developed and former socialist countries .had 
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seen such behaviour. One of the Pakistani investigation authorities, FIA had 
twice raided cement producers offices in the last few years to find any 
documentary evidence of cartel formation without any success.  Competition 
Commission of Pakistan also carried out a study to find out any evidence of 
monopoly formation in the last few years. The findings of the study were not 
clear. This study also tested the level of competition in post reforms period by 
using the popular indices of competition. The study conclude that industry has 
moved from highly competitive with no market power to some level of market 
power and has become relatively less competitive. However, I am unable to 
say that firms are operating under complete monopoly position. 
 
11.3. Contributions and Limitations of the Study 
 
This study tried to comprehensively evaluate the consequences of selling cement 
manufacturing units. The reason that cement industry was chosen was due to the fact 
that cement is almost homogenous product and econometrically, estimation of 
production technology would require this strong assumption. Further, significance of 
this industry in contributions to national exchequer and export receipts is well 
documented and appreciated in the national press and media. Allegations of cartel 
forming and subsequent raids on the offices of association of producers were added 
motives to research this industry. As for as I am aware, no such study exists which has 
used such a long data set in carrying out detailed analysis of the policy. Hence, the 
contribution of this study into the literature of ownership effect on performance could 
be significant. Despite these factors, some limitations of the study must be highlighted 
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in this section. In the following discussion, I discuss the issues not addressed 
adequately in this study. 
     
Generalization of findings: The effect of reforms on the cement industry could reveal 
just one side of the story. Lot of other industries which were privatised at the same 
time like automobile, edible oil, ceramics etc. may have experienced different market 
conditions and environment to operate. Hence generalizing cement industry results to 
judge the effectiveness of reforms could be misleading for the entire manufacturing 
sector. Initially, I intended to use 4-5 industries data to compare and contrast the 
results across different industries. But the idea of other industries was dropped after 
going through extremely difficult time to collect and compile the data to do a 
comprehensive analysis,  
 
Data quality: second issue is related to data quality. Lot of effort was made to get the 
comparable and complete data on the balance sheet, profit and loss accounts and other 
operational indicators. I have to visit many places and use number of different sources 
of data and documents, including government ministries, stock exchange libraries, 
development finance institution offices, interaction with the industry experts and 
physical visits to producers associations to conduct interviews. An utmost effort was 
made to make this data as accurate and as comparable as possible across these 
different sources. In some cases, I have to impute some data points using missing 
values imputation method for variables such as like workers strength for few years. 
Due to all these reasons, quality of the data may have been little compromised. Hence, 
despite the fact that this is the first comprehensive study of the evaluation of the 
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Pakistani privatization programme, a great care should be exercised while interpreting 
and generalising this study results.      
 
Econometric issue: A significant time, resources and skills were used to choose 
appropriate econometric techniques to calculate cost and production function 
parameters and competition indices as well as labour use efficiencies. But due to well 
known issue related to translog specification (i.e. over fitting), a great care should be 
exercised in interpreting and generalising these findings. In some cases (for example 
competition indices), the choice of instruments is extremely important in estimating 
the demand and supply functions. Choice of substitute of cement, and demand booster 
was based on some available literature and feedback from industry expert. But these 
proxies could be subject to debate. Further, lot of experimentations was done to get 
stable coefficients and econometric tests were conducted to verify the relevance of 
instruments used in the estimation. But still, nonetheless, few issues may have not 
been addressed adequately. 
      
11.4. Areas of Future Research 
 
As mentioned above, given the time and resources, the study would have used other 
privatized industries data to compare and contrast the results to get some idea of how 
reforms have changed the behaviour of different firms operating in different industries 
and different market environments. Future research in this area should address this 
issue and more industries should be evaluated alongside cement industry to get a 
complete picture. Further, this study carried out some partial social cost benefit 
analysis of the privatization policy using cement industry as a case study. But future 
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study should carry out a comprehensive cost benefit analysis of the privatization and 
deregulation policy in term of consumer surplus, producer surplus, government 
benefits and competitors surpluses/losses. 
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